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ABST R A C T  
This research investigates the role of health practitioner regulation in health service 
improvement. Over the last 25 years, service improvement has included management 
reforms, quality and redesign programmes, multidisciplinary teamwork, the integration of 
clinical information systems, and new roles for health professionals. Yet despite sustained 
effort, improvements tend to be localised rather than organisation or system-wide. 
Remedies have included attention to leadership, change management and service culture. 
Through the same period, there have been changes to expand and strengthen health 
practitioner regulation, but scant attention to whether this regulation could contribute to 
difficulties with health service improvement. A critical realist methodology was used to 
build an explanation of how regulatory policies could condition health professionals and 
health service organisations in ways that limit the progress of service improvement. A 
multilevel approach was used to discover the mechanisms that could operate among 
policy-makers and the health workforce, generating effects in health service 
organisations. The study concluded that this explanation contributes new insights to 
explain persistent difficulties in health service improvement.  
The research began with the 19th century to understand the social conditions in the 
construction of the health workforce and health service organisations. Next, it identified 
the network of modern regulatory stakeholders in healthcare, along with the potential for 
their policies to operate in conflict or concert depending on the circumstances. 
Deficiencies were identified in the traditional accounts of health practitioner regulation, 
which assumes a single profession and sole practice.  ‘Regulatory  privilege’  was 
developed as an alternative theory that describes the operation of nine historically 
constructed regulatory levers among the multiple health professions employed in health 
service organisations. This theory linked the regulatory and practice levels, to observe the 
interactions between health practitioner regulation and policies for health service 
improvement. Drawing on the recent history of health reforms, eight elements were 
identified that characterise directions for service improvement in healthcare. Investigation 
of interactions between these nine levers and eight elements identified sources for policy 
interactions through six sector levels. Interactive effects were identified in: policy design 
influenced by health practitioner regulation; the leadership and management capability in 
health service organisations, the design options for delivery of services, the means 
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available to coordinate services, the role opportunities and practice arrangements for 
health professionals, and the experience of service fragmentation by consumers.  
This multilevel explanation shows how health practitioner regulation could contribute to 
difficulties with service improvement, even when health services have adopted best 
practice in their implementations. It shows how poor alignment between the regulatory 
and practice levels makes it unlikely that health service organisations could address 
certain difficulties in the ways suggested by some scholars. Given the sustained directions 
for health service improvement, these findings could contribute to policy thinking around 
how to better align the regulatory and practice levels to realise organisation or system-
wide improvements in the delivery of healthcare. 
© M Jane Allison, 2015 
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1 
 IN TR ODU C T I ON 
 
Over recent decades, policy-makers have sought to improve health service delivery, but 
have often met with disappointing results. This research looks at whether health 
practitioner regulation could contribute to difficulties in any significant or systemic way. 
In this chapter, the scene for investigation is set in New Zealand and other English-
speaking developed economies where there have been repeated attempts to improve 
health service delivery amid anxieties about service failures associated with health 
practitioner regulation. An overview of current knowledge reveals a thin literature base 
with a focus on single professions rather than the health workforce, and scant attention to 
health practitioner regulation as a factor in health service improvement. Other 
explanations for disappointing outcomes in health reform have been offered, but they 
leave  room  to  ask  my  main  research  question:  ‘could health practitioner regulation have 
systemic effects that contribute to difficulties with policies for health service 
improvement?’ 
Section 1.1 sets the scene for the research question and provides an overview of current 
knowledge. The following three sections review the international context for health 
reform in Section 1.2, the explanations for disappointing outcomes in health service 
improvement  in  Section  1.3,  and  an  overview  of  healthcare’s  regulated  workforce  in 
Section 1.4. Section 1.5 overviews the research strategy, the thesis outline and 
contribution to research. 
1.1  SC E N E SE T T IN G , R ESE AR C H Q UEST IO N  
AND C URR E N T K N O W L E D G E 
This section sets the scene for the research question with an outline of the last 25 years of 
health reforms and changes to health practitioner regulation. It sets out the underlying 
research questions and explains selected terminology associated with the topics of health 
practitioners, health services, regulation, and health service improvement. There is a 
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thin literature base around the research question and the section concludes with an 
overview of the interdisciplinary nature of this literature and the contributing topics. 
Heal th reforms and regulatory barriers 
Over the past 25 years, there have been many and successive changes to the regulation of 
health practitioners and the organisation of health services, each directed at improving the 
delivery of healthcare. New Zealand has sought service improvement through 
competition policies, reorganisation of health services, management reforms and policies 
to improve service quality (Cumming, 2011; Gauld, 2009). It has also amended health 
practitioner regulation to strengthen consumer protection and to encourage flexibility in 
the healthcare workforce (Ministry of Health, 2009; Paterson, 2002). This picture is not 
unique to New Zealand. Across English-speaking developed economies, there are 
common themes in health policy around how best to improve service quality and 
efficiency, strengthen consumer protection, and ensure that the health workforce can meet 
changing demands for health services (Allsop & Jones, 2005; Duckett, 2005a; OECD, 
2011). 
There have also been numerous advances in diagnostic and treatment technologies in 
healthcare. However, integrating innovative components of care at the consumer interface 
has proved difficult, and has been unfavourably compared to transformations in other 
industries. For example, while banks and retailers have used computer and internet 
technologies to offer convenient personalised services, repeated attempts to introduce 
portable integrated patient records has met with far less success (Hillestad et al., 2005). 
As another example of the difficulties with new clinical technologies, Christensen and 
colleagues point to the failure of a new X-ray  machine  designed  for  use  in  doctors’ 
offices. This portable low-intensity machine offered consumers the convenience of 
receiving an X-ray, diagnosis and treatment decisions at a single consultation, thus 
avoiding multiple appointments, delays, and additional costs arising from referrals 
between the doctor and a radiology service. Despite these advantages, when a United 
States (US) company attempted to introduce this machine, they were unable to sell it. 
Despite the machine costing just 10% of conventional imaging technology, the regulatory 
barriers to using it were overwhelming (Christensen, Bohmer, & Kenagy, 2000). 
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‘Regulatory  barriers’  can refer to an array of rules, and variously inter-related 
relationships governing regulated health professionals and other industry stakeholders. In 
the case of the new X-ray machine, the medical specialists and hospital emergency 
departments had vested interests in maintaining the existing business model. The new 
technology threatened this model because patients with simple injuries might turn to the 
nearest  doctor’s  office,  rather  than  an  emergency  department  for  care  (Christensen et al., 
2000). Some scholars think that if single innovations like the new X-ray machine are too 
disruptive for existing players, the way forward may involve more incremental 
improvements. Cost reduction and quality improvement might still come from a 
combination of many small innovations, such as new or generic drugs, self-administered 
tests, devices that are cheaper to manufacture, use of less expensive health practitioners 
for some work, and relocation of care from hospitals to community-based clinics or self-
care at home (Robinson & Smith, 2008). Indeed, despite the rhetoric about service 
transformation, most service improvement programmes tend to have incremental effects 
on service delivery (Locock, 2003).  
In general, health service improvement has proved challenging, and scholars have pointed 
to difficulties with the management of change and service culture. Consequently, there 
has been a focus on leadership and service culture as the means to progress health service 
improvement (Braithwaite, Iedema, & Jorm, 2007; Degeling & Carr, 2004; Ferlie, 1997). 
Regardless of whether change is considered to be disruptive or incremental, scholars have 
also  identified  an  ‘Augean  stable’  of  regulatory  obstacles  to  service  improvement  such  as 
methods of provider payments, the power of incumbent service providers, consumer 
advocacy around specific diseases, and legislation concerning patient injury (Herzlinger, 
2006; Robinson & Smith, 2008). Yet, there has been little attention paid to the role of 
health practitioner regulation, which appears to be closely entwined with these other 
sources of difficulties with service improvement. 
Health  practitioner  regulation  entails  rules  about  ‘who  may  perform  what  work’  among 
registered health professionals. These rules weave through the fabric of other 
arrangements governing healthcare providers such as payments for services, access to 
indemnity insurance, use of technologies or procedures, and the accreditation of health 
service organisations (Jost, 1995). In English-speaking developed economies it is 
generally held that health practitioners should be regulated to enforce clinical practice 
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standards that can protect consumers from harm, and that while this may serve the 
interests of the regulated health professions it also serves the public interest overall 
(Baggott, 2002; Healy, 2012). Yet health practitioner regulation could also be linked to 
higher costs for healthcare, inconsistent effects on the quality of care, problems with 
flexibility in the health workforce, and difficulties with the service innovations (Duckett, 
2005b; Greenhalgh, Robert, Macfarlane, Bate, & Kyriakidou, 2004; Kleiner, 2006; 
Safriet, 2002). 
There is a consensus that health practitioner regulation is essential to ensure that health 
practitioners are competent, so that consumers are protected from poor practice. Yet it 
seems plausible that health practitioner regulation could also contribute to service 
fragmentation that the US Institute of Medicine (IoM, 2001) has identified as the primary 
source of poor quality in healthcare. Inquiries into major service failures have identified 
problems with inter-professional collaboration as contributing to patient injury, such as at 
the  United  Kingdom’s  (UK’s)  Bristol  Royal  Infirmary  (Kennedy, 2001). While each 
professional may act competently and ethically, it is possible that in some cases the 
process of inter-professional referrals could compromise the overall quality and 
efficiency of care. Pauly (2008) alerts us to the possibility that a new vocabulary is 
needed to overcome a confusion around an analogous discourse, in which cheaper 
technology is assumed to be incompatible with an acceptable quality of clinical care. In 
the case of health practitioner regulation, it might prove useful to consider whether some 
of the activities or policies of registration authorities could compromise inter-professional 
collaboration and the quality of services. It is timely to delve deeper to find out exactly 
how health practitioner regulation protects consumers and how it could contribute to 
difficulties with service improvement.  
Research quest ion and terminology 
The main research question is: could health practitioner regulation have systemic effects 
that contribute to difficulties with policies for health service improvement? To answer 
this question, it is necessary to investigate the following underlying questions: 
First, what are the linkages between the health professions and health service delivery in 
the organisation of modern healthcare?  
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Second, what are the intended mechanisms of health practitioner regulation? How are the 
mechanisms of health practitioner regulation related to other arrangements for the 
governance and improvement of health services?  
Third, what other mechanisms could be associated with health practitioner regulation? 
How might these be transmitted from registration authorities and leveraged in the 
multidisciplinary healthcare workplace?  
Fourth, how are management reforms and quality improvement programmes intended to 
change service delivery? In the light of recent management reforms, what do we know of 
the organisational context and capability for the implementation of these improvement 
policies? 
Fifth, could mechanisms in health practitioner regulation contribute to explaining 
difficulties with the implementation of management reforms and quality improvement 
programmes?  
 ‘Health  practitioner’  is  a  broad  term  referring  to  ‘a  person  who  helps  in  identifying, 
preventing  or  treating  illness  or  disability’.  Alternative  names  for  members  of  the 
healthcare  workforce  include  ‘caregiver’,  ‘health  care  provider’,  ‘health  professional’  or 
‘primary  care  provider’  (The Free Dictionary, 2012b). In legislation, it is common to 
define  a  ‘health  professional’  or  ‘regulated  health  practitioner’  in  terms  of  their 
registration  status,  such  as  ‘a  person  who is, or is deemed to be, registered with an 
authority  as  a  practitioner  of  a  particular  profession’  (New  Zealand  Health  Practitioners 
Competency  Assurance  Act,  2003).  The  term  ‘allied  health  professional’  has  been  used 
variously to refer to all or just a few health professionals who are not medical 
practitioners. I use this term to refer to all non-medical and non-nursing professionals, 
such as pharmacists, laboratory scientists, radiographers, physiotherapists etc.   
Most people have some understanding of  ‘health  services’  through  visits  to  the  doctor  or 
hospital.  Terms  like  ‘doctor’,  ‘nurse’,  ‘emergency  department’  or  ‘pharmacy’  are  in 
common usage and often referred to without further definition in scholarship about health 
services. Another way of thinking about health services is to categorize them into 
‘primary’,  ‘secondary’  or  ‘tertiary’  levels  of  care,  terms  that  suggest  differences  in  service 
intensity or delivery locations. We expect primary care to be delivered in the local 
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community, and secondary or tertiary services to be delivered in hospitals by specialists. 
While these terms are convenient, they suggest degrees of difference between services 
that might not be present on closer analysis. For instance, renal dialysis for kidney failure 
involves specialist equipment and skills but these services can be performed either in 
hospitals as part of a secondary care service, or by patients at home supported by primary 
care practitioners (McFarlane, Bayoumi, Perratos, & Redelmeier, 2003). In many cases, 
health practitioners from the same health professions may perform similar services in 
either hospital or community care locations.  
Regulation  is  commonly  used  in  public  policy  to  refer  to  ‘the  rules  of  behaviour  that  may 
be used to reconcile the conflicting rights and interests of citizens (and are) supported by 
the  courts  and  enforcement  agencies’  (Carmichael & Pomerisano, 2002, p. 21). In this 
thesis  ‘regulation’  is  used  in  three  ways  to  refer  to  the  rules  of  behaviour  intended  to 
guide the practice of health professionals or to govern health services, the sources of 
authority for sets of rules, and the activities of the agencies that prescribe and enforce 
these rules.  
Different  types  of  regulation  draw  on  different  sources  of  regulatory  authority.  ‘Self-
regulation’  refers  to  control ‘of a process or activity by the people or organizations that 
are involved in it, rather  than  by  an  outside  organization  such  as  the  government’  (English 
Collins Dictionary, 2012). This involves codes of practice established by industry 
associations, or codes-of-conduct and complaints-handling procedures established by 
professional associations (Taskforce on Industry Self Regulation, 2000).  ‘Self-regulation’ 
is contrasted with ‘statutory  regulation’  in  which  rules  are  specified and enforced by the 
state.  When  ‘self-regulation’  is  backed  by  statute,  it  may  be  more  accurately  described  as 
co-regulation. ‘Co-regulation’  refers  to  a  shared source of regulatory authority between 
the people or organizations involved in an activity and the agencies of the state (Bartle & 
Vass, 2005),  in  which  the  industry  or  professional  association  ‘develops and administers a 
code of practice and the government provides the ability to enforce it through legislative 
backing (Taskforce on Industry Self Regulation, 2000). The majority of health 
professionals are partly self-regulating and partly regulated by the state, which is referred 
to  as  ‘statutorily  underpinned’  or  ‘statutorily  supported’  self-regulation (Bartle & Vass, 
2005). Over the past 20 years, the international trend has been for governments to 
intervene and adjust the balance of co-regulatory interests in health practitioner regulation 
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to  improve  public  transparency  and  strengthen  the  oversight  of  health  practitioners’ 
competency (McDonald, 2012).   
‘Regulation’ has also been  described  as  ‘sustained  and  focused  control  exercised  by  a 
public  agency  over  activities  that  are  valued  by  the  community’  (Selznick, 1985, p. 363). 
This definition directs  attention  to  the  ‘regulators’  or  ‘regulatory  agencies’  that  exercise 
the authority to prescribe and enforce the rules of behaviour, operating at arms-length 
from the people whose activities are regulated (Chinitz, 2002; Hood & Scott, 2000). In 
health practitioner regulation, registration authorities operate at arms length to the health 
practitioners and their places of work. In this thesis, ‘registration authority’ refers to a 
government-supported agency that oversees the standards of clinical practice for the 
health professionals under its jurisdiction. These authorities are commonly described as 
‘boards’  in  the  United States,  ‘councils’  in  the  United Kingdom,  and  ‘colleges’  in 
Canada. Each of these terms appears in the discourse in Australia and New Zealand. 
Registration authorities are responsible for accreditation of training institutions, approval 
of curricula for training, registration of health practitioners, and investigation of 
complaints about practice. They have some of the features of courts, being responsible for 
the conduct of investigations, adjudication at disciplinary hearings, and the sanctioning of 
health practitioners (Jost, Mulcahy, Strasser, & Sachs, 1993; Paterson, 2002; Stacey, 
1995).  These registration authorities do not operate in isolation because they participate 
in a network of regulatory stakeholders engaged in the oversight of various aspects of 
health service delivery, which means to understand the operation of health practitioner 
regulation, it is important to include relationships between these stakeholders 
(Braithwaite, Healy, & Dwan, 2005; Jost, 1995). 
‘Linkages’  is  used  in  two  senses.  First,  is  the  notion  of  linkage  as  ‘a  system  of 
interconnected  machine  elements  used  to  transmit  power  or  motion’  (The Free 
Dictionary, 2012a). In this case, linkages consist of relationships between regulatory 
agencies  and  other  stakeholders  in  healthcare.  ‘Power’  refers  to  ‘political,  social  or 
economic  control’  (The Free Dictionary, 2012c), which could be associated with the 
health professions or other regulatory stakeholders and may be underpinned by statutory 
support.  Second,  is  the  sense  of  ‘linkage’  as  ‘a  negotiating policy of making agreement on 
one issue dependent on progress toward another objective’  (The Free Dictionary, 2012a). 
This is relevant because the rules of behaviour for professional practice are thought to 
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reconcile or balance the potentially conflicting interests of policy-makers, health 
professionals, and consumers.  
The  term  ‘interactions’  is  used  to  draw  attention  to  the  potential  for  bi-directional 
transmission of ideas, influence, and power associated with rule making and enforcement, 
between healthcare stakeholders at both the governance and service delivery levels. While 
the main focus of the thesis is on how the design of health practitioner regulation can 
affect health service delivery, it does not preclude multiple pathways and directions for 
the flow of influence. 
‘Health  service  improvement’  refers  to  policies  intended to improve the delivery of health 
services to increase efficiency, improve quality, ensure safety, or make services more 
accessible for consumers. While the particular policy mix and governance arrangements 
vary, these goals and the associated interventions are common across English-speaking 
OECD economies (Docteur & Oxley, 2003). This involves large-scale change in health 
service  organisations,  as  indicated  by  the  US  Institute  of  Medicine  (IoM)’s  2001  report 
‘Crossing  the quality  chasm:  Shaping  the  future  for  health’: 
In its current form, habits, and environment, American health care is incapable of 
providing the public with the quality health care it expects and deserves (as cited 
in Berwick, 2002, p. 83). 
Crossing the Quality Chasm (2001) identifies service fragmentation as the primary source 
of quality problems in service delivery. The range of changes it recommends includes: 
organisation-based standards for best practice rather than historically protected models of 
care; better use of electronic patient records; investment in human resources; more 
effective teamwork between health practitioners; better coordination of care through 
redesign of service delivery; and more sophisticated measurement of performance 
(Berwick, 2002). 
My  definition  is  similar  to,  but  broader  than  the  ‘systems  approach’  of  considering  human 
error and organisational factors in adverse events (Reason, 2004). The incidence of 
seminal and adverse events is commonly monitored to alert health service organisations 
to system weaknesses, such as: surgery performed on the wrong side of the patient or the 
wrong patient; the wrong medications, wrong dose or wrong combination of medication 
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given  to  patients;  or  care  processes  that  contribute  to  patients’  becoming  injured  through 
falling (Health Quality and Safety Commission New Zealand, 2014).  While  ‘service 
fragmentation’  could  contribute  to  an  adverse  event,  I  am  mostly  interested  in  the  general 
effects of fragmentation on the cost and quality of service delivery. 
Much of the service improvement recommended by the IoM depends on more effective 
collaboration among health professionals. In relation to service improvement, I use the 
terms  ‘inter-professional’  or  ‘multidisciplinary’  to  refer  to  situations  where  health 
practitioners from different health professions are expected to work closely together to 
care  for  particular  groups  of  patients.  ‘Multidisciplinary  teams’  are  those  constructed  to 
replace or improve services that are otherwise coordinated among specialist departments 
such as in mental health services, and not those traditional teams convened for session 
work, such as in operating theatres (Brown, Crawford, & Darongkamas, 2000; Manser, 
2009).  I  include  ‘near  patient  technologies’  as  an  aspect  of  service  improvement,  which 
refers to small portable machines or single use disposable kits that can enable services to 
be delivered to patients at one single, rather than several separate appointments (Crook, 
2000; Yager et al., 2006). 
 ‘Organisational  capability’  refers  to the: 
 ‘ability  and  capacity  of  an  organization  expressed  in  terms  of  its  (1)  Human 
resources: their number, quality, skills, and experience, (2) Physical and material 
resources: machines, land, buildings, (3) Financial resources: money and credit, 
(4) Information resources: pool of knowledge, databases, and (5) Intellectual 
resources:  copyrights,  designs,  patents,  etc.’ (Business Dictionary.com, 2014). 
In health service organisations this might include capability in: leadership, financial 
management, service design, human resource management, organisational policies and 
procedures, information communication systems, inter-professional collaboration, and 
teamwork. 
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Overview of current knowledge 
There is a thin literature base around the main research question. This section introduces 
the interdisciplinary nature of the topics contributing to this literature. The literature of 
health policy can be divided into two overlapping groups,  ‘health  reforms’  and  ‘health 
services  research’.  Topics  within  ‘health  reforms’  are mostly concerned with health sector 
governance and with questions about: the merits of different approaches to funding 
healthcare; how best to prioritise expenditure on diseases, populations or particular 
services; the application of competition or regulatory policies to health services; and the 
design of institutional arrangements for governance. An overlap with ‘health services 
research’ occurs in the effects of policies on health service organisations and patient 
outcomes. ‘Health  services  research’  extends  analysis  into  health  service  organisations 
and the work of health practitioners with topics including: the performance of health 
service organisations; factors influencing the cost, quality or safety of service delivery; 
the design and leadership of health service organisations; and a growing body of research 
on inter-professional collaboration in clinical practice settings. Health policy is an 
interdisciplinary literature with contributions from public policy, public administration, 
law, politics, sociology, and economics. 
The  small  body  of  scholarship  around  the  ‘regulation  of  the  health  professions’  includes 
historical accounts of the evolution of medical regulation (Berlant, 1975) and 
contemporary reviews of legislative change (Allsop & Jones, 2005; McDonald, 2012). In 
New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, there is grey literature associated with 
changes including, government discussion papers and responses from the professional 
organisations of the health professions, along with commentaries from health professions 
in their professional journals. Overall, there has been a tendency for separate treatment of 
health practitioner regulation and the governance of health service organisations, and for 
the focus of scholarship to be on international comparisons around specific topics. 
Apposite illustrations include a comparative study of US and UK healthcare regulation 
that excluded the regulation of health practitioners (Walshe, 2003), and edited books that 
canvass a range of international topics in the regulation of selected health professions 
(Allsop & Saks, 2002; Freckelton, 2006; Johnson, Larkin, & Saks, 1995; Jost, 1997b). 
There are a few notable exceptions. In the context of US health reform, Jost (1995) 
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evaluates the merits of the market, management or regulatory interventions to improve 
healthcare quality. More recently, Australian scholars have included the regulation of 
health practitioners as part of a network of regulatory stakeholders and strategies for the 
governance of health services (Braithwaite et al., 2005). 
Within health services research there has been scholarship around the progress of 
management reforms, for instance the implications for health practitioners (Harrison & 
Pollitt, 1994) and the progress of quality improvement programmes as a means to 
improve services (Bate, Mendel, & Glenn, 2008; Ferlie, 1997). However, to date, there 
has been a dearth of attention to health practitioner regulation in relation to difficulties 
with the implementation of management reforms or service improvement. Notable 
exceptions are a Canadian government commissioned report that points to health 
practitioner regulation and profession-specific industrial agreements as a source of 
difficulties in multidisciplinary teamwork (Oandasan et al., 2006), and research evidence 
that regulated scopes-of-practice contribute to difficulties in primary healthcare teams 
(Brown et al., 2011). More commonly, difficulties in the implementation of health 
reforms are related to questions about leadership, change management, diffusion of 
innovation, and professional or organisational cultures (Bate, 2004; Braithwaite et al., 
2007; Degeling & Carr, 2004; Ferlie, Fitzgerald, Wood, & Hawkins, 2005; Ham, 
Kipping, & McLeod, 2003). Although health practitioner regulation is not the focus of 
these studies, tensions between different health professions might be indicative of its 
presence as a contributing factor. 
Historical accounts of the health professions and their regulation tend to focus on a single 
health profession, such as medicine (Berlant, 1975) or nursing (Dingwall, Rafferty, & 
Webster, 1988). Some contemporary scholarship is more inclusive, particularly edited 
volumes that discuss developments for several different health professions (Davies, 2003; 
Davies, Finlay, & Bullman, 2000).  An  unusual  contribution  was  Begun  and  Lippincott’s 
(1993) strategic analysis of how the regulated health professions could use their 
professional networks to gain competitive advantage in healthcare. More generally the 
focus of scholarship appears to be shifting from analysis of the relationship between 
‘medicine  and  the  state’  (Moran & Wood, 1993; Saks, 1995) to edited volumes organised 
around the themes of  ‘regulating  the  health  professions’  (Allsop & Saks, 2002), 
‘regulating  health  practitioners’  (Freckelton, 2006) ‘professional  governance’  (Kuhlmann 
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& Saks, 2008), and most  recently  ‘healthcare  workforce  governance’  (Short & 
McDonald, 2012). Yet, so far these treatments fall short of examining how health 
practitioner regulation operates among a workforce comprised of many separately 
regulated health professions. 
Figure 1 below, illustrates the relationships between the topics health practitioner 
regulation, health services governance, and health service improvement discussed above. 
The topic groups are depicted as interactive cogs. At the governance-level are health 
practitioner regulation depicted as the red cog and health services governance depicted as 
the blue cog, which are both directed to oversight of health service quality improvement 
depicted as the orange cog. The black arrow locates the research question and the 
potential for important interactions in the gap between these three topic groups. 
Figure  1: Topic groups around the  research question 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The next three sections proceed through three focused reviews to establish what is known 
of the: international context for health reform and changes to health practitioner 
regulation; some scholarly explanations for difficulties with health service improvement; 
and an overview of discourse around the health professions, health practitioner regulation 
and contemporary concerns about the sustainability of the health workforce. 
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1.2 IN T E RN A T IO N A L C O N T E X T F O R H E A L T H R E F O R M  
There are similar patterns of reform to health practitioner regulation and health service 
delivery organisations across English-speaking developed economies. Reforms often 
originate in the United States, are adapted for government-led health systems in the 
United Kingdom, and subsequently influence changes in countries such as New Zealand 
and Australia. This section provides an overview of these patterns with a focus on New 
Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, and with attention to the United States as a 
key source of policy ideas. 
Reforms to heal th pract i t ioner regulat ion 
Traditionally each health profession lobbied government to secure statutory support for 
its own self-regulation. For instance in New Zealand prior to 2004, there were 11 separate 
Acts governing 14 health professions, such as the Physiotherapists Act 1949, Medical 
Auxiliaries Act 1966, Pharmacy Act 1970, Nurses Act 1977, Dental Act 1988, Medical 
Practitioners Act 1995 etc. (Statistics New Zealand, 2000). Since the early 1990s, there 
has been a trend for governments in New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, the 
United States and elsewhere to initiate changes to health practitioner regulation in 
response to highly publicised failures of healthcare delivery (Walshe & Shortell, 2004). 
The direction of change has been for greater public accountability and transparency 
concerning the operations of registration authorities, and more standardisation of 
legislation across different health professions. An authoritative source for this reform 
agenda is the US Pew Health Commission (1998; 1995), which recommended: simplified 
and standardised legislation; lay membership of, and greater public accountability for 
registration authorities; consistency around the entry-to-practice criteria and conduct of 
disciplinary proceedings for health practitioners; continuous oversight of health 
practitioner competency by registration authorities; and reciprocal recognition of 
registration status across jurisdictions to facilitate the migration of health practitioners. 
While this agenda is common to English-speaking developed economies, there are some 
variations in the paths to implementation. In New Zealand, changes began following 
public controversy surrounding the treatment for cervical cancer at the New Zealand 
National  Women’s  Hospital  (Paterson, 2002). In 1994, an independent consumer 
watchdog, the Health and Disability Commissioner (HDC), was established to 
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independently investigate complaints about health practitioners, refer consumer 
complaints to professional conduct committees, or to prosecute health professionals if 
warranted (Paterson, 2002). By 2004, there was one legislative framework applied to all 
the regulated health professions in New Zealand, which included: standardised 
legislation, ministerial appointments to registration authorities, inclusion of lay members, 
an independent court to oversee health practitioner disciplinary hearings, and a 
requirement for registration authorities to manage the ongoing competency of health 
practitioners. For health practitioners, it became mandatory to report concerns about the 
competency of colleagues, and to participate in workplace quality assurance programmes 
(MoH 2009; Paterson, 2002). 
In Australia, there was a similar process of change at state level, with health complaints 
watchdogs first established in Victoria in 1988 and New South Wales in 1993 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman, n.d.). Impetus for change, from a state-based to a national 
system of registration for health practitioners, emerged following a 2003 review by the 
Victorian State government, a 2005 report by the Australian Productivity Commission, 
and a scandal around patient deaths in Queensland in 2005 (Pacey, Harley, Veitch, & 
Short, 2012). From 2011, a national scheme was implemented, including: standardised 
legislation, transparency of information to the public; accountability of registration 
authorities to the federal government; ministerial appointment of registration authority 
board members; a national office that hosts 14 registration authorities and manages 
performance contracts for these authorities; and ongoing management of health 
practitioner competency (Carlton, 2006; Pacey et al., 2012). 
In the United Kingdom, lay members on the General Medical Council (GMC) date from 
the 1950s, and an independent health complaints investigator was introduced in 1993 
(Commonwealth Ombudsman, n.d.; Stacey, 1995). From 2000, following the Bristol 
Royal Infirmary deaths and the murder of patients by Dr Shipman, a new agency the 
Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE) was introduced. CHRE was 
responsible for monitoring the performance of nine registration authorities that govern 32 
health professions1. Other changes included: mandatory reporting of concerns about the 
competency of colleagues by health practitioners; and ongoing oversight of health 
practitioner competency by registration authorities (CHRE 2012; Kennedy, 2001). 
                                                 
1 CHRE is now the Professional Standards Authority (The Authority, 2012) 
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In the United States, there is a longer tradition of lay membership on registration 
authorities. Licensing of health professionals is governed by each state and can be closely 
linked to the governance of state universities. In New York for example, the Office of the 
Professions is housed within the University of the State of New York, and is responsible 
for hosting registration authorities for 48 professions, provision of policy advice to the 
state government, and has been introducing changes consistent with the Pew Health 
Commission’s  agenda  (Jost, 1997a; Office of Professions, 2000, 2012) 2.  
While the focus of reform internationally has been mostly directed to strengthening 
consumer protection, there have also been some changes intended to enable flexibility in 
the healthcare workforce. In the United States the concept of scopes-of-practice has 
emerged in the course of boundary disputes between health professions, as nurse 
practitioners and physician assistants began to perform work previously restricted to 
medical practitioners (Bertness, 2009; Safriet, 2002). In 1991, the first comprehensive 
regulatory scheme that provides for overlaps in scopes-of-practice among the health 
workforce was introduced in Ontario, Canada. Similar regimes have been introduced in 
other Canadian states, the Netherlands in 1997 and New Zealand in 2004 (de Bie, 
Cuperas-Bosma, Gevers, & van der Wal, 2004; MoH 2009).  
Through the 2000s, extension of regulatory regimes to include more health professions 
was common (Carlton & Bensoussan, 2002; Cooper & Stoflet, 1996; MoH 2011; NHS 
Executive, 2000). In the 2010s, there is some evidence of a change in direction with 
consideration of lighter alternatives to statutorily supported self-regulation, such as 
employer codes of practice, and the introduction of voluntary registers in the United 
Kingdom (Birch & Martin, 2009; CHRE 2011; The Law Commissions, 2012), 
developments that are discussed further in chapter four.  
Reorganising heal th systems 
The story of reforms to health service organisations follows a similar pattern of 
internationally adapted policy ideas. The use of competition policies in the United States 
to contain hospital cost growth influenced UK policy-makers to organise healthcare into 
purchaser and provider organisations (Enthoven, 1985; Le Grand, 1999). Instituting quasi 
markets for health services was emulated to varying degrees in New Zealand and by 
                                                 
2 See Appendix 1: Selected health profession regulators 
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Australian state governments (Bloom, 2000). Common strategies to improve 
accountability, resource allocation and efficiency in health service organisations, 
included: the introduction of private-sector style management structures and techniques; 
reorganisation to separate purchasing from service provision and to encourage 
competition; and, transfer of services from hospitals to community-care settings (Scott, 
2001).  
From the 1980s, New Zealand hospitals were grouped into larger organisations, funding 
linked to geographical populations, and general management structures introduced. In 
1990, these changes were still being bedded in when the health sector was reorganised to 
create purchasing organisations separate from service providers, and patients were 
transferred from long-term mental health or aged-care institutions into community-based 
care (Cumming & Mays, 2002; Gauld, 2001; Hobbs, Newton, Tennant, Rosen, & Tribe, 
2002). After 2000, the policy emphasis shifted to collaboration between service 
providers, quality improvement, the strengthening of primary care, and efforts to realise 
more integration of delivery among service providers (Cumming, 2011; Cumming & 
Mays, 2002; Gauld, 2009). 
This pattern of change in New Zealand has tended to reflect the direction of change 
elsewhere. In the 1980s, UK regional and district health authorities were reorganised, 
funding based on performance contracts, and general management structures introduced. 
In the 1990s, an internal market was established with greater independence for some 
service  providers,  and  a  charter  of  patients’  rights.  By  2000,  the  policy  emphasis  shifted 
to  cooperation  and  quality  improvement,  the  development  of  primary  care,  the  patient’s 
right to choose their provider, and improving the integration of service delivery to 
consumers (Cumming & Mays, 2002; Curry & Ham, 2010; Harrison, 1997; Oliver, 
2005). From 2013, in the wake of the global financial crisis and a change of government, 
the English National Health Service (NHS) has been reorganised with renewed emphasis 
on cost containment, and decentralised, general practitioner-led purchasing of health 
services, echoing aspects of policies from the 1990s (Imison et al., 2013; Roland & 
Rosen, 2011).    
Similarly, Australian state governments have repeatedly reorganised hospital services 
around geographical boundaries or networks of providers, and used some contestable 
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funding and contracts to improve service delivery (Bloom, 2000; Dwyer, 2004). Health 
sector reorganisations often occur following a change to government, such as those in the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand (Cumming & Mays, 2010); yet despite this 
association with changes to political leadership, reorganisations have tended to reflect 
international developments with similar patterns evident in the United Kingdom, 
Australian states and Canadian provinces. While there are variations in the detail of 
implementation, there have been similar policy agendas and interventions to improve the 
delivery of health services (Contandriopoulos, Denis, & Langley, 2001; Cumming & 
Mays, 2002; Oliver, 2005). 
The United States stands apart in having the highest proportion of GDP spent on 
healthcare and the greatest reliance on private insurance schemes to fund services. 
Despite this, it has been an important reservoir for policy ideas about how to improve 
health service delivery. For instance, UK competition policies were influenced by 
changes in the United States; following the rapid expansion of health technologies and 
expenditure from the 1970s, state governments and purchasers introduced competition 
policies to contain costs (Enthoven, 1985; Weisbrod, 1991).  
Heal th service improvement 
Interventions to improve the quality or organisation of care inside health service 
organisations have also been US-led. Regulation of health service organisations evolved 
organically through the development of voluntary accreditation systems associated with 
health profession organisations and hospital associations (Scrivens, 1995). Over time, 
accreditation has become a mandatory pre-requisite for a health service to qualify for 
service contracts or to operate as a training institution. The US Joint Commission is a 
non-governmental organisation (NGO) that provides accreditation services, investigates 
complaints about US healthcare, and provides consultancy services internationally (The 
Joint Commission, 2012; Walshe, 2003). From the 1970s multidisciplinary teamwork 
evolved as part of the redesign of mental health and aged care; as patients were 
transferred from hospital to community accommodation and health practitioners moved 
from specialist hospital departments to teams comprised of practitioners from different 
health professions (Bishop, 1999; Mechanic, 1998). From the late 1980s, business process 
re-engineering (BPR) was used to contain costs in US hospitals (Brider, 1992), and 
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subsequently management consultancy companies and NGOs such as the US Institute for 
Health Improvement (IHI) have promoted total quality management (TQM) and various 
brands for quality improvement in healthcare (Blumenthal & Kilo, 1998). Hospital use of 
information communication technologies (ICT) first developed in the United States for 
patient billing followed by systems for clinical departments, and today integration of 
clinical systems is important for service improvement (Hillestad et al., 2005). 
The use of service accreditation and quality improvement programmes is widespread. 
Accreditation has spread across 70 countries since the 1970s, and it appears to be 
evolving from its clinical roots to incorporate some management ideas (Greenfield & 
Braithwaite, 2008, 2009).  The  UK’s  NHS  Plan  (2000) introduced government agencies to 
oversee quality improvement in health service organisations, a move emulated with the 
Australian Commission for Quality and Safety in Health Care established in 2006, and 
the New Zealand Health Quality and Safety Commission established in 2010 (ACSQHC 
2012; HQSC 2012a). The IHI has promoted quality improvement programmes to improve 
service designs and the quality of care in the United States worldwide including Sweden 
(Ovretveit & Staines, 2007), the United Kingdom (Smith, 2001), Australia (Ben-Tovim et 
al., 2007) and New Zealand (Health Quality and Safety Commission New Zealand, 
2012b). Similarly the UK  government’s  Institute  for  Innovation  and  Improvement  has 
promoted  Toyota’s  Lean  Thinking  or  Lean-six Sigma in Australia and New Zealand 
(Ben-Tovim, Dougherty, O'Connell, & McGrath, 2008; Counties Manukau Health, 2011). 
Effective teamwork has become important internationally as part of strategies for service 
improvement, for instance to avoid mistakes in surgical procedures in the United States, 
the United Kingdom and elsewhere (Edmondson, Bohmer, & Pisano, 2003; 2001), and to 
facilitate more integrated delivery of primary care (Imison, Naylor, & Maybin, 2008). 
Greater use of ICT and integrated patient records is a staple of service improvement in the 
Australia (National Electronic Records Taskforce, 2000), the United Kingdom (Wanless 
& Health Care Review Team, 2002), New Zealand (Ministerial Review Group, 2009) and 
various reviews in many European countries (Aarts & Koppel, 2009).  
Cost containment in health service delivery remains a pressing concern for governments, 
particularly as healthcare expenditure commands an increasing proportion of GDP 
(Reinhardt, Hussey, & Anderson, 2004). Re-engineering and quality improvement 
programmes were first directed to cost containment, and subsequently continued with the 
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rhetoric changed to improvement of quality and reduction of waste. Regardless of the 
rhetoric, they each contain elements of service redesign. At the same time, the separate 
project of changes to health practitioner regulation is also ongoing.  
1.3 E XP L AN A T IO NS F O R D ISAPP O IN T IN G O UT C O M ES 
Despite repeated efforts to improve health service delivery from reorganisations, 
management reforms, and quality improvement programmes, in many cases the outcomes 
have fallen short of expectations (Degeling et al., 2006; Oliver, 2005). This section 
considers some scholarly accounts of the difficulties, beginning with the use of contracts 
to improve service delivery, then at efforts to reorganise service delivery and finally at the 
issues of leadership and culture that have been associated with the quality improvement 
programmes and ICT implementations. In each case, there are some reasons to look more 
closely at health practitioner regulation to better understand the difficulties in health 
service improvement. 
Contracts and incent ives 
Since the 1980s service contracts with varying degrees of competition between service 
providers have been used to shift the focus of providers to goals favoured by governments 
or purchasers. Such goals may be directed to: redistribution of healthcare resources, 
targeting of particular diseases, reduction of variations in clinical practice, improvement 
of access to services, or shifting hospital-based services into the community (Light, 2000; 
Scott, 2001). A comparison between the English and Scottish health services 
demonstrated the effectiveness of contracts to improve selected aspects of performance. 
From  2000,  the  English  NHS  successfully  used  contract  targets  to  reduce  patients’ 
waiting times for services using contracts, while these improvements were not realised in 
Scotland where competitive contracting had been dismantled in favour of policies for 
collaboration among service providers (Propper, Sutton, Whitnail, & Windmeijer, 2010).  
Contracts could be less effective for encouraging innovation when many service inputs 
are controlled by dominant service providers and regulatory agencies (Christensen et al., 
2000; Herzlinger, 2006). In the US, retail health clinics emerged precisely because they 
avoided competition with dominant providers and initially sought reimbursement directly 
from consumers (Laws & Scott, 2008). Healthcare is a labour intensive industry, and 
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health  reforms  have  sometimes  been  characterised  in  terms  of  ‘controlling  health 
professionals’  (Harrison & Pollitt, 1994) whose interests can be different to those of 
purchasers (Le Grand, 2003). The majority of the health workforce is subject to health 
practitioner regulation, for instance around 80% of the New Zealand health workforce 
(Health Workforce Advisory Committee, 2002). Resistance among networks of 
influential health professionals has been identified as a limiting factor in the diffusion of 
innovations (Greenhalgh et al., 2010), and could be particularly problematic where one 
health profession is expected to relinquish control over work to a different health 
profession (Ferlie et al., 2005). Understanding the role of health practitioner regulation, if 
any, in these difficulties could contribute to the future design of service contracts. 
E fficiency and heal th workforce flexibi l i ty 
Through the 1990s, US hospitals responded to competition policies with mergers and 
acquisitions, to reduce competition, afford new technologies, and retain ownership of 
services as they were transferred into community settings (Vogt & Town, 2006). 
Elsewhere, governments have used similar consolidation to gain efficiencies through 
centralisation of some hospital services and transfer of other services into the community, 
in the UK (Oliver, 2005), Australia (Dwyer, 2004), and New Zealand (Cumming & 
Mays, 2002). Yet, larger hospitals are not necessarily more efficient, and nor are high 
volumes necessary for most specialist services (Halm, Lee, & Chassin, 2002). There has 
been a persistence of optimal economies of scale operating around 200-300 beds, with 
diseconomies apparent in both smaller and larger hospitals (Vassilis, Jones, & Sheldon, 
1997). It is plausible that the economy of scale achieved by medium sized hospitals is 
related to the organisation of work in healthcare. If so, a better understanding of the 
organisation of healthcare work could contribute to optimal economies of scale in both 
community and hospital-based services.  
An alternative response to US competition policies was for smaller hospitals to gain 
efficiency  by  cross  training  health  professionals.  The  ‘multi-skilling  movement’  was  a 
natural extension of traditional on-the-job training, where employers could respond to 
changes in demand for services or the availability of health practitioners by training 
existing personnel to perform some work outside of their usual scope-of-practice 
(Blayney, Wilson, Bamberg, & Vaughan, 1989). A 1991 survey found that 25% of US 
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hospitals still employed multi-skilled practitioners with 63% of these practitioners located 
in small hospitals and physician clinics. The most common reasons to cross-train 
practitioners in both the United States and United Kingdom were to address labour 
shortages, improve flexibility of work practice and job satisfaction, and to achieve 
efficiencies in the face of competitive pressure (Bamberg & Blayney, 1993; Hurst, 1997). 
For large hospitals, mergers and acquisitions were an effective means to reduce price 
competition (Propper, 1993). In the United Kingdom, cross-training of health 
professionals was seen as a means to align services to patient needs and enable more 
clinically  integrated  or  ‘one  stop  shop’  services  in  the  community  (Hurst, 1997). 
However, multi-skilling appears to have been overtaken by social trends favouring 
tertiary education over employer-based training, degree and post-graduate qualifications 
for health professionals, and expansion of state sponsored schemes for health practitioner 
regulation (Collier, 2008). Subsequently, there has been little attention to the implications 
of these trends for the organisation of healthcare work or the opportunities to improve 
health service delivery. 
Leadership and cul ture 
Results from over two decades of management reforms and quality improvement 
programmes tend to be disappointing (Degeling & Carr, 2004; Ham, 2003). Studies in 
Europe that attempt to assess outcomes from re-engineering and quality improvement 
programmes suggest it makes little difference, and that gains may not be sustainable 
(Bowns & McNulty, 1999; Ovretveit & Staines, 2007). In the United States, researchers 
have found that re-engineering and quality improvement programmes could be associated 
with worse performance on both financial and clinical measures (Walston, Burns, & 
Kimberly, 2000; Walston, Urden, & Sullivan, 2001; Weiner, Alexander, Baker, Shortell, 
& Becker, 2006; Weiner et al., 2005). More generally, the research on Total Quality 
Management and NHS Lean Thinking points to a pattern of implementation that produces 
localised rather organisation-wide improvement (De Souza, 2009; Joss, 1994; Nwabueze 
& Kanji, 1997; Radnor, Holweg, & Waring, 2012; Young & McClean, 2008). Early 
criticisms focused on the quality of implementations, but while well-managed 
implementations do perform better, this is a necessary rather than a sufficient explanation 
for difficulties (Powell, Rushmer, & Davies, 2009; Walston et al., 2000).  
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Other explanations have focused on the quality of leadership, engagement of clinical 
leaders, and the culture of health service organisations (Bate, 2004; Braithwaite et al., 
2004; Ham et al., 2003; Ovretveit & Staines, 2007). There is some evidence for a link 
between organisation culture and performance. Researchers have observed differences in 
the work environment of hospitals that have embraced changes compared to those that 
have not (Braithwaite et al., 2004; Callen, Braithwaite, & Westbrook, 2007), and senior 
management teams who value and focus on external performance targets have led higher 
performing hospitals (Davies, Mannion, Jacobs, Powell, & Marshall, 2007; Mannion, 
Davies, & Marshall, 2005). However, so far there is scant evidence that strategies 
directed to improving culture within health service organisations are effective (Parmelli et 
al., 2011). One difficulty arises from the relationship between the concepts of 
organisation culture and performance, which could be different lenses for understanding 
the same underlying phenomena (Scott, Mannion, Marshall, & Davies, 2003). If so, there 
could be other mechanisms that influence both culture and performance in health service 
delivery. 
Cultures of individualism, tribalism and conservatism among the health professions have 
been identified as an obstacle to the information sharing or collaboration important for 
service improvement (Bate, 2000; Braithwaite et al., 2007; Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; 
Walshe & Shortell, 2004). Research in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand 
indicates that health professionals are likely to respond differently to service 
improvement initiatives, depending on the implications for their respective health 
profession, and that institutional factors limit the authority that health service leaders, 
whether general managers or senior clinicians, can exercise to implement health service 
improvement (Degeling & Carr, 2004; Degeling, Maxwell, Kennedy, & Coyle, 2003). In 
discussing the localised success with continuous quality improvement (CQI) in US 
hospitals, Shortell, Bennett, and Byck (1998) observed that health practitioner regulation 
could be philosophically incompatible with CQI because it controls the means rather than 
the ends of the care process. While quality improvement programmes call for 
improvement of all inputs contributing to care outcomes, the policies of registration 
authorities could restrict the inputs that may be changed to improve services.  
Over this 25-year period of contracts, regulatory oversight of service quality, the 
implementation  of  successive  ‘brands’  of  quality  improvement  and  industry  learning,  it 
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seems implausible that most disappointing outcomes could be adequately accounted for 
by deficiencies in management and implementation. According to Degeling and Carr 
(2004) difficulties cannot be overcome through transformational leadership or training in 
quality improvement for health professionals, and they recommend attention to the 
regulatory ideals of health professionals.  
1.4 H E A L T HCARE’S REGULATED WORKFORCE 
This section overviews the scholarship on the health professions, health practitioner 
regulation,  and  the  health  workforce.  It  looks  at  ‘social  closure’  and  ‘regulatory  capture’ 
as explanations for professional power, and concludes with an outline of contemporary 
concerns about the sustainability of the health workforce. 
Heal th professions 
The  professions  have  become  a  ‘natural’  part  of  the  modern  state,  evolving  with  the  state 
to provide the expertise it required to classify, organize, and control its citizens (Moran, 
1999). They gain power through controlling access to specialized knowledge and skills, 
who may perform professional work, and securing state recognition for the right to self-
governance (MacDonald, 1985). The balance of interests between self-regulating 
professions, the state, and consumers is the subject of ongoing debate (Roberts & 
Dietrich, 1999).  
Through the 20th century, the medical profession has used its self-regulatory authority to 
restrict the numbers of medical practitioners, producing a scarcity of practitioners that 
enables them to retain autonomy over their work (Freidson, 1994; Savage, 2004). 
Traditionally, medicine has also controlled the organisation of healthcare work, restricted 
the authority of health service managers, and ensured that practitioners from other health 
professions remain in subordinate roles (Freidson, 1994; Safriet, 2002). Medical 
autonomy has declined since the 1980s, as health reform has altered its control over 
healthcare work and its relationship with the state (Harrison & Ahmad, 2000). These 
changes  have  provoked  questions  about  whether  management  reforms  could  go  ‘too  far’ 
or damage aspects of professionalism integral to the expert judgment or ethical conduct 
necessary for delivery of care to consumers (Freidson, 1994; Southon & Braithwaite, 
1998). However, management has a long history of being closely entwined with 
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medicine, as private benefactors or governments have sought to control the expenditure of 
medical practitioners (Abel-Smith, 1964; Dingwall et al., 1988). An alternative view 
depicts health reforms as part of an ongoing adjustment in power relations between 
medicine, consumers, and the state (Harrison & Ahmad, 2000; Salter, 2003). However, 
the focus on medicine and management leaves little room for considering the implications 
of an expanding and diverse professional workforce in healthcare. 
Another perspective sees all professions within a system of competing jurisdictional 
claims over work related to human problems. In this picture, the professions compete for 
control of their work at the boundaries of their knowledge or for shared clientele, and are 
vulnerable to developments in knowledge and technology that could threaten their claims 
(Abbott, 1988). The generation of new knowledge has shifted from production by health 
professionals, as part of clinical practice, to the work of multidisciplinary research 
institutes. New knowledge can now be widely disseminated through information 
technologies, although professionals can still retain significant control over tacit 
knowledge acquired in clinical practice (Johnson, 1995). Higher education and regulatory 
status for other health professions could erode the power of medicine (Cooper & Aiken, 
2003). Many of the difficulties in service improvement relate to inter-professional 
knowledge sharing and collaboration in clinical practice (Currie & White, 2012; Reeves, 
MacMillan, & Van Soeren, 2010). To gain a better understanding of these difficulties, it 
is important to understand more about health practitioner regulation and its application to 
the health workforce.  
Heal th pract i t ioner regulat ion 
Self-regulation is a widely used regulatory instrument, and there is a consensus that it is a 
more efficient way to regulate professionals than oversight by a government agency. It is 
held to be less costly because it uses the expertise of professional associations to set 
standards, and through professional associations professionals are motivated to maintain 
the  profession’s  reputation  by  monitoring the quality of their own work and that of 
colleagues (Ogus, 1995; Roberts & Dietrich, 1999). However, critics have been 
concerned that while self-regulation can reduce uncertainties about the quality of services 
for consumers, a profession can also use its regulatory status to advance its own interests 
in ways that are not beneficial for consumers. For instance, if a profession restricts the 
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numbers of practitioners, then services could be more expensive for consumers (Cox & 
Foster, 1990). Empirical research in the United States and the United Kingdom lends 
some support to this scenario with findings that regulated occupations command higher 
earnings (of around 13 to 15 percent), but that regulation has had inconsistent outcomes 
for the quality of care (Humphris, Kleiner, & Koumenta, 2010). Even so, most policy-
makers support the regulation of health professionals on the basis that it is necessary to 
protect consumers from poor practice (McDonald, 2010; Roberts & Dietrich, 1999). 
Governments have recognised deficiencies in health practitioner regulation and 
strengthened their oversight of the registration authorities (Allsop, Jones, Meerabeau, 
Mulcahy, & Price, 2004; McDonald, 2012). 
Another trend is for the expansion of regulatory coverage to include many different health 
professions. Health professions typically lobby legislatures for inclusion in regulatory 
schemes, in order to increase their status or access to funding for services (Cox & Foster, 
1990; Fels, 2007). Nursing has led the way in moving to degree-based training, and 
subsequently sought regulatory approval to perform work previously restricted to medical 
practitioners, a move emulated by professions such as pharmacy and physiotherapy 
(Safriet, 2002). Policy-makers have supported these agendas, although they have tended 
to stop short of agreeing to equivalent practice rights with medicine (Bertness, 2009; 
Safriet, 2002). Governments have seen advanced practitioners from non-medical 
professions as useful to fill shortages among medical professionals or to lower the fees 
for services. However, it is not clear that these strategies have been effective in reducing 
the cost of care (Cooper & Aiken, 2003; Cooper & Stoflet, 2004). Why governments have 
expanded regulatory schemes for health practitioners is less clear, and more recently this 
appetite for expansion seems to have waned (Council for Healthcare Regulatory 
Excellence (CHRE), 2011; Department of Human Services (DHS), 2003). 
While governments have strengthened the oversight of registration authorities, there has 
been little scholarly attention to the operations of these agencies. Stacey (1995) describes 
the  organisation  of  the  UK’s  General  Medical  Council.  A  report  on  the  UK  Health 
Professions Council explains how operations could be reorganised into multidisciplinary 
committees overseeing 12 health professions, although work would still be delegated to 
panels of experts from each profession (NHS Executive, 2000). There has been more 
attention to the way complaints about health practitioners are handled. A US study 
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appears to be unique in investigating all sources of complaints (including those from 
health professionals) to a registration authority governing medical and allied health 
professionals (Jost et al., 1993). Other studies have focused on complaints from 
consumers, such as in New Zealand (Paterson, 2002) and the United Kingdom (Lloyd-
Bostock & Mulcahy, 1994).           
Some Australian scholars have included health practitioner regulation as part of a wider 
network of regulatory stakeholders in healthcare (Braithwaite et al., 2005). This draws 
attention to how health practitioner regulation can interact with other institutional 
arrangements, and could shed light on how health practitioner regulation could interact 
with policies for health service improvement. To date, there does not seem to have been 
specific research attention to how health practitioner regulation might play out amongst 
health professions to condition responses to service improvement, although regulated 
scopes-of-practice have been found to contribute to difficulties with teamwork in primary 
care (Brown et al., 2011). 
Heal th workforce 
Over recent decades, policy-makers have been interested in how to improve health 
workforce planning to avoid the cycles of over, or under supply of health professionals 
(Bloor & Maynard, 2003). This includes management of the international migration of 
health professionals (OECD, 2010; Zurn & Dumont, 2008). There have been debates 
around the impending over or under-supply of medical practitioners (Cooper, Getzen, 
McKee, & Laud, 2002), the best methods for attracting and retaining nurses (Bartram, 
Joiner, & Stanton, 2004), and the merits of different approaches to workforce planning 
(Bloor & Maynard, 2003; Segal & Bolton, 2009; Zurn, Dal Poz, Stilwell, & Adams, 
2004).  
There has also been some attention to questions about the productivity of the health 
workforce. Skill-mix has been observed to vary widely across jurisdictions, although 
research has mostly focused on the proportion of qualified nurses to unregistered nursing 
assistants, and how hospital management policies around skill-mix and professional 
development  affect  nurses’  work  experience  or  the  quality  of  care  (Aiken et al., 2011; 
Buchan & Calman, 2004). There is a growing literature about inter-professional practice, 
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 which focuses on how well health professionals from different health professions work 
together, such as multidisciplinary teams (Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 2006; Reeves et 
al., 2010). There are also questions about whether increased numbers of health 
professionals produce a commensurate increase in healthcare outputs (Appleby, Ham, 
Imison, & Jennings, 2010; Bloor & Maynard, 2001). If productivity is to be improved, 
policy-makers could need to consider new roles that mix skills from different health 
professions (Australian Productivity Commission, 2005; Sibbald, Shen, & Anne, 2004).  
Since 2000, there has been more attention to whether the design of the health workforce 
is adequate to meet service demand. This has been prompted by concerns about aging 
populations, care of patients with chronic health conditions, new clinical technologies or 
models of care, retirement of health professionals, and how to shift from profession-
centred to consumer-focused services (Bodenheimer, Chen, & Bennett, 2009; Duckett, 
2005a; Pruitt & Epping-Jordan, 2005). In 2011, Health Workforce New Zealand tried a 
new approach to identifying future health workforce requirements. In the context of 
changing social conditions, calls for patient self-care, teamwork and information 
technologies, it commissioned 13 workforce reports. In a departure from the traditional 
approach of focusing on individual health professions, each report focused around an area 
of consumer need, such as diabetes care, aged care and rehabilitation care (Health 
Workforce New Zealand, 2011). This stopped short of considering changes to 
institutional arrangements that could facilitate different ways of working among health 
professionals to facilitate new services. 
Some scholars have offered opinions about the need for adjustments in the design of the 
health workforce. Mullan (2002) anticipates  the  need  for  more  ‘generalist health 
practitioners’  to  link  the  work  of  specialists,  Masys (2002) foresees  new  ‘knowledge 
workers’  to  manage  an  explosion  of  clinical  information  and  disseminate  it  to  health 
professionals and consumers, while Duckett (2005b) advocates a common foundation for 
health practitioner training and flexible pathways for entry to training. Yet there has been 
little attention to the institutional arrangements that could be necessary to align the health 
workforce to the needs of service delivery rather than to the strategies of the regulated 
health professions (Segal & Bolton, 2009; Willis & King, 2010). There is a gap in 
knowledge around the institutional oversight of the health professions and health services,  
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and how these arrangements could enhance or impede progress toward improving 
services for 21st century consumers.   
1.5 R ESE AR C H ST R A T E G Y , O UT LIN E AND C O N T RIB UT IO N 
Research strategy 
The overview of current knowledge, set out above, reveals the scholarly attention to 
developing the health workforce and improving service delivery, but reveals scant 
attention to how health practitioner regulation could be linked to these topics. This called 
for a research strategy that could shed light on how health practitioner regulation could 
relate to policies for health service improvement, and whether it could contribute to 
difficulties with the implementation of certain improvement policies. According to Crotty 
(1998): 
‘In  a  very  real  sense,  every  piece  of  research  is  unique  and  calls  for  a  unique 
methodology. We as the  researcher  have  to develop  it’  (pp. 11-12). 
The overview of current knowledge contained themes of historically conditioned power 
struggles, a perspective consistent with critical inquiry (Crotty, 1998). This included 
picturing health reforms in terms of struggles between medicine and the state, or 
managers and health professionals. There were also themes consistent with the way 
critical theory has been applied in management research (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000), 
including the general consensus around technical reasoning that health practitioner 
regulation is effective for consumer protection, and that quality improvement 
programmes can improve health service delivery.  
The main research question is concerned with how health practitioner regulation could 
contribute to explaining difficulties with policies for health service improvement. To 
answer this question it is necessary to discover mechanisms that can generate events at 
the macro-level of health policy, the meso-level of health service organisations, and the 
micro-level of health professionals and managers in service delivery (Ackroyd, 2009). I 
adopted a critical realist methodology in which entities at each of these levels are treated 
as real and capable of generating events (Reed, 2005). I decided to continue to work with  
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the literature to explain the linkages between health practitioner regulation, the health 
workforce, and health service organisations, and to build an explanation of how health 
practitioner regulation could influence the course of health service improvement. This 
methodology is explained in Chapter Two. 
Thesis Out l ine 
Chapter Three describes the main health profession groups that comprise the health 
workforce and the health service organisations that deliver healthcare. The description 
draws on the historical construction of health services, and explains the networks or 
supply chains that form around specialist groups of health professionals in the modern 
health industry. It shows that the arrangement of health professions and health services, 
familiar today, originated in response to 19th-century social conditions. Importantly, 
19th-century social restrictions, knowledge and technologies were pivotal in the 
emergence of particular health professions. This chapter establishes a foundation for 
explanation building in Chapters Four, Five, and Six.  
Chapter Four begins explanation building at the macro-level of policy-makers. It 
critically overviews health practitioner regulation, depicts the network of regulatory 
stakeholders, and outlines the potential for independent policy making among regulators 
to have effects in health service organisations. The chapter reprises the historical debates 
about medical regulation that continue to influence thinking about the regulation of the 
health workforce. It outlines the trends for governments to strengthen the oversight of 
registration authorities, and shows there are reasons to doubt these mechanisms for 
strengthening consumer protection and increasing the flexibility of the health workforce. 
The chapter overviews the policies for health service improvement that have mostly been 
directed to shaping inputs to service delivery. It identifies the potential for policy 
interactions among the many registration authorities and other agencies overseeing 
improvements in health service organisations.  
Chapter Five continues explanation building at the micro-level of the health workforce. It 
shows that when health practitioner regulation is viewed from the perspective of a 
workforce comprised of many health professions employed in health service 
organisations, there could be many regulatory levers in play. Drawing on the historical 
construction of the health professions and contemporary legislation, eight regulatory 
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levers are identified and investigated. In addition to traditional levers around expertise 
and  training,  health  professionals  appear  to  be  able  to  leverage  ‘regulatory  privilege’  to 
control resources, such as clinical and information technologies, special language and role 
definition, and the systems of referrals and inter-professional complaints important in the 
organisation of their work. This establishes authority for control over certain resources as 
the focus for interactions between health practitioner regulation and health service 
improvement. 
Chapter Six concludes explanation building at the meso-level of health service 
organisations. It shows how health practitioner regulation appears poorly aligned to 
certain directions for service improvement and could also undermine the organisational 
capability essential for implementing improvement policies. The first part of the chapter 
shows that while service improvement tends to be incremental, the directions for change 
are significant and entail changes to the organisation of work. This includes separation of 
routine and complex care, use of cross-functional or multidisciplinary teams, and changes 
to the deployment of clinical technologies and personnel. Success also depends on 
changes to leadership, training or engagement of personnel, organisation-based clinical 
policies, policies for role development and supervision, and improved information 
sharing and management of ICT. The second part of the chapter shows how regulatory 
privilege could contribute to a lack of organisational capability in health service 
organisations. This includes contested leadership, weak human resource management, 
difficulties integrating clinical information systems, and problems with the design and 
operation of multidisciplinary teams. This combination of effects could contribute to 
explaining difficulties with realising inter-departmental and organisation-wide service 
improvement. 
Chapter Seven investigates the plausibility of the explanation. It shows how regulatory 
privilege could contribute to explaining difficulties in illustrations of service 
improvement. The chapter examines three different types of service improvement. These 
include: options for service designs, including clinical directorates, Patient Focused Care 
(PFC), and multidisciplinary teams; the use of process improvement and ICT to improve 
the coordination of care; and, the changes affecting health practitioners, including 
continuous oversight of competency by registration authorities, the introduction of 
overlapped scopes-of-practice, and the introduction of role redesign in health service 
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organisations. The chapter concludes that regulatory privilege could contribute to 
explaining certain difficulties in health service improvement, evident in the illustrations. 
Chapter Eight concludes this thesis by summarising the research findings and presenting 
some concluding propositions for consideration by researchers and policy-makers. It 
outlines some implications of the research findings, the limitations of the findings, and 
the contribution of the research. 
Contribut ion to research 
This research investigates a question that does not appear to have received previous 
attention in the health policy and health services research literature. It contributes to 
knowledge about health practitioner regulation by identifying deficiencies in traditional 
accounts, and building a fresh lens for understanding its operation among the many 
professions that comprise the health workforce. The research shows how health 
practitioner regulation could contribute to explaining the difficulties with management 
reforms and quality improvement programmes in health service organisations. This 
explanation could contribute to further research, and to the policy discourse around the 
regulation and improvement of health services, and the development of the health 
workforce. 
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2
 R ESE A R C H M E TH OD O L O G Y A ND D ESIGN 
 
Following Crotty (1998), I developed a specific methodology to enable me to research 
how health practitioner regulation could relate to health service improvement, and 
whether it could impede the progress of service improvement. I began by adopting a 
critical theory perspective, which reflected themes evident in my initial work with the 
literature. The main research question called for discovery of the mechanisms that could 
explain interactions between health practitioner regulation and health service 
improvement, a task consistent with a critical realist research methodology (Ackroyd, 
2009). The lack of previous attention to the research question meant a lack of concepts or 
material linking health practitioner regulation to health service improvement. On the 
other hand, there was some literature around health practitioner regulation and a 
substantial literature concerning aspects of health service improvement. I decided to 
continue to work with the literature to find conceptual links and evidence, and build an 
explanation of how health practitioner regulation could contribute to difficulties in health 
service improvement. I used Reed’s  (2005) critical realist epistemology and three phases 
of retroductive reasoning to inform my research design.  
This chapter is divided into two main sections. Section 2.1 explains the critical realist 
methodology, and Section 2.2 sets out the three phases of the research design. 
2.1 A C R IT IC A L R E A LIST M E T H O D O L O G Y 
This section begins by outlining the goals and themes common in critical management 
research and their relevance to this study. It continues by explaining the critical realist 
methodology, the emphasis is on conceptual reasoning in this research project, and the 
attention to multiple industry levels in the research design. Next, the section outlines the 
critical  realists’  approach  to  ontology  and  epistemology  and  how  retroductive  reasoning 
leads to a three-phase research design. The section concludes with an outline of the 
methods used to implement the research design.    
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Goals and themes in cri t ical management inquiry 
Critical researchers seek to understand, explain, and question existing social 
arrangements to inform us about how these systems could be changed, particularly for the 
benefit of those who are disadvantaged by these arrangements (Crotty, 1998). My 
experience in health service organisations led me to question whether health practitioner 
regulation could impede changes that might otherwise improve the quality of services for 
consumers. Most professionals and managers in health service organisations are likely to 
support quality improvement, but could be placed in situations of conflict if quality 
improvement does not align with the policies of particular registration authorities.  
Critical theory as it has been applied in management studies informed this research 
project. It directed attention to the dominant ideas or theories at the source of existing 
arrangements, how these could play out in organisational structures, processes or among 
actors, and how fresh insights or perspectives could contribute to knowledge that enables 
actors to improve their organisational life or the services they provide to consumers 
(Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Reed, 2011).  
In their review of critical management research Alvesson and Deetz (2000), identified 
four recurring themes in published research reports. I found congruence between these 
four themes and those in the literature around my main research question. First, there is a 
tendency for arrangements that are historically or socially constructed to be viewed as 
‘natural’  over  time,  and  therefore  to  go  largely  unnoticed  or  unchallenged.  In  this 
research,  health  professions  are  seen  as  ‘natural’  rather  than  as  historically  constructed 
groups that could be subject to reconstruction. Second, the interests of dominant groups 
tend  to  become  ‘universalised’  as  though  the  interests  of  these  few  also  serve  the  many. 
The traditional claim of the medical profession to lead health services in the interests of 
consumers and taxpayers has been the subject of debate in health reform (Salter, 2002), 
and continues as a tension in questions around the leadership of health service 
improvement (Degeling & Carr, 2004). Third, there is a tendency for technical reasoning 
to dominate over other perspectives. With respect to health practitioner regulation, the 
accounts of economists and sociologists dominate in the discourse concerning particular 
health professions, often medicine. Yet, alternative accounts could emerge if theories 
were directed to the regulation of a workforce comprised of many health professions. 
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With respect to difficulties with health service improvement, there has been a focus on 
leadership, change management and organisation culture as contributing to difficulties 
(Degeling & Carr, 2004). There has been scant attention to the implications of 
healthcare’s  regulated  workforce.  The  fourth  theme  is  concerned  with  hegemony  in  the 
way consent to social arrangements is orchestrated, as dominant groups influence the 
common sense ways of viewing the world. In this research, the idea that state sponsored 
self-regulation for each health profession is the most effective means to protect 
consumers from harm has mostly been promoted by the self-regulating health professions 
(Fels, 2007). This view is widely shared among health professionals, policy-makers and 
consumers alike, but there is scant attention to whether this regulation could also 
contribute to the fragmentation of services for consumers. The congruity of these themes 
to those evident in my initial work with the literature encouraged me to investigate the 
methods used in critical management research.  
A conceptual ly focused and mul t i -level research project 
Work with the literature revealed common origins for the health professions, and a 
consensus that health practitioner regulation protects consumers in New Zealand, 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Despite theoretical claims that 
licensure and certification regimes for health professionals operate differently, a close 
reading of the literature suggested they have similar mechanisms and issues. There were 
also similar approaches to health service improvement in New Zealand, Australia and the 
United Kingdom, including service contracts, management reforms, and quality 
improvement programmes. I confirmed this assessment of the similarities, evident in the 
literature, through informal discussions with officials from government agencies in the 
United Kingdom (Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence, Department of Health, 
NHS Confederation), Australia (Australian Productivity Commission, Victorian 
Department of Human Services), and New Zealand (Ministry of Health). These 
similarities in the origins of health services, the operation of health practitioner 
regulation, and policies for improving health service delivery precluded a comparative 
case study design. 
At the same time, these similarities can establish constancy in the context for research, 
which is useful for discovery of the mechanisms in social arrangements that could 
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generate events in organisations (Ackroyd, 2009). In this research, similarities across 
English-speaking and some other developed economies provided a relatively consistent 
context for the discovery of mechanisms that could link health practitioner regulation to 
health service improvement. Ackroyd (2009) draws a distinction between two different 
types of realist research: the first is more conceptually focused on discovery of the 
mechanisms that could explain certain events in organisations; while the second is more 
empirically focused on refining the knowledge about mechanisms (already identified) 
through understanding how differences in organisation contexts could alter events or 
outcomes. This research project belongs to the first type of realist research because it is 
primarily focused on discovering how health practitioner regulation could generate 
effects in health service organisations and whether these could impede health service 
improvement. This task of discovering explanatory mechanisms and reasons for thinking 
that discoveries are significant, depends on both conceptual reasoning and empirical 
evidence for the mechanisms identified and their effects (Ackroyd, 2009). Even so, as the 
focus of this research has been on discovery of the mechanisms rather than the refinement 
of understanding, there has been an emphasis on conceptual reasoning (Ackroyd, 2009). 
The implication of this is that refining the understanding of the mechanisms and how 
specific contexts could modify outcomes is a task for further research. 
To understand the mechanisms that shape behaviour in organisations, it is necessary to 
consider these mechanisms at the macro, meso and micro levels of an industry (Smith, 
Schneider, & Dickson, 2006). Following Smith et al. (2006): the macro-level refers to the 
stakeholders that govern health professions and health service organisations, or 
participate in industry supply chains; the meso-level refers to the health service 
organisations that are conditioned by arrangements at the macro level; and the micro-
level refers to the health professionals, managers and consumers engaged in service 
delivery.                       
Figure 2 below depicts the scope of the inquiry: in the white rectangle is the historical 
conditioning of the health professions and health service organisations; in the brown 
rectangle is the macro-level of inquiry that includes industry supply chains and the 
policies for health practitioner regulation and health service improvement; in the green 
rectangle is the meso-level that includes the health service organisations, the 
organisational capability for service improvement, and the options for service designs and 
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coordination of service delivery; in the blue rectangle is the micro-level that includes the 
health workforce employed in health service organisations. 
Figure  2: Scope  of inquiry and leve ls of investigation 
 
The potential for interactive effects depends on the design of policies, the historical 
construction of health services and the health workforce, and the organisational capability 
that health service organisations may bring to service improvement. There is potential for 
interactions at the macro, meso, and micro levels, and for influence to travel in either 
direction across these levels. For a single researcher, it was impractical to attempt new 
empirical research through surveys, interviews, or observations. The investigation of any 
one aspect of health service improvement, across multiple levels, would require the 
resources of a research team. I therefore decided to continue to work with the literature 
and published empirical studies of improvement interventions. 
Ontology and epistemology 
This research follows a critical realist epistemology, which recognises the importance of 
mechanisms such as those inherent in health practitioner regulation and health service 
improvement, the operation of such mechanisms within and across different levels of 
analysis, the potential for mechanisms to generate events such as in health service 
organisations, and to influence the behaviours or experiences of personnel engaged in 
service improvement. Critical realist research methods include retroductive reasoning that 
supported my goal of explaining mechanisms in order to understand how they might be 
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changed to address difficulties in service improvement.  
‘Retroductive  inference  is  built  on  the  premise  that  social  reality  consists  of 
structures and internally related objects but that we can only attain knowledge of 
this social reality if we go beyond what is empirically observable by asking 
questions about and developing concepts that are fundamental to the phenomena 
under  study’  (Meyer & Lunnay, 2013). 
As these authors explain, retroduction inference makes use of other forms of reasoning, 
including deductive logic, inductive reasoning from observed events, and abductive 
reasoning in which the researcher formulates new ideas from observed events. 
Additionally in retroductive reasoning, the researcher must bring assumptions into the 
research (Meyer & Lunnay, 2013). In this case, the central assumption is that health 
practitioner regulation could link to health service improvement in ways that contributes 
to certain difficulties. My task in this study is to discover whether there are mechanisms 
that could explain the link and the potential effects.  
Critical realists maintain an ontological dualism that treats social structures, 
organisations, events, and actors as real objects, and also recognises the subjective and 
socially mediated experience of the actors (Reed, 2005). In this research, the social 
arrangements and practices associated with health practitioner regulation and health 
service improvement, and the structures and events in health service organisations have 
been taken to be real entities. While these entities change over time, there is significant 
continuity in the legally enforceable oversight of health practitioners by regulatory 
authorities, the persistence of organisational forms like hospitals or community practices, 
and the range of health professions offering services. Within regulatory agencies and 
health service organisations, the health practitioners, managers, and policy-makers are 
real persons who may act to reinforce or change arrangements, while also having 
subjective experiences of events such as changes to regulation or to the management of 
healthcare.  Individuals’  subjective  experience  of  events  is  shaped  by  their  education, 
socialisation into their roles, contemporary organisational contexts, and the opinions or 
behaviours of people around them. 
For the critical realist, knowledge is produced by identifying the social and power 
mechanisms inherent in social structures, how these mechanisms may create conditions 
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for the existence of organisations that operate as intermediate social structures, and how 
this combination of mechanisms and structures influences events among the individual 
actors,  or  the  actors’  experience  of  those  events.  Power  exists  within  enduring  social 
structures, and is also exercised among actors engaged in contests for control over 
resources in particular circumstances. Accordingly, causality exists in the mechanisms 
and powers inherent in social structures that create the conditions for organisations and 
individuals to generate certain events or outcomes depending on the particular social or 
organisational context. Knowledge produced by the critical realist is in the form of 
explanations that account for the interactions between certain organisational entities at 
different levels of analysis (Reed, 2005). 
Research methods 
A critical realist methodology has three key research tasks. First, it is necessary to 
discover the mechanisms inherent in social structures and how these could create the 
conditions for organisations. Next, the researcher builds an explanation for how these 
mechanisms could generate events with consideration of the actors and contingencies that 
could be involved. Finally, the plausibility of the explanation must be evaluated as part of 
theory building (Reed, 2005). 
A broadly based research design enhances the task of discovering and explaining 
mechanisms, rather than predicting outcomes (Reed, 2005). Multiple sources of material 
are essential to create rich descriptions that incorporate various stakeholder perspectives 
that could contribute to fresh insights, even where the significance of any particular 
material might not be immediately evident (Kelsey, 1999). I used a broadly scoped 
research design to capture material that could reveal linkages, power, assumptions, and 
practices in health practitioner regulation and health service improvement, and the 
operation of these mechanisms in health service organisations. 
Only through a wide range of sources was I able to locate material that could assist me to 
develop insights and evidence around an association between health practitioner 
regulation and health service improvement for which there appeared to be no previous 
research and only a thin literature base. Additionally, initial work with the literature 
suggested a similar pattern of policy making in my jurisdictions of interest. Ensuring that 
this was in fact the case, involved extensive searching for both grey literature and 
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associated scholarship for each of the important policy developments in many 
jurisdictions, particularly New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom. In many 
case, some of the best sources around reasons for policy developments came from North 
America, as the United States and Canada have both tended to lead in certain polices that 
were subsequently adapted for the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and certain 
European countries, notably the Netherlands and Sweden. Similarly, there were a wealth 
of sources for changes in particular health professions, but scant sources for whether such 
changes were occurring more generally in the health workforce. To address this problem, 
I searched for material related to each of the main health profession groups I described, 
and checked to see that the changes observed were also occurring in each jurisdiction of 
interest. Again with quality improvement programmes, several brands have been 
implemented successively, so I checked for scholarship on the use of each brand in 
healthcare, in each jurisdiction of interest.  
On some occasions, there was an authoritative source that reduced the need to use several 
references for effects on the health workforce or the similarity of policies internationally. 
These sources were useful to reduce the number of references used and improve the 
readability of the thesis.  Examples  include:  Moran’s  (1999) study that shows the mid 20th 
century change from UK to US leadership in health technologies and the health 
workforce,  Locock’s  (2003) study that demonstrated the similar way that different quality 
improvement brands have been implemented in health service organisations, and 
Nancarrow’s  (2005) study about dynamic changes in the health workforce that included a 
number of different health professions and inter-professional boundaries. 
In critical realist research, explanations are produced by means of retroductive reasoning. 
Analysis begins from observed events for which explanations are sought through 
discovery of the mechanisms in social structures (Reed, 2005). This thesis began from the 
observation that in many cases health service improvement appears to fall short of 
achieving the anticipated outcomes. Explanations have been offered concerning a lack of 
continuity of leadership, poor management of implementations, or difficulties with 
organisational and professional cultures. However, there are many illustrations of 
attention to effective leadership, well-managed implementation, and engagement of 
health professionals in service improvement, so these explanations might not provide a 
sufficient account of the difficulties. This left room to investigate the role of health 
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practitioner regulation as a contributing factor in difficulties with health service 
improvement. 
The development of understanding and insights about the historical construction of social 
arrangements, and then questioning or critically analysing the mechanisms in these 
arrangements can generate fresh perspectives (Alvesson & Deetz, 2000; Reed, 2005). 
Investigation of the social construction of health professions and health service 
organisations in the 19th century, revealed mechanisms that endure as regulatory levers 
and arrangements in modern institutions. This led to a question of whether these levers 
optimally serve the different social conditions and technologies of the 21st century. 
Similar doubts about the potential efficacy of service improvement emerged from a 
comparison between the institutional arrangements that inform health service 
organisations and those assumed in policies for management reforms and quality 
improvement programmes. Bringing these two sets of insights and empirical evidence 
together made it possible to construct a conceptual explanation that showed how these 
mechanisms originating from the macro-level of regulators and policy-makers could 
interact in ways that account for difficulties with certain illustrations of service 
improvements at the meso-level in health service organisations and micro-level of health 
practitioners and managers. 
Critical realist explanations are concerned with how macro-level social mechanisms 
persist through time, influencing organisations that are intermediary or meso-level 
structures, and contribute to interactions between social structures, intermediate entities, 
and actors at the micro-level (Reed, 2005). Research designs that trace the operation of 
mechanisms through these three levels can be used to strengthen conceptual analysis 
(Smith et al., 2006). Illustrations drawn from published studies can be used as secondary 
data sources to develop explanations for how social structures evolve or endure over long 
timeframes and generate events among actors in particular circumstances (Ackroyd, 
2009). Building an explanation and evaluating its plausibility for explaining observable 
events, including comparison of the explanation with other competing explanations, 
contributes to theory development (Reed, 2005). 
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2.3 T H E R ESE AR C H D ESIG N 
This section sets out the three-phase  research  design.  Phase  One  ‘Foundations’  shows 
how insights concerning the historical construction of healthcare were used to enhance a 
description of the modern health workforce and health service organisations. Phase Two 
‘Explanations’  sets  out  how  investigations  of  the  macro,  micro  and  meso-levels of the 
health industry were used to build an explanation of how health practitioner regulation 
could  interact  with  health  service  improvement.  Phase  Three  ‘Plausibility’  investigated 
whether this explanation could contribute to explaining events in illustrations of health 
service improvement. The research concluded by considering the implications for 
researchers and policy-makers.  
The main research question is: could health practitioner regulation have systemic effects 
that contribute to difficulties with policies for health service improvement? The research 
proceeded by answering five sets of underlying questions: the first in Phase One, the 
second to fourth in Phase Two, and the fifth in Phase Three. 
Phase One: F oundat ions 
Phase one established the foundation for inquiry through investigation of the first 
question:  
First, what are the linkages between the health professions and health service 
delivery in the organisation of modern healthcare?  
I began by investigating how 19th-century social conditions such as poor medical 
knowledge, mechanical technologies, and social class and gender shaped the construction 
of the regulated health professions and health service organisations. These insights 
contributed to describing the modern health industry. This description highlighted the 
enduring workforce divisions and organisations that have continued into the 21st century, 
despite significant changes to social conditions. The concept of supply chains was used to 
show how health industry stakeholders are also organised around the health professions. 
Social histories were invaluable for understanding the social construction of the health 
professions, including Dingwall et al. (1988), Abel-Smith (1964), Weisz (2006), 
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Carruthers and Carruthers (2005). The overlapping material in these studies was useful 
for cross checking events. These sources were supplemented with more detailed accounts 
about the discovery of medical knowledge and clinical technologies shaped particular 
health professions. Literature searches were complicated by an absence of relevant 
subject terms in the indexing of scholarly databases, which tended to generate clinical 
histories or topics around the regulation of biomedical systems rather than the material 
sought. A wide range of sources was used to remedy this problem and to check for 
consistency around dates, events, and interpretations in the construction of the health 
workforce and service delivery organisations. Sources included library catalogues, 
journals, websites of research institutes and media organisations, along with visits to 
London museums and the London libraries of professional associations. Australian, New 
Zealand, and UK sources for workforce data were used to illustrate the proportional 
contribution of different health professions to the modern health workforce. 
Phase Two: E xplanat ions  
Phase  two  ‘explanations’  investigated  the mechanisms of health practitioner regulation 
and policies for health service improvement to understand how they could shape events in 
health service organisations and impede the progress of service improvement. This 
progressed through the macro-level of policy-making, the micro-level of the health 
workforce and meso-level of health service organisations. 
‘Explanations’  began  at  the  macro-level of the health industry with the second set of 
questions: 
Second, what are the intended mechanisms of health practitioner regulation? How 
are the mechanisms of health practitioner regulation related to other arrangements 
for the governance and improvement of health services?  
I began at the macro-level by investigating the mechanisms of health practitioner 
regulation, and the logic associated with policies for health service improvement. This 
revealed the potential for interactive effects to arise from independent policy-making 
among the many registration authorities and the network of healthcare regulatory 
stakeholders. Historical debates around the regulation of medical practitioners contributed 
to insights about the regulation of the modern health workforce. Grey literature from 
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particular English-speaking jurisdictions and international comparative scholarship were 
used to trace the last three decades of changes to health practitioner regulation and the 
introduction of policies for health service improvement. This was strengthened by 
attention to the scholarly accounts that often include comparison of changes in English-
speaking and some other developed economies such as the Netherlands and Sweden. The 
literature on policies for health service improvement was variable, for example, there was 
more material on service contracts and evidence based medicine than on accreditation 
programmes or health workforce policies. The extensive literature on management 
reforms and the quality improvement programmes in health service organisations 
contributed to the decision to focus further inquiry on the effects of these policies. 
Of the recent changes to health practitioner regulation, the recognition of overlapped 
scopes-of-practice and continuing oversight of competency by registration authorities 
seemed most likely to have effects on the health workforce and health service 
organisations. Among health service improvement policies, there was the potential to 
observe the effects of health practitioner regulation in management reforms and quality 
improvement programmes. A critical review of the goals of health practitioner regulation 
and policies for service improvement was used to identify conflicting philosophies about 
consumer protection, service quality or improving the efficiency of service delivery. This 
revealed a focus on different inputs or outputs of health services, but also the potential for 
alignment of thinking around goals for quality improvement. 
The traditional account of health practitioner regulation is that it protects consumers by 
setting standards for the training of health professionals and adjudicating in consumer 
complaints about professional practice. Yet these regulatory levers seemed insufficient to 
account for the persistence of historical divisions in the health workforce despite the 
significant changes in 21st-century social conditions, knowledge, and technology. This 
led to a third set of questions directed to understanding how health practitioner regulation 
could shape events at the meso-level of health service organisations: 
Third, what other mechanisms could be associated with health practitioner 
regulation? How might these be transmitted from registration authorities and 
leveraged in the multidisciplinary healthcare workplace?  
I revisited the scholarly accounts of the social, knowledge and technology conditions in 
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the 19th century construction of the health professions. In addition to the traditional 
levers of health practitioner regulation, there appeared to be other levers that were pivotal 
in evolution of the health professions. These levers could enable professions to control a 
range of resources important to professional work, and to shape inter-professional 
relationships in the health workforce. The networked character of the professional 
associations of the health professions could provide both formal and informal conduits for 
the operation of health practitioner regulation. There were eight levers that could 
contribute to effects in health service improvement. These were: control of expertise, 
training, clinical technologies, clinical information and ICT, special language, role 
definition, the referral system, and inter-professional complaints. This established control 
over resources and sources of authority for that control as the lens for considering the 
potential for interactions between health practitioner regulation and health service 
improvement. These levers could influence arrangements in the health workforce in ways 
that do not align with directions for health service improvement. 
Sources for these mechanisms of health practitioner regulation were similar to those used 
for phase one to understand the historical construction of health services. Additionally, I 
searched in scholarly databases, Google Scholar, and health profession journals, to assess 
whether these levers were present in the contemporary discourse concerning the 
development of the health professions. Search  terms  included  variants  of:  ‘advanced 
practitioner’, ‘inter-disciplinary’,  ‘inter-professional’,  ‘technology’,  ‘information 
systems’,  ‘human  resource  management’  combined  with  specific  health  professions  and 
health service organisations  such  as  ‘hospital’  or  ‘community  practice’. Key authors, 
references, and citations were searched intensively until no new material or alternative 
accounts were evident. 
Next, I considered the organisational context for health service improvement. This 
concluded the explanation-building phase by focusing on the meso-level of health service 
organisations, and investigation of the fourth set of questions:  
Fourth, how are management reforms and quality improvement programmes intended to 
change service delivery? In the light of recent management reforms, what do we know of 
the organisational context and capability for the implementation of these improvement 
policies? 
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I began by identifying the directions for health service improvement. Changing social 
conditions have been influencing organisational change from functionally focused 
designs of the 19th century to more consumer-focused services for the 21st century. 
There is some evidence that health professionals, clinical leaders, and managers have 
different attitudes to certain redesign elements in management reforms and quality 
improvement programmes. Next, I investigated how these service improvement policies 
have changed health service organisations since the 1980s. The picture that emerged was 
of organisations that appear to be in transition from functionally focused to consumer-
focused  designs.  However,  there  were  reasons  to  doubt  health  services’  capability  for 
realising the organisation-wide improvement anticipated in quality improvement 
programmes. Some levers of health practitioner regulation appeared to contribute to a 
lack of organisational capability. This suggested that ongoing improvement could depend 
on changes to both the regulatory and service delivery levels. This completed the 
explanation-building phase of the research design by showing that health practitioner 
regulation could impede the progress of health service improvement because it tends to 
reinforce the traditional organisation of healthcare work and limits organisational 
capability to implement new arrangements in service delivery.  
I drew on the literature on general management reforms and quality improvement 
programmes to identify the elements of redesign in these policies, the recent history of 
these improvement policies health service organisations, and the responses of different 
groups  of  actors.  Search  terms  included  combinations  of  ‘hospitals’,  ‘health  services’, 
‘healthcare’,  ‘team’,  ‘redesign’,  ‘ICT’,  ‘clinical  technologies’,  ‘clinical  policies’  with 
each quality improvement  ‘brand’,  each  English-speaking or similar jurisdiction, and 
each health profession. Google Scholar was useful for its ability to progressively produce 
more relevant material. This overcame a problem, noted by Elkhuizen, Limburg, Bakker, 
and Klazinga (2006) of the lack of search terms in scholarly databases, for quality 
improvement programmes in health services. 
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Phase Three: Plausibi l i ty 
The third phase, assesses the plausibility of the explanation built in phase two. This 
involved answering a fifth question:  
Could mechanisms in health practitioner regulation contribute to explaining 
difficulties with the implementation of management reforms and quality 
improvement programmes?  
I began with the explanation, developed so far. This showed that particular levers and 
design elements were likely to account for certain interactive effects. Next, I selected 
illustrations of these service improvements from published research reports. At the meso-
level of health service organisations, I grouped these illustrations into those related to 
service design, including clinical directorates, patient-focused care units, and 
multidisciplinary teams; and those related to improving service coordination through 
clinical ICT and quality improvement programmes. The third group of illustrations 
related to the micro-level, and included changes to overlapped scopes-of-practice, 
continuing oversight of competency by registration authorities, and government-led 
changes to roles for health practitioners.  
I began by producing a summary of these research reports, focusing on the aims of the 
research, the organisational context and nature of the improvement, the improvement 
outcomes, and the conclusions of the researchers. These three groups of summaries are 
set out in Appendices B, C and D of this research report. I condensed these summaries to 
produce vignettes that are included in Chapter Seven. The research that informed these 
vignettes had not been designed to identify the effects of health practitioner regulation on 
health service improvement. I used these vignettes to consider whether an explanation 
centred on health practitioner regulation could contribute to explaining events, and add to 
the  authors’  explanations. 
Overall, there were six criteria for the selection of illustrations. In the initial selection 
three criteria were important. First, service improvements needed to involve health 
professionals or unregistered health practitioners as described in Chapter Three. For 
improvements to service design and the coordination of care, at least three or more 
professions in each illustration were preferred. This criterion proved challenging due to 
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the many papers that focus on single professions with less attention to the other personnel 
in the practice setting. Second, illustrations needed to come from jurisdictions with 
similar groups of health professions and a similar history of management reforms, 
regulatory change and interventions for service improvement. Third, papers had to 
include sufficient description of the intervention, the organisational context for the 
intervention and the participants or researchers views on the sources of difficulties 
encountered. This is consistent with the critical realist methodology that seeks 
explanations for events through understanding how social structures create conditions for 
interactions involving organisation structures and actors. Illustrations in which authors 
had offered explanations for the observed events were useful in assessing whether the 
explanation of regulatory privilege contributed additional insights to these accounts. 
In the final selection, three further criteria were important. Fourth, the interventions 
needed to be representative of those introduced in developed economies as part of 
management reforms to change health practitioner regulation and improve health service 
delivery. Fifth, I looked for at least two illustrations of each type of intervention, although 
this proved too difficult in the case of interventions for role redesign. Sixth, the quality of 
the material was important with fifteen illustrations sourced from research in scholarly 
publications, and two from studies published by UK government agencies. Systematic 
reviews were useful for locating a range of material and ensuring that it had been assessed 
to be of good quality by researchers and for identifying illustrations from an international 
perspective.  
These criteria proved demanding. I found that many studies focus on a single health 
profession, or lack detail about the organisational context, the events, or the experiences 
of the actors. There have been few studies that consider the impact of regulatory changes 
on health services. To confine the scope of the study, it would have been preferable to 
restrict illustrations to New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom that have a 
common history and sharing of recent policy initiatives. This produced 11 illustrations 
from the United Kingdom, one from Australia and none from New Zealand. To provide 
adequate coverage of service improvement at the meso-level, I included one US 
illustration of process improvement, along with one Canadian and one Danish illustration 
of using ICT for service coordination. There was less material available to illustrate the 
micro-level of individual health practitioners. Two Dutch studies that appear to be unique 
  61 
in evaluating the effects of regulatory changes at the practice-level, complemented three 
studies from the United Kingdom. 
Having selected the illustrations based on the above criteria, I prepared the vignettes set 
out in chapter seven. Next, I assessed whether the material in the illustrations adequately 
explained the progress of each intervention and whether there was any evidence for an 
explanation based on health practitioner regulation. For each of these illustrations, an 
explanation centred on how health practitioner regulation added to other explanations 
concerning the progress of the improvement interventions. This showed how health 
practitioner regulation could contribute to explaining difficulties with health service 
improvement. The selection of illustrations, the material available for inclusion and the 
preparation of vignettes are discussed in more detail in section 7.1.  
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3
OR G A NISAT I ON O F TH E H E A LTH WOR K F OR C E  
A ND SE RV IC E D E L IV E RY 
 
IN TR OD UC TION 
This chapter establishes a descriptive foundation for investigating the role of health 
practitioner regulation in health service improvement. It shows how the historical 
construction of the health workforce informs the modern organisation of the health sector. 
Nineteenth-century knowledge, technologies and social conditions each contributed to the 
emergence of the health professions, and organisations such as hospitals or community 
practices. Medicine established the pattern of founding professional organisations and 
training programmes, then lobbying government for recognition of self-regulation. Other 
professions followed, in many cases to establish professional work for educated women. 
While medicine and nursing tend to dominate in descriptions of healthcare work, the 
chapter highlights the contribution of the allied health professions to the design of modern 
health services. Health professions have evolved in groups of dominant and assistant 
practitioners, and these groups have endured even as subordinate practitioners have 
secured self-regulatory status. The chapter concludes by showing how these groups form 
the specialist departments or practices that inform the organisation of modern health 
services and the pattern of supply chains in the health sector. 
Section 3.1 provides an account of how medical discoveries and social conditions 
combined to shape modern medicine, establishing hospitals at the centre of service 
delivery. Roles were needed for educated women, and section 3.2 traces the evolution of 
nursing, social work and other health professions that met this need. Section 3.3 describes 
the importance of new technologies or shortages of medical practitioners in the rise of 
some other health professions such as pharmacists or physician assistants. Finally, section 
3.4 shows how enduring professional divisions in the health workforce inform structures 
throughout the health sector.  
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3.1 M E DIC A L D ISC O V E R IES AN D T H E  
         E M E R G E N C E O F M E D IC IN E  
This section focuses on the emergence of medical specialties in 19th-century London, 
which  was  at  that  time  the  world’s  largest  city  and  highly  influential  in  the  development 
of healthcare in new-world English-speaking societies. This influence waned as the 
United States gradually became more influential in the development of the health 
professions (Moran, 1999, 2002). 
Social condi t ions and medical discoveries 
Economic and social developments in the 18th century set the scene for the expansion of 
health care through the 19th century. Improvements in agriculture (Allen, 1999) and 
sanitation (Razzell, 1993) contributed to population growth (Wrigley, 1983) and more 
reliable systems for transport of food and materials enabled the growth of factories and 
urban centres, creating new wealth (Szostak, 1988; Szreter, 1999). Rapid industrialisation 
increased the need for healthcare for three reasons: centralisation of factory work 
disrupted labour markets, contributing to unemployment and poverty; unplanned urban 
growth produced slum conditions with endemic infectious disease; and the new 
mechanised factories and transport systems were associated with increased accidents and 
injuries (Szreter & Mooney, 1998). The modern state emerged as the government created 
new institutions to control these social problems, through gathering population statistics 
and administering health and welfare services (Moran, 1999). 
Through this period, there were also many important medical discoveries, including a 
smallpox vaccine in 1796, anaesthetics from 1846, antiseptics from 1848, the link 
between cholera and contaminated water in 1854, evolution of germ theory from the 
1860s, the diphtheria anti-toxin in 1890, identification of viruses in 1892, and recognition 
of the link between mosquito viruses and yellow fever in 1900 (Greene, 1971; Lederberg, 
2000). However, while these discoveries advanced medical knowledge and shaped the 
development of the healthcare work (Weisz, 2006), they did little to advance the 
contribution of medical science to health outcomes until the development in treatments 
through the 20th century (McKeown & Record, 1962).  
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In the early 1800s, most health care was provided in the home. Dingwall et al. (1988) 
described a range of different practitioners offering services largely on a class basis, with 
few possessing formal qualifications. Poor households managed their own care, perhaps 
supported by a local herbalist or nurse to provide medicine, or a bonesetter to stabilise an 
injury. The lower middle classes might afford the services of lower-class medical 
practitioners such as surgeons or apothecaries. Physicians cared for the wealthy, and 
frequently delegated the performance of treatments to an apothecary or surgeon. 
Apothecary treatments included bleeding, purging, and the use of various metal-based 
medicines, followed by doses of opiates to mitigate the adverse effects (Dingwall et al., 
1988). Surgeries ranged from tooth extractions and toenail removals to cutting out 
tumours  and  the  amputation  of  limbs,  and  a  surgeon’s  speed  was  prized  as  a  means  of 
pain reduction. Surgery was generally restricted to life-threatening circumstances because 
there was a 50% death rate associated with major operations, and in 80% of hospital 
surgeries the patients had to survive gangrene (Alexander, 1985). Yet by the end of the 
19th century, hospitals emerged as centres of medical knowledge with service delivery 
organised around a new range of specialised departments and health practitioners 
(Carruthers & Carruthers, 2005). 
Special isat ion in medicine  
Five factors associated with 19th-century conditions contributed to the development of 
specialisation in medicine. First, there were practical obstacles to acquiring medical 
knowledge, and the solution was for doctors to specialise in the treatment of patients who 
appeared to have similar conditions so that they could accumulate sufficient experience to 
create new knowledge. Specialisation in medicine was closely related to this quest for 
new medical knowledge, and also patterned on the new specialties emerging in French 
and German universities (Weisz, 2003). These specialist divisions evolved to 
accommodate an era in which practitioners had to be both clinicians and researchers; 
whereas, today; research is mostly conducted in research institutes that are separate from 
clinical practice (Johnson, 1995). 
Second, the new social arrangements for welfare also influenced medical specialisation 
and the creation of distinctive types of healthcare organisations. From 1834 changes in 
government funding for paupers gradually saw the mentally ill removed from prisons to 
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asylums for the insane, and those suffering from infectious diseases shifted from poor 
houses into fever hospitals (Carruthers & Carruthers, 2005). Psychiatry emerged in 1845, 
when Parliament required local governments to establish asylums for the insane 
(Dingwall et al., 1988).  
Third, the wealth from benefactors and subscription income allowed the London private 
hospitals to become centres for medical research and teaching. Medical specialists were 
concentrated in London, where they could maximise their earnings from a mix of 
teaching medicine and servicing wealthy clients (Gorsky, Mohan, & Powell, 1999). 
Fourth, the unification of medical training between 1858 and 1872 established conditions 
for new specialities to emerge. As training was integrated, the old divisions between 
physicians, surgeons and apothecaries, disappeared and new divisions between hospital 
specialists and general practitioners (GPs) were established (Weisz, 2006). The modern 
specialty of general practice began as community-based doctors completed dual training 
as surgeon-apothecaries, a combination facilitated by the historical association of both 
these occupations with the treatment of the lower classes (Lawrence, 1985; Waddington, 
1974).  
Fifth, in contrast to the United States, upper-class control of the London private hospitals 
contributed to the persistence of a strong separation between hospital-based specialists 
and community-based GPs in Britain and many former British colonies. In London, 
medical specialties were developed by foreign and lower-class medical practitioners, 
creating a proliferation of specialist hospitals for a range of ailments like tuberculosis, 
chest diseases, eye diseases, skin diseases and orthopaedics, because the physicians’  ideal 
of gentlemen practitioner did not fit with the labour-intensive work of accumulating 
specialist knowledge through the treatment of many patients. Additionally, physicians 
had long associated specialisation with the work of the lower-class practitioners they 
supervised, including: apothecaries, surgeons, dentists, eye specialists, and midwives. 
However, by the end of the century the physicians had realised the importance of 
specialisation and brought this under their own control by establishing specialist 
departments in the private hospitals, and leaving community-based practice as the domain 
of GPs (Abel-Smith, 1964; Weisz, 2003). 
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Rise of hospi tals 
Until  around  1850  the  private  hospitals  admitted  only  the  ‘curable  cases’  and  routinely 
declined admissions for chronic complaints, infectious diseases, cancer, and child cases 
(Abel-Smith, 1964). As McKeown and Record (1962) explain the 19th-century decline in 
population mortality was mostly related to changes to living conditions rather than to 
medical treatment. First, between 1770 and 1900, 50% of the mortality decline is 
attributable to improvements in living standards, particularly diet, and 25% relates to the 
impact of sanitary or hygiene reforms from the 1880s. Second, much of the remainder of 
mortality decline relates to changes in disease organisms, the work of the sanitation 
campaigners that led to hospitals separating different infectious diseases, and the public 
funding which enabled the transfer of these patients to fever asylums from 1867. Finally, 
while surgery expanded following the introduction of anaesthetics, operating conditions 
remained crude. There was little concern about the cleanliness of instruments, operating 
personnel  or  the  spectators  admitted  to  operating  ‘theatres’.  Death  from  post-surgical 
infection only improved from the 1880s when surgeons began to understand the central 
importance of aseptic techniques (McKeown & Record, 1962).  
Through the first half of the 20th century, mortality from infectious diseases that largely 
afflicted the young continued to decline, due to increased economic wealth, nutrition and 
sanitation. From the 1930s, sulpha drugs, penicillin, and antibiotics proved effective 
against death from pneumonia, influenza, and tuberculosis. Subsequently diseases of 
aging such as cardiovascular disease and cancer have emerged as major causes of death 
(Cutler & Meara, 2001).  
The expansion of the London private hospitals had begun 100 years before the 
development of effective medical treatments and was very much related to the demands 
of research and experimentation in the 19th century. Despite the lack of effective medical 
treatments, wealth and demand for healthcare underpinned the rise of hospitals as 
facilities: to accommodate the patients, operate the outpatient clinics useful for recruiting 
interesting cases, and as sources of funding for the equipment related to the new medical 
procedures (Abel-Smith, 1964; Weisz, 2003). By the mid-19th century these private 
hospitals had departments for: outpatients, mortuaries, operating theatres, dispensaries, 
and electrical stimulation treatments. By 1900, they had various medical speciality 
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departments and had begun to include facilities for X-ray, medical laboratories, and 
radium treatments (Carruthers & Carruthers, 2005).  
It appears that the organisation of healthcare developed well ahead of effective medical 
treatments that only date from the mid-20th century (Cutler & Meara, 2001). The 
historical divisions in medical work and the central importance of hospitals as centres for 
patient care continues today, even though this organisation relates to the research, 
technologies and social institutions of 19th century; conditions that are no longer in 
evidence in the 21st century. It is worth asking in the light of differences in modern 
diseases, technologies and their treatment, whether these divisions remain optimal for the 
delivery of health services in the 21st century?  
3.2 R O L ES F O R E D UC A T E D W O M E N 
In 19th century Britain and the United States, roles in healthcare were important to 
women because women had difficulty gaining admission to jobs in the new industrial 
economy and in professional work. A few women became doctors, particularly in 
obstetrics, gynaecology, and psychiatry, which were specialties that were seen as relating 
to  women’s  health  problems  and  where  treatment  by  a  female doctor was seen as 
necessary  to  protect  the  ‘innate  modesty  and  virtue’  ascribed  to  female  patients  (Theriot, 
1993). Indeed during this period, all kinds of ailments in women were commonly linked 
to their reproductive functions. In Britain, opportunities for working class women were in 
domestic services, untrained nursing positions, and in the factory jobs that had evolved 
from  women’s  work  in  the  cottage  industries.  Skilled  jobs  in  new  industries  such  as  steel 
and railways were closed to women (Jordan, 1989) and as with medicine there were few 
openings for women in engineering, law or the church (Brumberg & Tomes, 1982). These 
difficulties for women in gaining admission to education and to medicine were influential 
in the development of nursing, midwifery, social work, physiotherapy, and occupational 
therapy.  
Until the late 19th century, there was a general lack of education especially for women 
(Howarth & Curthoys, 1987). From the 1870s, attendance at elementary school became 
compulsory for both sexes in  England,  but  there  was  little  support  for  women’s  access  to 
higher education. As Dyhouse (1976) points out, opponents insisted that the education 
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curriculum for girls must include compulsory home economics because of fears that 
education in other subjects would dissuade women from becoming mothers, or even 
render them infertile. By the end of the 19th century, compulsory elementary education 
had removed children from the factories, and opened up more jobs for poor women 
(Jordan, 1989). Educated women began to find work in the new welfare institutions, the 
schools and the printing industry, as teachers, nurses, librarians, and social workers 
(Brumberg & Tomes, 1982). 
Medical social work 
Medical social work developed into a health profession when it became central to 
resolving a dispute over patients between hospital specialists and GPs. Hospital 
physicians ran free outpatient clinics to find interesting cases for research, to enhance 
their appeal to fee-paying medical students, and to establish their reputation amongst 
wealthy clients. State-funded healthcare was restricted to the inmates of the poorhouses, 
because policy-makers believed that if community-based clinics were funded, then those 
who did not qualify for welfare would also receive services. The combined effect of free 
outpatient clinics and restricted welfare payments meant that as the numbers of GPs grew, 
competition for the fee-paying community patients reached a crisis, and the GPs accused 
hospital physicians of poaching their fee-paying clientele. This dispute was settled in 
1895 with the introduction of a formal system of referral between physicians and GPs. 
While the private hospitals already  used  early  social  workers  known  as  ‘almoners’  to 
determine whether a patient met criteria for admission as a charity case, it was now 
necessary to appoint formally qualified social workers to means-test patients for 
acceptance into the free outpatient clinics. By 1912 the qualification for medical social 
work required a university certificate in sociology (Abel-Smith, 1964). Today medical 
social workers can be found in a range of settings, such as family therapy, mental health, 
rehabilitation, and care of the aged (Brown et al., 2000; Long, Kneafsey, & Ryan, 2003; 
Reeves & Lewin, 2004). 
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Nursing 
The transformation of nursing from unskilled labouring work to a recognised professional 
occupation proved difficult, and was first achieved by midwives. This began in England, 
in 1858 when an Obstetrical Society was formed, followed by a diploma in 1872, and 
state registration in 1902. Initially most registrations were on the basis of experience 
rather than formal qualifications, and many midwives were illiterate (Carruthers & 
Carruthers, 2005).  
Due  to  the  physicians’  practice  of  delegating  work  to  midwives,  the  General Medical 
Council (GMC) supported the new diploma for midwives (Dingwall et al., 1988). 
However, implementation of this diploma was delayed by a dispute within nursing and 
objections from GPs. Amongst nurses, midwifery training was initially supported by a 
group  lobbying  for  women’s  access  to  medical  training,  and  by  Florence  Nightingale  who 
saw an opportunity for midwives to provide obstetrics services to the lower classes. 
However, Mrs Fenwick (who led the British Nurses Association) wanted training and 
registration of midwifes as a first step toward securing registration status for general 
nurses. GPs viewed both training for midwives and registration for general nurses as a 
competitive threat (Dingwall et al., 1988). As Carruthers and Carruthers (2005) point out, 
by the time training had become established for midwives, obstetrics had also been 
included in medical training for GPs. 
The GMC also supported training and recognition for asylum nurses, who they saw as 
assistants to the medical superintendent of the asylum (Dingwall et al., 1988). There were 
gradual reforms to asylums including: removal of criminals to prisons, improved 
accommodation, less use of chains for restraint, and the creation of programmes to 
support patients to transition into the community. By 1885 a Medico-Psychological 
Association was formed under the GMC along with training for a certificate of 
psychological medicine, which evolved into a two year training course for mental health 
nurses (Carruthers & Carruthers, 2005), establishing a physician assistant workforce in 
mental health. Divisions between general nurses, midwives, and mental health nurses 
persisted through the 20th century (Francis & Humphreys, 1999a). 
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The path to professional recognition for general nurses was dogged by objections from 
the male-dominated medical profession, and by disputes between nursing leaders with 
different social agendas. In 1840, the Institute of Nursing Sisters offered a few months of 
training  at  Guy’s  or  The  London Hospital, to literate women of good character 
(Carruthers & Carruthers, 2005). Twenty years later, in 1860, the first Nightingale school 
for nurses opened with a curriculum that emphasised both technical and moral training. 
Technical training included expertise in the cleanliness and ventilation of hospital wards, 
clinical observation of the sick, application of treatments such as bandages, poultices, 
leeches, and enemas, preparation of food for the sick, and assistance with surgical 
procedures. The  Nightingale  school’s  moral  training was essentially about deference to 
medical authority, a strategy to appease those doctors opposed to training for nurses. In 
these trained nurses, hospitals found a skilled low-cost labour force, and a source of 
income from hiring out nurses to the wealthy for home nursing. Florence Nightingale also 
promoted home nursing for the poor, as a preferred alternative to the  ‘morally corrupting’ 
practice of grouping them together in hospitals. These home-nursing traditions evolved 
into the modern roles of nurse visitor or district nurse (Dingwall et al., 1988).  
The availability of trained nurses led to further divisions in hospital labour, with the 
appointment  of  servants  or  ‘scrubbers’  for  cleaning  and  domestic  duties  under  the 
supervision of nurses (Carruthers & Carruthers, 2005). Today there are generally three 
levels of training in nursing: enrolled or licensed practical nurse, registered nurse and 
nurse practitioner (NP) (Nursing Council of New Zealand, 2013). The shift to degree-
based training for nurses has increased the distinction between nurses, and their 
assistants. Training of healthcare assistants who work with nurses has shifted to 
employers (Thornley, 2000). As with other health professions, the work of nurses has 
become more technical with an international trend to recognise more advanced practice 
(de Bie, Cuperas-Bosma, van der Jagt, Gevers, & van der Wal, 2005). 
In the 19th century, the spread of formal training for nurses was slow, and partly reflected 
a class-related struggle between two nursing factions: the upper-class Nightingale faction 
that favoured the development of nursing into an occupation for respectable middle-class 
women; and the Fenwick faction that supported both  women’s suffrage and entry to 
nursing based on merit regardless of class (Carruthers & Carruthers, 2005). Despite the 
rhetoric around class and respectability, an important difference appears to be the level of 
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education favoured. The Nightingale schools promoted apprenticeship-style training for a 
range of trainees including married women and widows, while Fenwick campaigned for a 
higher standard of training as a basis for nurses to challenge the authority of the medical 
profession (Dingwall et al., 1988). The UK parliament also had mixed agendas, with a 
desire to remedy exploitation of nurses evident in low wages balanced by an equally 
strong desire to avoid the unionisation of nurses. This dispute over nursing education was 
partly resolved in 1919, when the government intervened introducing separate registration 
for general nurses and mental health nurses as well as hospital-based training (Dingwall 
et al., 1988). However, debates around the merits of on-the-job training, certificate or 
degree courses, and advanced practice roles continued into the late 20th century (Francis 
& Humphreys, 1999a; Safriet, 2002). 
There has been a powerful link between the feminist movement and nursing since the 
19th century. Earlier than the United Kingdom, in 1893 New Zealand women secured the 
right to vote in parliamentary elections, and this was soon followed by the registration of 
nurses in 1901 (Sargison, 1997).  Women’s  suffrage  was  closely  entwined  with  the 
achievement of professional status for nurses in the 19th century, and feminism 
influenced the development of degree courses and recognition of advanced practice roles 
for nurses from the 1960s (Nichols, 2000). 
Physical and occupat ional therapists 
Physiotherapy began as a new profession for respectable, educated women, partly in 
response to scandals over the practice of massage in the 1880s. In late nineteenth century 
London, massage services were offered by a range of practitioners, including nurses, 
midwives, Swedish masseurs and medical practitioners. In 1894 the British Medical 
Journal attacked the practice of massage, on the basis that it was largely a front for loose 
morals and prostitution. In response, three midwives and one other woman formed the 
chartered Society of Physiotherapy to regulate the education, training, registration and 
practice of massage therapy. These women secured social and scientific respectability for 
this new profession by forging an alliance with the medical profession, and by 1912 had 
enlisted 79 medical men as patrons. Physiotherapists were required to wear uniforms and 
perform physical rehabilitation for female patients on referral from a medical practitioner. 
Massage of male patients was not permitted, unless urgently requested by a medical 
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practitioner (Nicholls & Cheek, 2006). Today, physiotherapists can be employed in 
specialised hospital departments and rehabilitation units, in community practice, or in 
sports medicine, and are known as physical therapists in the United States. The link 
between midwifery and physiotherapy persists today where both professions are engaged 
in the delivery of antenatal care (Schmied, Myors, Wills, & Cooke, 2002). 
Occupational therapy also offered new opportunities for educated women, building on the 
manual or occupational training found in schools (Friedland & Silva, 2008), the more 
enlightened asylum programmes (Carruthers & Carruthers, 2005) in the United Kingdom, 
in convalescent care of tuberculosis patients, and in welfare programmes in Chicago 
(Schwartz, 2009). Occupational therapy became particularly important in the 
rehabilitation of soldiers in World War I, and in 1917 a diverse group of social reformers 
founded the American Occupational Therapy Association (AOTA). These founders had 
diverse backgrounds including: manual training, rehabilitation of Canadian soldiers, care 
of tuberculosis patients and the mentally and physically disabled, and welfare reform. 
Like nursing and physiotherapy, some founders were motivated by a desire to establish a 
career for educated women (Schwartz, 2009). 
One of these founders was Thomas Bessall Kidner, who constructed a medical basis for 
occupational therapy by analysing craftwork and mapping this analysis onto different 
stages of rehabilitation care. Originally from England, Kidner had a background in 
technical and vocational education, and made the transition to healthcare when he was 
engaged in the rehabilitation of World War I soldiers in Canada and the United States. 
From 1917, he was active in building the AOTA, forging alliances with both medicine 
and the American Hospitals Association (Friedland & Davids-Brumer, 2007). Part of 
Kidner’s  strategy  was  to  build  a  disciplinary  foundation  for  occupational  therapy  that 
differentiated it from the claims of other professions, namely the physical work of 
physiotherapists, the mental-health work of psychologists, the manual training offered by 
teachers, and the organisation of social assistance provided by social workers (Friedland 
& Silva, 2008). Today, occupational therapists are employed in specialised hospital 
departments and rehabilitation units, and are also found in community-care settings, 
notably community mental health teams (Long et al., 2003). 
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3.3 O T H E R H E A L T H PR O F ESSIO NS  
A L LIE D T O M E D IC IN E  
Weisz emphasises the importance of the development of new medical knowledge and 
social institutions as pivotal to the development of medical specialties and suggests that 
radiology,  which  does  not  seem  to  fit  this  picture,  is  a  ‘marginal’  specialty  (2006, p. 171). 
Yet, taking a wider perspective across the health professions, technology does appear to 
be important to divisions in the health workforce, particularly in radiology and medical 
imaging, pathology and laboratory sciences, and in pharmacy. This section looks at how 
19th-century innovations in technologies as well as social forces shaped these health 
professions. 
Pharmacists  
The influence of new knowledge, social factors and technology are each evident in the 
separation between pharmacy and medicine. First, during the 18th century there was a 
dramatic change in the knowledge around medicines, with ingredients such as animal 
parts being removed from the pharmacopeia, and replaced with metal-based medicines 
that required more skill to formulate. By the 19th century discoveries in botany and 
chemistry had further expanded the range of medicinal agents, with even more knowledge 
and skill necessary for synthesis and formulation (Carruthers & Carruthers, 2005).  
Second, the influence of social factors can be traced from 1815 when the Society of 
Apothecaries received its royal charter (Crellin, 1967). Physicians used their influence to 
make the award of this charter conditional on the apothecaries agreeing to an 
apprenticeship-style training associated with lower class occupations, rather than the 
degree-based training favoured by physicians (Berlant, 1975). The irony, as Crellin 
(1967) points out, is that given this rigorous training it was subsequently natural to 
include apothecaries as medical practitioners under the Medical Act of 1858. In the years 
leading up to 1858, the apothecaries were more engaged in medical work and had less 
time to devote to their traditional activity of making medicines. This opened the way for a 
group of chemists and druggists to found the Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain in 
1841 and a School of Pharmacy in 1842.  
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Third, the importance of new technologies is evident in the London pharmacy shops of 
this period. Capital was required to fit these shops with their extensive laboratories, 
furnaces, stills, steam apparatus, refrigerators and presses. During this period, pharmacists 
invented new devices such as the infusion jug, measures for volumes, an ether inhaler, 
production of medicines in single doses, and different formulations such as pills, 
suppositories and cachets, along with the compressed tablet patented in 1843 (Crellin, 
1967). Thus a combination of new technical skills and equipment was required to 
standardise the production of medicines. As the apothecaries were absorbed into the 
profession of medicine, it was more difficult for them to maintain their role in the 
compounding of medicines, and this left room for pharmacists to emerge as a profession 
separate from both the retailers who sold drugs and groceries, and from the apothecaries 
and dispensing doctors (Berlant, 1975). 
The path to professional recognition for pharmacists was different in new world societies 
that relied on medicines imported from England and the rest of Europe. In the new world, 
the responsibilities of pharmacists were similar to modern pharmacy practice. Early US 
pharmacists focused on the importation and distribution of medicines, testing medicines 
for  quality,  advising  on  dosages,  checking  doctors’  prescriptions,  and  dispensing  to 
patients. As the industrial production of medicines developed through the 20th century, 
and rules for labelling of medicines became more stringent, small scale manufacturing or 
formulary largely disappeared from pharmacy retail shops (Savage, 1994). Today the 
majority of pharmacists are employed in community pharmacy dispensing and retailing. 
They are also found in hospitals in the purchase, distribution and management of 
medicines, and in policy and regulatory roles that oversee the use of medicines and the 
conduct of audits (Chaffee, 2010; Pederson & Gumpper, 2008; Roberts et al., 2005). 
Medical imaging professions 
There was rapid diffusion of X-ray tube photography following its discovery in Germany 
in 1895, and by early 1896 the first experiments with X-rays were already underway in 
England. The first practitioners were often photographers but also included house 
surgeons, nurses and hospital porters, with X-ray dermatitis and death from skin cancer or 
leukaemia common amongst both patients and practitioners (Guy, 1995). Even so, there 
was significant demand for and rapid transfer of this new technology. An English pioneer, 
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Sir John Hall-Edwards, sold his general practice to specialise in radio-diagnosis, radium 
and electrotherapy, and also demonstrated the usefulness of portable X-ray equipment for 
diagnosis in the second Boer War (1899-1902) (Guy, 1995). There was a similarly rapid 
diffusion of radiation treatments for cancer in Europe, America and elsewhere, with the 
use of X-ray tubes for cancer treatment from 1896, surgical insertion of radium from 
1900, and the Radium Institute established in London in 1911 (Hayter, 1998). By World 
War I the British military standards for hospitals included X-ray facilities and a 
radiographer (Abel-Smith, 1964, p. 260).  
In 1920, the Society of Radiographers was established to advance the training, 
certification and professional status of non-medical X-ray practitioners. Price (2009) 
describes the struggle for ownership of X-ray work, which dominated the early years, and 
from which the medical profession triumphed by claiming ownership over the 
interpretation of X-ray plates. X-ray technologies gradually improved, but the complexity 
of the technology meant that training for radiographers continued to include the 
calibration, fault diagnosis and maintenance of equipment as well as the production of 
images and management of procedures (Nixon, 2001). Today the medical practitioners 
specialising in these areas include radiologists and oncologists. Since the 1970s 
diagnostic and therapeutic radiographers (the latter are engaged in cancer treatment) have 
been trained separately (Rominger & Browning, 1977).  
Diagnostic radiology now incorporates a range of specialties from surgery-like medical 
procedures to the use of ultrasound, computerised axial tomography (CAT) scanning and 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). Radiographers are also called radiologic or imaging 
technologists. They have traditionally performed advanced practice work, when there are 
shortages of medically trained radiologists, and in the late 20th century persistent 
shortages have contributed to formal recognition of advanced practice roles (Bate et al., 
2008). While the potential for portable X-ray was demonstrated in the Boer War (Guy, 
1995), radiology has successfully limited the use of most imaging examinations to 
radiology departments or practices (Christensen et al., 2000).  
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Medical laboratory professions  
Laboratory science evolved from simple blood and urine tests in the 18th century 
(Shinton, 1992; Winsten, 1969), to rapid development from 1800 on due to new 
technologies such as microscopes, photography, chemicals, and tissue cutting techniques 
(Gal, 2001). By the mid-19th century, it was common for medical practitioners to 
investigate body fluids and tissues as part of medical diagnosis and treatment (Winsten, 
1969), and to autopsy their own patients (Gal, 2001). There were small areas adjacent to 
the hospital wards for performance of tests, and some specialist pathologists offered tests 
and vaccines from private consulting rooms (Shinton, 1992). Dedicated hospital 
laboratory departments date from the 1890s (Carruthers & Carruthers, 2005).  
Many developments in laboratory science came in the 20th century, such as electron 
microscopes in the 1930s, identification of DNA in 1944, and new antibiotics in the 
1950s (Lederberg, 2000; Shinton, 1992). By the 1970s, the main specialties of 
biochemistry, haematology, microbiology, virology, histopathology, immunology and 
genetics had emerged (Shinton, 1992).  
Along with developments in science and technology, social factors related to first and 
second World Wars, and gender shaped laboratory work. From the 19th century, 
laboratory assistants were often female. US training programmes for medical laboratory 
work proliferated during World War I to educate the largely female laboratory workforce. 
In 1926, the American College of Surgeons required all hospital laboratories to meet 
accreditation standards, and by 1928 the first US national accreditation organisation 
began to certify training and recognise graduates in laboratory technology (Delwiche, 
2003). In Britain, fear of biological warfare led to the development of a national system 
of laboratories during World War II (Shinton, 1992).  
Similar to other non-medical professions, there have been protracted struggles to establish 
recognition for new health professions independent from medical oversight. In 1937, a 
dispute around control of the training curricula led the laboratory technologists to 
establish the American Society of Medical Technologists in 1933. Forty years later, in 
1973, this dispute was finally concluded in favour of the technologists, with a new  
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national organisation for accreditation of training and certification of graduates 
(Delwiche, 2003).  
Today, there is extensive automation in some laboratory work, and a range of personnel 
with different roles is employed. In the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, 
there are five main groups of personnel including: pathologists, medical laboratory 
scientists, medical laboratory technologists, medical laboratory technicians, and 
assistants. Pathologists are medical specialists who are primarily involved in providing 
interpretation and expert advice to medical colleagues. In the case of histopathology, their 
work can include performing autopsies and tissue examinations. Medical-laboratory 
scientists and technologists are not medical practitioners but can have equivalent 
laboratory expertise, particularly in specialty areas like chemistry, haematology or 
microbiology. They are more likely to perform laboratory management roles than 
pathologists. Technicians generally require a health science degree and laboratory 
experience. They perform and oversee routine tests, often supervising medical-laboratory 
assistants.  Assistants  may  also  perform  ‘phlebotomy’  or  drawing  blood  samples  from 
patients. Dramatic changes in technology contributed to the expansion in the range of 
laboratory services and personnel in the 1960s and 1970s (Price & Barnes, 1999; Shinton, 
1992). 
Since the 1980s continued advances in automation mean that more work is performed by 
technicians and assistants; pathologists have reoriented toward work with patients in 
clinical practice; and new laboratory instruments or analysers can reshape the divisions 
within laboratories (Shinton, 1992). For instance, if some chemistry and virology tests 
can be performed on the same machine, it may be cost-effective to co-locate specialists or 
separate the performance of some tasks. Many divisions in laboratory science have been 
enabled by 20th century technology, and regulation of laboratory professionals dates from 
the late 20th century. Despite this delay in achieving regulatory coverage, laboratory 
professionals have been largely successful in resisting the transfer of laboratory work to 
other health professionals despite the development of near patient testing technologies 
that are relatively cheap and easy for less specialised personnel to use (Lee-
Lewandrowski et al., 2003). 
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Physician Assistants 
In the latter half of the 20th century, physician assistants (PAs) (who have been a 
traditional feature of the military health workforce and perform work that would 
otherwise require medical practitioners) were introduced into US healthcare (Jolly, 2008). 
Following the Korean War, returning military PAs were retrained for civilian healthcare 
to address shortages of medical practitioners, particularly in rural and poor communities 
(Cooper & Stoflet, 2004). PAs are often described in comparative terms with nurse 
practitioners (NPs), because both these health professions can work with significant 
independence from medical practitioners, caring for their own patients in hospital and 
community settings. Training for NPs involves  completion  of  a  master’s  degree  after 
experience as a registered nurse, while PAs complete a four or five year degree, and then 
undertake a clinical internship.  
The most influential difference appears to be the philosophical foundation of these health 
professions. Consistent with its feminist influence, nursing has sought independent 
practice rights for NPs and collegial relationships with medical practitioners. In contrast, 
PAs acknowledge an inter-dependent relationship with medical practitioners, which is 
consistent with their roots in the command structure of the military. However, these 
distinctions around independent versus assistant status can be misleading. In most US 
jurisdictions, PAs may practise within a 50-mile or one hour drive from a supervising 
physician, as long as telephone contact is maintained (Cooper & Stoflet, 2004). Civilian 
PAs are overwhelmingly located in the US with a few in Canada (Jolly, 2008). However, 
the numbers training in this profession have been increasing rapidly, and trials have been 
undertaken in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand as a means to address 
shortages in the medical workforce (Health Workforce New Zealand, 2010; Jolly, 2008).  
3.4 T H E ST RUC T UR E O F T H E H E A L T H SE C T O R 
The focus of this investigation is the organisation of professional work and how this may 
inform the design of health services. This section shows how this perspective places 
emphasis on how health services are organised, rather than their place of delivery. It 
begins by depicting the distribution of health professions in the health workforce, and 
then shows how these workforce divisions inform the organisation of health services. It 
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concludes by depicting the patterns of supply chains in healthcare that link health industry 
stakeholders to particular groups of health professionals and the specialist departments 
they occupy in health service organisations.  
E nduring workforce divisions 
In the tables below, Australian and New Zealand health workforce data is used to 
illustrate the continuity of the professional divisions in the health workforce, and the 
distribution of health professionals in hospital and community settings. Table 1 illustrates 
the proportions of the main health professions in the Australian health workforce drawing 
on a study by the Australian Productivity Commission (2005). It shows that medical 
practitioners, who are trained to oversee the widest range of illness and injury, form just 
11.5% of the regulated workforce. Nursing is the largest group at 43%, along with 
nursing assistants or carers at 11.2%. However, taken together, other non-medical and 
non-nursing health professions form a significant proportion of the workforce with 
pharmacists, allied health (therapists and others), medical laboratory and imaging 
technologists, paramedics, and others comprising around 27% of the Australian 
healthcare workforce. Allied health professions (non-medical and non-nursing) have the 
highest growth rates, ranging from 12.5 to 30.2% between 1996 and 2001. 
Other research shows that 45% of Australian medical practitioners are located in primary 
care practices, 35% are specialists, 10% are trainee specialists, and 10% are employed in 
non-specialist hospital roles (Duckett, 2000). Hospital specialists and their trainees 
comprise 45% of the medical workforce and just 5.2% of the overall health workforce. A 
review  of  the  UK’s  health  workforce  shows  similar  growth  in  the  health  workforce  and 
faster  growth  for  those  health  practitioners  described  as  ‘technical  and  professional’ 
compared to nurses or medical practitioners (Bloor & Maynard, 2001).  
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Table  1: M ain health profess ion divis ions in the  Australian health workforce  
Australian health professions 
2001 
Proportion of health 
workforce % 
Rate of growth  
1996-2001 % 
Registered nurses/midwives 38.7 7.3 
Enrolled nurses 4.3 2.7 
Nursing assistants/ personal 
carers 
11.2 18.8 
Medical practitioners 11.5 12.6 
Dentists 8 1.9 
Dental technicians/assistants 3.9 12.5 
Pharmacists 3.0 13.0 
Allied health workers3 8.8 26.6 
Complementary health workers 1.9 29.6 
Medical imaging workers 1.8 25.0 
Medical scientists 2.6 16.8 
Ambulance Officers and 
paramedics 
1.5 12.5 
Other 9.1 30.2 
Total & average growth 100 11.6          
(see Australian Productivity Commission, 2005, p. xvi) 
 
Table 2 below uses New Zealand health workforce stocktake (2002) that describes the 
proportion of different health professions in hospital compared to community-based 
practice. The New Zealand study shows that at 23% the proportion of nurses employed in 
community settings is small, when compared to the distribution of other health 
professions such as medical practitioners of whom 39% are employed in community-
based practice. The necessity for around-the-clock care for hospital inpatients explains 
this concentration of general nurses in hospital settings. In the community, there is a 
strong presence of dentists at 83%, pharmacists at 60%, and physiotherapists at 51%.  
                                                 
3 Note:  the  use  of  ‘allied  health’  in  this  thesis  is  broader  and  includes  all  non -medical and non-nursing 
health professionals. 
  82 
Other health professions are also present in the community, with the proportions for 
midwives, medical imaging and laboratory technologists, and others ranging from 25 to 
47%4. 
Table  2: Practice  locations for New Zealand health workforce  
New Zealand health professions 
2001  
 % Employed in 
community settings 
Registered nurses 23 
Midwives 47 
Medical practitioners 39 
Dentists 83 
Dental technicians/assistants 100 
Pharmacists 60 
Medical imaging workers 38 
Medical laboratory technologists 25 
Physiotherapists 51 
Podiatrists 83 
Registered psychologists 32 
Informal support workers 100 
(extracted from Health Workforce Advisory Committee, 2002, p. 64) 
Since the middle of the 20th century, new health professions have originated in the 
United States (Moran, 2002). In 1977, a US study identified 181 primary or unique health 
practitioner titles legally protected by state legislatures (Begun & Lippincott, 1993). 
Despite this growth, there has been continuity in the health professions and the 
organisation of healthcare work through the 20th century, as many new roles form as 
specialties within regulated health professions or as previously unregulated health 
practitioners have successfully lobbied for inclusion in regulatory regimes. 
                                                 
4 This New Zealand study includes an estimate of community-based support workers at 30% of the New 
Zealand health workforce, which means that the proportions of health professions in this study are not 
directly comparable to those in the Australian study depicted in Table 1. 
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The organisat ion of heal th services 
Descriptions of the health sector are important since they may entail assumptions or 
emphasis that directs the process of investigation. It is common to distinguish between 
hospital and community-based locations for service delivery, yet this could distract 
attention from the similarities among the health professionals and services provided in 
these locations. There are some exceptions; for instance, many types of surgery are likely 
to be delivered in hospital settings. Yet, most health professionals such as general 
practitioners (GPs), medical specialists, pharmacists, nurses, laboratory scientists, 
radiographers, physiotherapists and occupational therapists can each offer services in 
hospitals, in the community, or in both settings (see Table 2). Another descriptive focus is 
to  distinguish  between  ‘primary’,  ‘secondary’  and  ‘tertiary’  care.  This  may  also  be 
problematic,  since  ‘tertiary’  hospitals  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  Canada  deliver  a  wide 
range of services, with tertiary-level work that could only be delivered in specialised 
hospital departments, comprising as little as 15 % of the total. Most of the work 
comprised primary care, secondary care, or teaching (Mintzberg, 1997). Thus primary, 
secondary or tertiary care could reflect the intensity of particular services or the specialist 
nature of the skills involved, but does not necessarily denote the location for service 
delivery.  
Community general practices are mostly organised around medical practitioners, their 
patient lists and their requirements for nurses and clerical personnel. There has been some 
development of nurse-led clinics, and in this case, the work of clerical and assistant 
nursing staff is similarly organised around the needs of these practitioners (Britt et al., 
2010; Checkland et al., 2008). Other specialised practices include pharmacists in 
pharmacy retail stores, radiologists and radiographers in community-based radiology 
practices, laboratory specialists in community laboratories, physiotherapists in 
physiotherapy practices etc. Within these practices, the work of clerical and assistant 
personnel is also led by the senior health professionals and organised around the 
practice’s  patient  lists  or  bookings.  Managers  may  be  employed  to  assist  in  the 
management of facilities, employment of personnel, and the management of contracts 
with suppliers of specialised equipment, materials and services (Feletto, Wilson, Roberts, 
& Shalom, 2010; Van Akkeren & Rowlands, 2007). 
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The process of community-based service delivery commonly begins with a consumer 
visit to a general practice where the GP completes a medical assessment and may refer 
their patient or allocate work to other health professionals. To receive these other 
services, a consumer generally has to visit and engage with practitioners in each specialist 
practice. An episode of care may be concluded once all the referred work is completed, or 
following a further visit to the GP. Figure 3 below illustrates this general pattern of 
service delivery: the consumer in the white circle, and the general medical practitioner in 
the red crescent. Other health professionals are depicted in the diamonds and linked to 
their suppliers in the rectangles. The colours are used to distinguish different health 
profession groups with: pharmacy in purple, laboratories in yellow, therapies in green, 
and a white rectangle for general suppliers. The solid arrows depict the pattern of referrals 
from a medical practitioner to other health professionals, and the dashed lines show how 
this fragments care for consumers.  
Figure  3: Organisation of work in community-based se rvices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Descriptions of hospitals commonly focus on the number of beds and the treatment of 
inpatients. Yet more patients generally receive hospital care through outpatient clinics or 
day case units. Auckland hospital, for example, is a New Zealand tertiary level institution, 
with annual services comprising 120,000 inpatient stays, 700,000 outpatient visits, 90,000 
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emergency department visits, 250,000 radiology examinations and 3.1 million laboratory 
tests (A. Arulambalam, Adult Services Manager, Planning & Funding, Auckland District 
Health  Board,  personal  communication  May,  2010).  Another  illustration  is  the  UK’s 
Leicester Royal Infirmary (LRI), which in the mid-1990s had 103,000 inpatient episodes, 
400,000 outpatient visits and 120,000 emergency attendances (Bowns & McNulty, 1999). 
Thus, while the terms community and hospital care denote the place of service delivery, 
the services provided could also be seen as part of the continuum of community-based 
care. 
Hospitals are typified by the co-location of different medical specialties and groups of 
health professionals. Generally each group is located together in its own department or 
work unit and organises much of its own work practice (Braithwaite, 1995; Doolin, 
2004). For instance a group of orthopaedic specialists are likely to be co-located and 
either directly control or influence the management of many assets like wards and 
equipment, relationships with specialised suppliers, and groups of assistant personnel. 
Communications between health practitioners proceed through a system of assessments 
by medical specialists and trainees, and referrals or delegations to other health 
practitioners (Reeves & Lewin, 2004). 
Figure 4 below illustrates the typical organisation of work in hospitals: the consumer is 
depicted in the white circle; general practitioners and medical specialists in the red 
crescents; and suppliers in the rectangles. The different health professions or their 
suppliers are distinguished by colours with: pharmacy in purple, laboratories in yellow, 
therapists in green, nurses in blue, general suppliers in white, and other technical 
specialists or their suppliers in brown. The solid arrows represent referrals or supply 
contracts, and the dashed lines show the movement of consumers around the specialist 
health professionals. The boundaries of the hospital organisation are depicted by the 
purple rectangle, with dotted lines to indicate the porous nature of this organisational 
boundary through which referrals may proceed directly from a medical practitioner to 
other service providers. 
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Figure  4: Organisation of work in hospital-based se rvices  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An image common in traditional analysis of health practitioner regulation is that of a sole 
health practitioner engaged in an ongoing confidential and trust-based relationship with a 
consumer (Arrow, 1963; Roberts & Dietrich, 1999). While this type of consultation does 
occur, it is important to notice that this is mostly within the structure of a health service 
organisation, where many other people in different roles contribute to scheduling, record-
keeping, diagnosis, treatment and follow-up (Hartswood, Procter, Rouncefield, & Slack, 
2003). The involvement of many different practitioners has implications for consumers, 
who may experience fragmentation in service delivery, as they encounter different 
practitioners for different aspects of a service within the same organisation or through 
referrals to different organisations (Bodenheimer, 2008; Bomba & Prakash, 2005).  
Supply chains in the heal th sector 
Profession-centric patterns of organisation characterise the health sector more generally. 
These patterns or supply chains are formed by a range of firms and agencies that 
specialise in the provision of equipment, materials, and services to particular groups of 
health professionals. I illustrate the range of organisations involved in a supply chain for a 
typical radiology practice. 
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A ‘supply chain’ denotes the relationships between a manufacturing or service delivery 
organisation and the other firms or organisations it depends on to manufacture, supply, 
transport or warehouse materials, components or products, and the activities related to 
managing relationships with customers like taking orders and tracking payments (Tan, 
2001). Supply chains are also networks of actors, resources or activities, that extend both 
inside and outside a focal organisation, and which taken together may have their own 
identity and shared strategic interests (Chen & Paulraj, 2004). Supply chains may form 
around health service organisations, such as for the supply of general inventory, legal or 
audit services, or sub-contractors that deliver some services for patients. There are also 
highly specialised supply chains that form around specialist groups regardless of whether 
these groups are located in the community practices or in the specialist departments of 
hospitals. On the supply-side, these profession-centric supply chains can include: 
regulatory-agencies, educators, research organisations, and technology and materials 
companies. On the consumer or demand-side they may include: consumers, insurers, and 
patient complaints investigation agencies (Begun & Lippincott, 1993). 
Figure 5 below illustrates the notion of a healthcare supply chain using the example of a 
radiology practice, which might be located in either the community or in a hospital 
department. Each of the orange boxes depicts a type of healthcare stakeholder 
organisation that may contribute to the supply chain, including: education institutions, 
health profession regulatory agencies, and health profession organisations, healthcare 
technology suppliers, health services providers, consumers and their purchasing agents, 
and organisations tasked with regulatory oversight of health services. Listed inside each 
box are examples of these stakeholders. The boxes on the left of the service providers are 
engaged in supply-side activities, while the boxes on the right indicate those on the 
demand side. While this figure places these stakeholders in a horizontal plane, the blue 
arrows indicate that communications and relationships can be multi-directional. The 
diagram also shows the range of regulatory authorities that could be engaged in 
overseeing a health profession. Governments may award statutory authority to entry-to-
practice regulators such as for medical practitioners or radiographers. Over time the  
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picture may become more complex as specialist colleges form to set standards for 
specialist training and gradually secure recognition from their respective registration 
authority, such as for medical practitioners specialising in radiology or radiographers 
specialising in sonography. 
Figure  5: Supply chain re lationships around radiology se rvices 
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This picture of healthcare stakeholders forming supply chains around a group of health 
professions has implications for service improvement. Following Chen and Paulraj (2004) 
it is important to recognise that profession-centric supply chains may become conduits for 
advancing the interests of each respective health profession. If the health profession does 
well, then its suppliers are also likely to benefit. While a profession-centric supply chain 
is likely to be interested in sharing the success of a specialist department, it might have 
little interest in the health service organisation overall. Health service organisations have 
porous boundaries due to the pattern of referrals between medical practitioners and 
groups of health professionals, both inside and outside the organisation. Thus, health 
service organisations can also be pictured as a co-location for the intersection of many 
profession-centric supply chains in which strategic objectives could differ from those of  
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the health service leadership. Given the regulatory authority that health professions may 
command, this could have important implications for service improvement that affect the 
organisation of work among the health workforce. As leading authors in quality 
improvement, Womack and Jones (1994) point out that success with quality improvement 
programmes could involve changes to both the specialist departments of an organisation 
and the supply chains that service that organisation. 
C ON C LUSION 
This chapter has begun the task of uncovering the mechanisms inherent in health 
practitioner regulation and health service improvement by understanding the historical 
construction of the health workforce and how this creates linkages through profession-
based departments or practices in hospitals and community practices, and in supply chain 
organisation of firms and agencies across the health sector. These descriptions have 
generated important insights that deserve further investigation in the next four chapters.  
First, the social conditions, knowledge, and technologies that were pivotal in the 
construction of the health professions and service delivery organisations in the 19th 
century have each changed significantly. In the 21st century women generally have 
access to higher education and careers, evidence-based curative medicine is the norm, the 
public has both a higher level of education and significant access to healthcare 
knowledge, technologies are much more sophisticated and reliable, and computerisation 
of many work processes could enable new ways of organising clinical work. The extent 
of these changes suggests that there could be opportunities to improve health service 
delivery through the reorganisation of work in the health workforce. 
Second, the non-medical health professions secured their position in the social 
organisation of healthcare by agreeing to the terms of the 19th-century physicians. Since 
then, there has continued to be boundary struggles both within medicine and at its 
boundaries with other health professions, notably around delegation or referral of clinical 
work. From a political and policy perspective, it could be important to have a better 
understanding of these struggles to identify opportunities for stakeholder engagement and 
improvement. However, it is equally important that the subject of conflict at the inter-
professional boundaries not obscure the bigger picture. There could be important insights 
from a broadly based investigation of how to organise work to meet the needs of 
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patients, rather than directing too much attention to the merits of inter-professional 
skirmishes around pre-existing boundaries in the health workforce. At the same time, 
there are likely to be implications for health professionals. 
Third, consumers seem to have had little voice in this historic division of work, for 
reasons that may relate to the historic lack of cures, the concentration of power amongst 
the physicians, or the limited participation of the general population in the governments 
of the 19th century. Today, health workforce divisions mean that consumers can be 
required to negotiate appointments or relationships with various specialist health 
practitioners to complete a single episode of healthcare. This could be contrasted with 
developments in other industries, where new designs make services more accessible and 
convenient for consumers, such as in the reorganisation of work that has created choices 
in retail, from shops to supermarkets, malls, and most recently to the internet. 
Fourth, the boundaries of health service organisations appear porous, and are intersected 
by supply chains that could place professional interests above those of the organisation, 
and they are also penetrated by the referral system that operates between professionals, 
regardless of their community or hospital locations. In particular, the hospital could be 
seen as an artefact of the co-location of health professionals and their respective supply 
chains. This suggests that any programme directed to improvement of service quality or 
efficiency could have to negotiate changes among both specialist departments and their 
associated supply chains.  
Finally, there could be implications for policy-makers. While traditional descriptions 
have focused on the ideal of a sole medical practitioner, and the location or intensity of 
service delivery, progress in health service improvement might also be served through 
attention to the profession-based structure of health services and the organisation of 
agencies throughout the health sector. 
The next chapter begins building an explanation about how health practitioner regulation 
could affect health service improvement, with a critical review of mechanisms in health 
practitioner regulation, an overview of health service improvement, and an outline of how 
unintended interactions could occur in health service organisations from independent 
policy making. 
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4  
A C RITIC A L O V E RV IE W 
O F H E A LTH P R A C TITI ON E R R E GU L AT IO N A ND 
H E A LTH SE RV IC E IMP R O V E M E N T  
 
IN TR OD UC TION 
This chapter focuses at the macro-level of the health industry as the first step in 
discovering mechanisms and builds an explanation of how health practitioner regulation 
could contribute to difficulties with health service improvement. The chapter begins with 
the historical construction of medical regulation and its enduring influence in the 
regulation of the modern health workforce. It then overviews recent international trends 
for the expansion of regulatory regimes for health professionals and intensified 
government oversight of registration authorities. This suggests that there are reasons to 
doubt that the mechanisms available at the regulatory level could deliver the intended 
policy objectives to strengthen consumer protection and increase health workforce 
flexibility. The chapter then overviews health service improvement policies and the 
network of regulatory agencies directed to improving safety, quality, and efficiency in 
health service organisations. This leads to a consideration of the potential for differing 
goals among the many registration authorities and other regulatory stakeholders to have 
unintended interactive effects in health service organisations. Yet the narrow focus of 
policy reviews of health practitioner regulation appears to preclude consideration of this 
potential. Regulatory changes around health practitioner competency and scopes-of-
practice, along with policies for management reforms and quality improvement 
programmes are selected for further investigation. The chapter concludes that it is 
necessary to look beyond traditional accounts to discover the mechanisms that could link 
health practitioner regulation to health service improvement,   
The chapter draws on grey literature, which uses acronyms for certain government 
agencies. Among these: MoH refers to the New Zealand Ministry of Health; HDC refers 
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to the New Zealand Health and Disability Commissioner; the Treasury refers to the New 
Zealand Treasury; DHS refers to the Victorian Department of Human Services in 
Australia; AHPRA refers to the Australian Health Practitioners Regulation Agency; DH 
refers to the Department of Health in England; CHRE refers to the UK Council for 
Regulatory Excellence in Healthcare, which became the Professional Standards Authority 
in 2013; Office of the Professions refers to the agency governing the health professions in 
the US State of New York. 
Section 4.1 begins with the historical legacy of medical regulation in policy thinking 
about health practitioner regulation. Section 4.2 overviews contemporary international 
trends in the regulation of the health workforce. Section 4.3 overviews health service 
improvement policies and the network of regulatory stakeholders governing healthcare. It 
suggests that separate policy making among regulatory stakeholders could contribute to 
difficulties with health service improvement. 
4.1 H E A L T H PR A C T IT IO N E R R E G UL A T IO N: T H E 
HIST O R IC A L L E G A C Y 
This section overviews the 19th-century construction of regulation for medical 
practitioners, and its legacy in the regulation of the health workforce. This shows there 
are reasons to doubt traditional accounts of occupational regulation, in the context of a 
regulated workforce and policy levers available to modern governments.  
Tradi t ional levers of medical regulat ion 
The modern form of health practitioner regulation dates from 1858 when the UK 
government established the General Medical Council (GMC) authorising physicians to 
manage a register of all medical practitioners. This replaced former arrangements 
whereby the church, the universities, or the monarch determined who was permitted to 
practice medicine, with parliamentary support for self-regulation by medical practitioners 
(Berlant, 1975). Today, this system is applied to many health professions that comprise 
the modern health workforce. 
Traditional levers of medical regulation continue in modern legislation, including: control 
of protected titles, approval of training curricula, accreditation of training institutions, 
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maintenance of a register of approved practitioners, and prosecution of non-complying 
practitioners (Stacey, 1995).  Protected titles have evolved  from  ‘apothecary’,  ‘surgeon’ 
or  ‘physician’  to  ‘medical  practitioner’  (Berlant, 1975). The use of titles associated with 
other  health  professions  such  as  ‘registered  nurse’  is  also  restricted.  Modern  registration 
authorities register newly qualified health practitioners, and accredit the training 
programmes provided by both tertiary education institutions and health service 
organisations (Fels, 2007; Stacey, 1995). Prosecution of non-complying practitioners was 
a feature of the early royal charters, and this continues in the private courts of modern 
registration authorities (Berlant, 1975; Bertness, 2009; Paterson, 2002). Each of these 
levers may be found in contemporary legislation for all regulated health professions, such 
as in the New Zealand Health  Practitioners’  Competency  Assurance  Act  2004,  or  the 
Australian Health Practitioners National Law Act 2009. 
Control over training was central to securing a unified medical profession. In the United 
Kingdom, the physicians first persuaded parliament to establish the GMC, and within just 
14 years they had used this statutory authority to amalgamate training for physicians, 
apothecaries, and surgeons (Berlant, 1975; Weisz, 2006). In the United States, state 
legislatures were reluctant to award control over medicine to the medical profession. 
They preferred to maintain competition by appointing non-medical personnel to medical 
licensure boards, certifying a range of different training institutions, and having negligible 
penalties for unlicensed practice. In response, US medical practitioners progressively 
amalgamated state medical associations to form the American Medical Association 
(AMA),  and  then  secured  control  over  training  by  awarding  ‘accreditation’  status  only  to 
those medical schools and hospitals that recognised the authority of the AMA (Berlant, 
1975). Common to both the UK and US strategies is control over the training of medical 
practitioners, which is essential to ensure that power is centralised within the profession, 
rather than distributed across small groups of practitioners with the potential for divergent 
views. 
The  system  of  separate  ‘colleges’  governing  post-graduate or specialist qualifications also 
dates from this period. The GMC and its equivalents in Australia and New Zealand 
govern basic medical training, while specialist training begins after registration as a 
medical practitioner under the supervision of colleges like the Royal Australasian College 
of Surgeons (Medical Council of New Zealand, 2013a). In the United States and some 
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European jurisdictions, insurance companies were instrumental in formally recognising 
similar colleges that oversee post-graduate qualifications for medical specialists (Jost, 
1995). Other health professions have emulated this system of additional self-regulatory 
authorities for post-graduate qualifications. For instance, in New Zealand the College of 
Mental Health Nurses sets standards for nursing practice in mental healthcare (New 
Zealand College of Mental Health Nurses, 2013). The effect is to create various elite self-
regulatory specialties within each regulated health profession.   
The regulated health professions, particularly medicine, may use a range of strategies to 
maintain control over their work (Begun & Lippincott, 1993). Historically physicians 
prosecuted competitors who infringed on their clients, and more recently complaints 
about professional practice have been made against competitors (Berlant, 1975; Jost et al., 
1993). As the first registered health profession, medicine has been able to wield its 
influence in the development of other health professions, approving or sheltering those 
who  agreed  to  perform  services  only  when  work  was  ‘referred’  from  or  ‘delegated’  by  a 
medical practitioner. It has also been common to enforce these agreements through the 
appointment of medical practitioners to the registration authorities that oversee other 
health professions (Gardner & McCoppin, 1994; Nicholls & Cheek, 2006; Price, 2009; 
Savage, 1994; Schwartz, 2009).  
Power has also been exercised over a range of other industry stakeholders. In the United 
States, the AMA has used its power to adopt regulatory authority similar to that of the 
GMC, to restrict the number of training places in medical schools and hospitals, influence 
nominations to state licensure boards, and lobby against non-medical appointments to 
roles of strategic importance to the medical profession (Berlant, 1975; Friedman, 1962). 
As nurse practitioners (NPs) have performed work previously reserved to medical 
practitioners, the AMA has used its authority over hospital-based training to censure 
hospitals that allowed NPs to admit patients (Bertness, 2009). Similar tactics have been 
evident in the United Kingdom where the GMC refused to allow the government 
appointed Chief Medical Officers of England, Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland to 
participate in GMC business (Stacey, 1995). These tactics tend to occur away from public 
scrutiny, and registration authorities are sensitive about public perceptions that their 
activities could involve the pursuit of self-interest. For instance, the Australian Pharmacy 
Council accredits training and internship programmes for pharmacists in Australia and 
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New  Zealand,  but  it  makes  a  public  disclaimer  that  it  ‘does  not  collaborate with pharmacy 
schools or organisations  in  the  development  of  curricula  or  programs’  (Australian 
Pharmacy Council, 2013). However, it is not clear how activities that involve control or 
influence over other stakeholders can be either separated from or unrelated to 
professional interests. 
In policy reviews, occupational regulation has been viewed as lighter or stronger 
depending on its location on the continuum of registration, certification, and licensure 
(Cox & Foster, 1990).  Under  ‘registration’  practitioners  must  file  their  name  and  business 
details with a government-held register. Quality is enforced by the removal of a 
practitioner from the register in cases of criminal or unethical behaviour, or poor quality 
work.  ‘Certification’  is  a  stronger  scheme  because  it  delegates  the  tasks  of  setting 
standards that inform the maintenance of a register or the investigation of complaints 
about practitioners to the professional association of each respective health profession. At 
the same time, it is held to be a more flexible regime than licensure because any person 
may  perform  the  work,  and  it  is  only  the  use  of  titles  such  as  ‘medical  practitioner’  or 
‘registered  nurse’  that  is  restricted.  Under  ‘licensure’  it  is  unlawful  for  a  health 
practitioner or any other person to perform the specified work unless they hold a current 
licence to do so, and licences are awarded only to those with the requisite qualifications. 
‘Negative  licensure’  is  a  variation  on  registration  where  a  ‘black  list’  is  published  that 
names any persons who have criminal convictions, or have otherwise been found unfit to 
offer services as a health practitioner (Cox & Foster, 1990; DHS, 2003; Fels, 2007). Since 
licensure is less common in New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom, it may be 
simpler  to think  of  ‘negative  licensure’  as ‘reverse  registration’  in  these  jurisdictions. 
The case for the regulat ion of medicine 
This section takes a critical look at the arguments in favour of regulating medical 
practitioners. From the late 1700s, the College of Physicians claimed exclusive 
knowledge, that consumers lacked judgement, and that physicians were not engaged in 
commerce (Berlant, 1975). It used these arguments in a struggle with universities for 
control of medical training and to stop the award of medical degrees to applicants from 
the lower social classes (Waddington, 1974). Subsequently, other professions have used 
similar claims in seeking statutory support for self-regulation (Fels, 2007; Kleiner, 2006). 
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The claim to exclusive knowledge underpins arguments for health practitioner regulation 
(Roberts & Dietrich, 1999), but today there are some reasons to question the strength of 
this claim. In the 19th century the population was largely uneducated, there were few 
cures, and doctors were developing knowledge through practice (Weisz, 2006). In the 
21st century the health workforce is highly educated and while it is important for 
practitioners to have appropriate expertise, knowledge generation mostly occurs in multi-
disciplinary research institutes (Johnson, 1995). Governments have also used independent 
research to establish standards or guidelines for clinical decision-making amongst 
medical practitioners (Harrison, 1998). In the modern health workforce, the idea of 
knowledge  being  ‘owned  by’  a  particular  health  profession  has  been associated with 
underutilisation of skilled professionals, where a health practitioner is educated to 
perform work but legally restricted from doing so (Safriet, 2002). 
Health  practitioner  regulation  provides  for  protected  titles  like  ‘medical  practitioner’, 
which was originally intended to assist consumers to select a trained practitioner from 
among many untrained practitioners (Abel-Smith, 1964; Dingwall et al., 1988). Through 
the 20th century, there has been a proliferation of protected titles associated with the 
health professions, counted at 717 in the United States, which may be confusing rather 
than informative for consumers (Begun & Lippincott, 1993). The general qualification 
denoted by a protected title does not necessarily indicate whether a health practitioner is 
suitably skilled and experienced to offer services. The modern consumer is more likely to 
rely on the assessment of employers as to the capability of a health practitioner to offer 
particular services (Jost, 1995).  
To counter advocates of free trade the physicians argued that rather than engaging in 
competition or trade they provide services for a fee, and that surgeons and apothecaries 
were  simply  ‘the  instruments’  of  a  physician’s  practice  and  not  competitors (Berlant, 
1975; Waddington, 1974). These arguments continue today when medical practitioners 
claim that nurses and other health professionals are assistants, performing work only on 
referral or as delegated (Reinhardt et al., 2004; Safriet, 2002). Yet, as the health 
professions have become subject to competition laws, there has been evidence that they 
can use their registration status to exploit monopoly power. In Australia, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, medical specialists have been found to engage in anti- 
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competitive behaviour such as establishing price floors or boycotting of other service 
providers (Fels, 2007; Miller, 1992). 
There are reasons to doubt these traditional arguments about exclusive knowledge, 
protected titles, and services rather than trade, when applied to the modern health 
workforce. In the workforce context, the proliferation of professional titles and claims to 
exclusive knowledge might reinforce intra-professional identity, but contribute little to 
inter-professional collaboration in the care of consumers (Hall, 2005; Wackerhausen, 
2009). In addition to the evidence of anti-competitive practices among medical 
specialists, similar behaviour that disadvantages consumers has been noted more 
generally, for instance in dentistry, pharmacy, or optometry (OECD, 2005). 
Arguments against the regulat ion of medicine 
Traditional arguments against the regulation of medicine have focused on the way 
regulation could limit consumer choice, and how regulated professionals may exploit 
their registration status at the expense of consumers. These arguments have been 
advanced by economists, including Adam Smith in the late 18th century and Milton 
Freidman in the late 20th century, and appear to have had some influence on policy-
makers.  
Smith argued that a qualification does not necessarily guarantee the quality of a medical 
practitioner’s  services,  and  that  consumers should be free to choose a physician based on 
their reputation for service delivery (as cited in Berlant, 1975, p. 148).  Smith’s  concerns 
about the limitations of qualifications appear to have been borne out as governments have 
intervened in the investigation of consumer complaints and mandated ongoing training 
for health practitioners (Allsop & Jones, 2005). The task of providing consumers with 
more information to support choice appears to be more difficult as professional 
associations may enforce rules among their members that suppress advertising to 
consumers, criticism of peers, or price competition (Fels, 2007). Consumers have been 
increasingly turning to the Internet for information about symptoms, tests, and treatment 
options, which is changing the nature of their relationship with health professionals 
(Ahmad, Hudak, Levinson, Bercovitz, & Hollenberg, 2006). Some governments have 
strengthened consumer rights, for instance in New Zealand consumers are entitled to ask 
  98 
service providers to provide them with copies of their test or assessment results in 
addition to informing their general practitioner. Other strategies have been to substitute 
proprietary medicines or products with less expensive alternatives; permit direct 
advertising or sales to the public, without a prescription, for medicines or devices like 
eyeglasses; and allowing some non-medical professionals to offer services previously 
restricted to medical practitioners or dentists (Fels, 2007; OECD, 2005). However, 
interventions tend to be piecemeal and discrete, reflecting the high cost of investigating 
healthcare practices, and the power of professional associations to keep their policies 
private to their membership (OECD, 2005). 
Friedman (1962) accused medicine of controlling entry to training to restrict the supply of 
practitioners and increase medical incomes, making services more expensive and less 
accessible for consumers. He based these claims on evidence that in the early 20th 
century when US medical practitioners gained licensure, their incomes grew at a rate 32% 
higher than that of dentists who were not licensed (Friedman & Kuznets, 1945). Focusing 
on this same period, other researchers have shown that licensure did not necessarily 
improve the quality of care, for example mortality reduced for appendicitis but not for 
diabetes (Law & Kim, 2005). There are similar findings from contemporary research that 
shows an income benefit of 10-12% for regulated occupations in the United States and 
13% in the United Kingdom, but inconsistent associations to service quality in both these 
jurisdictions (Humphris et al., 2010; Kleiner, 2006; Kleiner & Krueger, 2010). Modern 
governments have intervened to increase or restrict training places, to shorten the length 
of training, and have used purchasing or employment policies to influence the 
remuneration of medical practitioners. For instance, in Australia competition laws have 
been used to increase training places for medical specialists (Fels, 2007), while in the 
United States legislatures have also restricted training places for medical specialists on 
the basis that more specialists would generate more tests or treatments and thereby 
increase the overall cost of healthcare (Cooper & Aiken, 2003).  
Longer training may also be used as a barrier to entry into medicine. The length of US 
medical training is much longer than that of comparable economies, yet there is scant 
evidence that this improves the quality of US medical care (Emanuel & Fuchs, 2012). 
This observation has fuelled proposals to reduce the length of US training by 30% to 
make it more responsive to service demand (Emanuel & Fuchs, 2012). In the United 
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Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, governments are interested in shortening the time 
to train medical specialists (Dowton, Stokes, Rawstron, Pogson, & Brown, 2005). 
Internationally, there are concerns about whether medical training is sufficiently flexible 
to respond to changing demands in healthcare. However, finding solutions is complex 
because it depends on engaging a network of stakeholders including governments, tertiary 
training institutions, health service organisations, and registration authorities governing 
medicine or various post-graduate specialties (Dowton et al., 2005; Paltridge, 2006) 
While governments may intervene, these interventions appear to have occurred on a 
piecemeal basis, with new professions, advanced practice roles, or reviews of medical 
training occurring in response to particular concerns about shortages in the medical 
workforce (Cooper & Aiken, 2003). There are now varying degrees of centralised 
planning for the health workforce in countries such as New Zealand, Australia, and the 
United Kingdom. Critics point to the weakness of this planning, which tends to focus on 
individual health professions, with little attention to the health workforce overall, or the 
skill needs in service delivery (Bloor & Maynard, 2003; Segal & Bolton, 2009; Zurn et 
al., 2004). There have also been recommendations for government intervention to 
improve the flexibility and productivity of the health workforce (Australian Productivity 
Commission, 2005; Duckett, 2005b; Kirby & Keon, 2004), which has led to some 
changes to regulation discussed in the next section. 
4.2 R E G UL A T IO N O F T H E H E A L T H W O R K F O R C E  
This section critically overviews the recent changes to health practitioner regulation, 
including the expansion of regulatory regimes and the intensified oversight of registration 
authorities. It concludes with a critical look at how the regulatory levers of referrals, 
inter-professional complaints, and scopes-of-practice could be used to control the 
organisation of work in healthcare. 
E xpansion of regulatory regimes 
Since the late 20th century, there has been a significant increase in the range of health 
professions or specialties recognised within regulatory regimes, which has been justified 
as a means to protect consumers. US policies are important, as this country tends to lead 
in the development of new health professions and technologies (Moran, 2002). 
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The expansion of regulatory regimes is evident in the US State of New York, where 
licensure first began for medical practitioners in 1890 and has progressively expanded to 
include many health professions: 22 by 1970, 38 by 2001, and 48 by 2010.5 According to 
the New York Office of the Professions (2001) around 80% of newly regulated 
professions are engaged in healthcare, and the distinctions between these and other health 
professions may be subtle. The situation is similar in the United Kingdom, where the 
Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE) lists nine health profession 
councils, with oversight of 32 health profession groups, which does not include the 
colleges governing medical specialities or the sub-divisions within non-medical health 
professions (CHRE, 2010a). The proliferation of recognised sub-divisions in the health 
workforce is evident in the UK Health Professions Council (HPC), which oversees fifteen 
different health profession registers amongst which there are 33 protected titles (HPC, 
2010; NHS Executive, 2000). 
There could be several reasons for this expansion of regulatory regimes. First, when 
professional associations lobby for inclusion in regulatory regimes, they claim that 
without regulatory oversight their members can pose a risk to consumers. Policy-makers 
can err on the side of caution in assessing these claims (DHS, 2003; Office of 
Professions, 2001). Second, it is plausible that governments could increase their leverage 
over the health professions by including more professions in self-regulatory regimes, for 
instance, by holding each health profession accountable for the quality of practice, or by 
requiring that information is regularly supplied to enhance health workforce planning 
(Tuohy, 2003). Third, some regulators could be predisposed to recognise new health 
professions. For example, the New York Regents are responsible for education policy for 
the State of New York as well as for occupational regulation (University of the State of 
New York, 2011); and, the recognition of new courses of study, new disciplines, and 
ultimately new regulated health professions is entirely consistent with progressing the 
interests of a tertiary education institution. In the United Kingdom, the Health Professions 
Council was specifically tasked with recognising and regulating new health professions 
(NHS Executive, 2000). Fourth, in an internationally competitive market for health 
practitioners, the expansion of health professions under regulation may be necessary to 
                                                 
5 These figures do not include all of the divisions in healthcare work because the New York Office of the Professions is not 
responsible for the regulation of many post­graduate specialties (Office of Professions, 2001, 2010). 
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attract migrants with healthcare qualifications, or to utilise the skills of migrants who 
have trained for health professions recognised in other jurisdictions (MoH,  2010; Zurn & 
Dumont). 
In the United Kingdom, there are signs that enthusiasm for the expansion of health 
practitioner regulation may be waning, with some experimentation with employer-based 
regulation  for  healthcare  assistants,  and  proposals  for  ‘voluntary  registers’  for  new  health 
professions seeking regulatory status (CHRE, Birch & Martin, 2009; 2011; The Law 
Commissions, 2012).  
Increased government oversight  
Since the end of the 20th century, amendments to health practitioner regulation have been 
linked to high profile failures in service delivery, and social expectations for safe and 
effective healthcare (Walshe & Shortell, 2004). It is now common for governments to 
appoint members of registration authorities, use independent agencies to investigate 
consumer complaints, standardise legislation governing the health professions, use 
contracts to monitor the performance of registration authorities, and require that 
registration authorities continuously monitor the competence of health practitioners. 
Despite these many changes, there appears to be little change to the way registration 
authorities delegate policy-making to professional associations, for instance, by 
employing advisory committees of expert professionals (NHS Executive, 2000; Tuohy, 
2003). 
Consumer representation on registration authorities originated in the United States 
(Berlant, 1975) and is now common in the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand. 
It is intended to improve the public accountability and transparency of registration 
authorities, but its effectiveness has been questioned. In the United States consumer 
representation  has  been  referred  to  as  a  ‘token gesture’  (Jost, 1997a); UK research shows 
that the effectiveness of consumer representatives depends on the skills of the appointees 
(Stacey, 1995); and a Canadian review found that consumer representatives were not 
performing well and required training (Health Professions Regulatory Advisory Council 
(HPRAC), 2009). In New Zealand the potential for consumer representatives to become 
subject to regulatory capture by a health profession was apparent when two consumer 
representatives on the NZ Physiotherapy Board advocated in an inter-profession turf 
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battle, publicly criticising nurses for the performance of respiratory aspiration therapy 
(MoH,  2004). Yet, both these health professions may perform this work and this seems 
to be an inappropriate subject for consumer representatives. 
Consumer watchdogs have been introduced in Australian states, New Zealand, and the 
United Kingdom, to independently investigate consumer complaints about health 
practitioners. These agencies alter the balance of power, by increasing the consumer voice 
and subjecting registration boards to greater scrutiny. However, this may not be an 
efficient means to identify incompetence. A study of the Ohio State Medical Board shows 
that just 2.5% of consumer complaints yield matters of clinical incompetence (Jost et al, 
1993); and, there is similar evidence from New Zealand where independent investigation 
of consumer complaints resulted in increased complaints about medical practitioners, but 
fewer cases that merited referral to their disciplinary tribunal (Paterson 2002). While 
complaints may concern matters of service quality, they seldom involve cases of clinical 
incompetence; and, eventually surveillance programmes that apply meta-analysis to 
clinical data may prove more effective for identifying questionable patterns of diagnosis 
and treatment, such as unusual prescribing or claims to funders (Jost, 1995). 
There is a trend to standardise the legislation governing the health professions. In part this 
reflects a tidying up of legislation. The NZ Health Practitioners Competency Assurance 
Act came into effect in 2004, replacing 11 separate pieces of legislation that dated from 
different decades (Statistics New Zealand, 2000). In Australia, the focus was on a single 
national scheme to replace and removal disparities between separate state-based 
regulatory regimes (Pacey et al., 2012). 
There is also a trend to use agreements and audits to monitor the performance of 
registration authorities, and to reorganise some of the functions within these agencies. 
From 2000, following the death of children in surgery in Bristol, the UK government 
created the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE) to monitor the 
performance of its nine registration authorities (Department of Health (DH), 2000). One 
UK registration authority was reorganised, changing from 12 boards that governed one or 
more health professions to four joint committees responsible for investigation of 
complaints, conduct and disciplinary hearings, management of practitioners with personal 
health problems, and the determination of training requirements (NHS Executive, 2000). 
  103 
Since 2009, following the death of surgical patients at Bundaberg, the Australian Health 
Practitioners Regulatory Agency (AHPRA) has been responsible for hosting 12 national 
registration authorities, negotiating performance agreements with each authority, and 
managing their shared corporate resources (Pacey et al., 2012). In New Zealand, the 
government has been encouraging its 16 registration authorities to consolidate their 
operations into a single secretariat (Health Workforce New Zealand, 2013b). 
Continuous monitoring of health practitioner competency by registration authorities 
began in the United States, influenced by pressure for quality improvement from the 
public, purchasers, and health service regulators, as well as those interested in reform of 
health practitioner regulation; and this is now common practice across international 
jurisdictions (Allsop & Jones, 2005; Grossman, 1998; Pew Health Commissions, 1998; 
1995). While health professions and education providers have led the development of 
competencies for initial or specialist training, legislative requirements for continuing 
competency have been controversial among the health professions (Conlon, 2004; 
Grossman, 1998). There appears to be a mix of implementation difficulties and 
potentially conflicting agendas among the stakeholders. 
There is a range of implementation difficulties related to the specification and assessment 
of competencies. For professional associations, ongoing competencies appear to lie 
somewhere between entry-level training and the narrow focus of established specialties, 
which poses conceptual problems around how to specify or assess these competencies, 
and how to account for expertise acquired on-the-job (Conlon, 2004; Grossman, 1998; 
Lysaghta & Altschuld, 2000). Registration authorities have favoured self-assessment by 
health practitioners as the least costly method of implementation, and this is common in 
Australia and New Zealand. Yet, evidence available from New Zealand, Australia, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States suggests that health practitioners have limited 
ability to assess their own practice when compared with assessments by independent 
observers (Davis et al., 2006). Alternatively, in the United Kingdom some employers may 
complete competency assessments of non-medical practitioners using criteria set by the 
registration authorities (DHS, 2003; MoH, 2009; Secretary of State for Health, 2007). 
Among health professionals, there are concerns that ongoing assessments may burden 
conscientious practitioners who have little access to resources for ongoing training, but 
fail to engage those who most need to improve their practice, and that competencies may 
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lack relevance to the practice environment (Conlon, 2004; Grossman, 1998; Lysaghta & 
Altschuld, 2000).  
There may be a confusion of objectives for competency assessment among employers, 
registration authorities, and health practitioners, such as, between professional 
development, assessing performance in clinical practice, or managing situations of gross 
incompetence (Conlon, 2004).  Problems  with  a  health  practitioner’s  competence  may 
originate from injury, illness, substance abuse, unethical behaviour, stress, or poor 
behaviour towards other health service personnel (Grossman, 1998). However, in the face 
of an employment investigation, a health practitioner could use an appeal to the 
regulatory level to conflate the nature of the performance issue or delay procedures, even 
where the matter may not be related to clinical competency. US research shows that 
employers can find such protracted proceedings too costly to manage the performance of 
health practitioners in such circumstances (Jost, 1995, 1997a). Yet, most complaints 
about health practitioners do not appear to involve matters of clinical competency (Jost, 
1995; Paterson, 2002), and may therefore not warrant adjudication at the regulatory level. 
These are contentious issues and some commentators have suggested that thresholds be 
established to avoid unnecessary appeals to the regulatory level (Baker, 2006). 
The overarching mechanism in health practitioner regulation is the delegation of the 
management of expertise or professional practice rules to each professional association 
(Tuohy, 2003). To date, moves to strengthen the oversight of registration authorities stop 
short of disrupting this mechanism, or even making its operation more transparent to 
outside observers. 
Levers to organise work among the heal th professions  
This section looks at the traditional levers of referral agreements, inter-professional 
complaints, and the more recent emergence of scopes-of-practice as a means to recognise 
overlaps in roles among the health professions. The focus is on how these levers may be 
used to control the organisation of work among the health professions.  
The system of referrals was first introduced to settle disputes within medicine over the 
ownership of patients. Hospital specialists were permitted to offer outpatient services 
provided they returned the patient to the care of their general practitioner (Abel-Smith, 
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1964). Similar arrangements were struck between medicine and other health professions, 
which reserved the right to clinical decision-making and the allocation of clinical work to 
medical practitioners (Safriet, 2002). From the 1960s nurse practitioners and other non-
medical practitioners have sought similar referral rights to medical practitioners, to 
diagnose patient conditions, take responsibility for treatments, and allocate work to other 
practitioners by ordering tests, treatments, or writing prescriptions. Generally, advanced 
non-medical practitioners such as pharmacists, nurse practitioners, physician assistants or 
physiotherapists have secured restricted rights that only partially overlap those of medical 
practitioners (Bertness, 2009; Cooper & Stoflet, 2004; Safriet, 1992). 
Health practitioners may use inter-professional complaints to shape practitioner behaviour 
around inter-professional boundaries, or to manage rivals (Jost, 1995; Jost et al., 1993). 
Until 1840 the UK physicians prosecuted and even imprisoned competitors such as 
apothecaries,  or  surgeons,  when  they  encroached  on  the  physicians’  clientele.  The  legal 
profession disapproved of these private courts, and today registration authorities are 
restricted to adjudications over the practice of their own registrants (Berlant, 1975; 
Bertness, 2009). However, US research shows that health practitioners may still make 
complaints to registration authorities as a means of taking action against a competitor in 
their own or another health profession. This strategy is useful for inter-professional 
boundary management because it invokes the legal obligation of registration authorities to 
investigate and enforce rules around the permitted scopes-of-practice for its own 
registrants, regardless of whether there is any risk to consumers (Jost, 1995; Jost et al., 
1993). Breaches may be reported from clinical settings and communicated through letters 
of complaint between registration  authorities;  for  instance,  an  Australian  podiatrists’ 
registration  authority  complained  to  a  nurses’  registration  authority  about  nurses 
performing foot care in contravention of podiatry regulations (Nurses Registration Board 
of New South Wales, 2003).  
The  concept  of  a  ‘scope-of-practice’  rather  than  a  ‘protected  title’  became necessary  as  a 
means to legally enable overlaps in ‘who  may perform  what  work’, as nurse practitioners 
and physician assistants took on work previously restricted to medical practitioners (Jost, 
1997b; Safriet, 2002). In jurisdictions that use this concept, registration authorities are 
required to develop and publish specifications for both generalist and specialist scopes-of-
practice (Bertness, 2009; MoH, 2009). Some jurisdictions have constructed legislative 
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frameworks to encourage overlaps in scopes-of-practice as a means to improve the 
flexibility of the health workforce (Beardwood, 1999). This involves certification of 
health practitioners for their scope-of-practice  with  licensure  applied  to  ‘restrict’  the 
performance of specific procedures (MoH, 2009; Safriet, 2002). These schemes 
originated in Ontario in 1991 and were subsequently introduced in other jurisdictions; for 
instance, the Netherlands in 1997, and New Zealand in 2004 (Beardwood, 1999; de Bie et 
al., 2004; MoH, 2009). In theory, overlapped scopes-of-practice solve the problem of 
non-medical practitioners who are educated to perform work but face legal obstacles to 
practice, and may increase the supply of primary care practitioners like Nurse 
Practitioners (Institute of Medicine, 2010).  
There are reasons to doubt that overlaps in scopes-of-practice improve workforce 
flexibility. Traditionally medical practitioners have been permitted to perform, allocate or 
supervise all work in the domain of medical practice (Safriet, 2002). This enabled 
adjustments around the supply of medical practitioners, because medical practitioners 
could delegate or refer less desirable work to non-medical practitioners in situations of 
shortage, and reclaim the work as the numbers of medical practitioners increased 
(McGregor, 2010; Witz, 1994). For instance, orthopaedic surgeons have shed work to 
emergency specialists, physiotherapists, and podiatrists when there has been an 
abundance of interesting orthopaedic work; however, if these referrals occur over 
protracted periods the work may become part of the scopes-of-practice of other 
professions, leading to conflict if surgeons seek to regain this work (Nancarrow, 2005). 
The Canadian experience suggests that a legislative framework that encourages overlaps 
in scopes-of-practice may not increase collaborative behaviour among the health 
professions; to the contrary, it appears to draw attention to inter-professional boundaries 
and intensify demarcation activity (DHS, 2003; Health Professions Regulatory Advisory 
Council (HPRAC), 2001, 2009). 
Scopes-of-practice may also be used to demarcate hierarchies within each health 
profession. In the case of nursing, there may be separate scopes-of-practice between nurse 
practitioners, advanced practitioners, registered nurses, second tier nurses, or nursing 
assistants (Sarah Robinson & Peter Griffiths, 2007); while pharmacy regulators may 
distinguish between pharmacists, pharmacy technicians, and assistants (Noyce, 2006; 
Wick, 2008). As the scopes-of-practice proliferate, there is a risk that this may exacerbate 
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complexity  around  ‘who  may  perform  what’  or  ‘delegate  what  to  whom’  both  within  as 
well as between the health professions.  
Regulation tends to lag practice and regulatory regimes may contain inherent 
inconsistencies, particularly between different health professions. In the United States, 
licensure rules lag the requirements of practice settings, with breaches of regulations by 
nurse practitioners and other non-medical practitioners both common and seldom 
prosecuted (Bertness, 2009; Cooper & Stoflet, 2004). In New Zealand, health professions 
such as ambulance  officers,  army  medics  or  physicians’  assistants are not included under 
the NZ regulatory regime and commonly work under delegation from a medical 
practitioner (Ayling, 2004). The New Zealand Medical Council sets policies for 
relationships between medical practitioners and consumers, or between medical 
colleagues, but has limited jurisdiction in inter-professional delegation (Medical Council 
of New Zealand, 2013b). If a surgeon employs an enrolled nurse to perform some 
surgery, then unless there are complaints regarding the competence of the surgeon this 
matter falls outside of the jurisdictional interests of the Medical Council. Yet surgical 
work is outside the scope-of-practice for an enrolled nurse. In an analogous supervisory 
arrangement between a nurse practitioner and an enrolled nurse, both practitioners might 
be subject to censure from the New Zealand Nursing Council (Nursing Council of New 
Zealand, 2011, 2013). Thus regulatory regimes may entail significant inconsistencies in 
the treatment of similar work by different health professions despite the overall claims 
that such regimes are designed to protect consumers. 
While governments have strengthened their oversight of health practitioner regulation, 
some changes may generate complexity in service delivery. The trend to define scopes-
of-practice within health professions and encourage overlaps between different health 
professions is intended to enable workforce flexibility, but may generate ambiguity and 
complexity  around  ‘who  may  perform  or  delegate  what  work’  in  the  multidisciplinary 
workplace. Difficulties may also arise from conflicting objectives and complexity 
associated with regulators defining and overseeing competencies that may or may not 
usefully support developments to improve the practice environment. 
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4.3 R E G UL A T O R Y ST A K E H O LD E RS IN H E A L T H C AR E 
This section overviews the policies for service improvement and the network of 
regulatory stakeholders governing healthcare. It concludes with a critical look at whether 
goals could be aligned among regulatory stakeholders and the isolated treatment of health 
practitioner regulation in policy reviews. 
Pol icies and agencies in service improvement  
Governments in New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom have used a range of 
policies to improve service delivery. Service contracts have been used to motivate service 
providers, to increase services for targeted diseases or populations, reduce variations in 
clinical practice, or increase efficiency (Bloom, 2000; Cumming & Mays, 2002; Oliver, 
2005). Service guidelines and technology evaluations have encouraged medical 
practitioners to consider current evidence in decision-making, rather than to rely solely on 
their professional training or experience (Chalkidou et al., 2009; Cumming & Mays, 
2010; Rogers, 2000). Service providers may now be expected to reach accreditation 
standards for specialist departments such as laboratories, or for facilities, bed numbers, 
equipment etc. (Bohigas et al., 1996; Burnett et al., 2002). Since 2000, there has been 
more attention to workforce planning due to concerns about the sustainability of the 
health workforce and the skill-mix needed to meet the demands of aging populations 
(Duckett, 2000). Since the 1980s, management reforms and quality improvement 
programmes have been ongoing to improve leadership, teamwork, and clinical processes, 
along with leveraging ICT to improve service delivery (Degeling & Carr, 2004; Powell, 
1995).  
Accreditation programmes, management reforms and quality improvement programmes 
have each been directed to improving a range of inputs in health service organisations. 
Health practitioner regulation also controls inputs to service delivery by governing the 
work of many health professions, which means that interactive effects could arise if 
improvement policies are directed to the control of similar inputs. This might occur in 
accreditation programmes, for instance in prescriptions around the qualifications of health 
professionals, management of clinical technologies, or use of quality indicators in 
reporting systems (Greenfield & Braithwaite, 2008). However, while accreditation has 
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evolved into a multi-million dollar industry, there is only a small literature around these 
programmes, with research underway to improve the evidence base (Braithwaite et al., 
2011; Ovretveit, 2005).  
In contrast to accreditation programmes, there is an established literature around 
management reforms and quality improvement programmes both in healthcare and in 
other industries. While these improvement policies have been directed to improving 
service inputs, such as leadership structures, financial management, ICT and work 
processes; they are also concerned with how best to organise these inputs to realise 
improvements in service efficiency, quality or safety (Ben-Tovim et al., 2008; Hunter, 
1996). Further, these policies have engaged registered health professionals to change 
aspects of their practice environment and work processes. While improving patient care is 
a goal shared among health professionals and managers alike, management techniques for 
quality improvement focus on the overall service to consumers and not the priorities of 
each health profession (Shortell et al., 1998). Thus, studies of management reforms and 
quality improvement programmes could reveal interactions between health practitioner 
regulation and health service improvement. 
As part of implementing improvement policies, governments have moved functions that 
were once part of government-owned health services into new regulatory agencies (Hood 
& Scott, 2000). As these authors point out, the new regulators could act in concert or in 
conflict depending on the circumstances. The combination of many registration 
authorities and other regulatory agencies governing health services has been referred to as 
a ‘network  of  regulatory  stakeholders’  (Braithwaite et al., 2005). As the New Zealand 
Productivity Commission has observed, this reorganisation of government services and 
creation of arms-length agencies can impose significant costs on service delivery. This 
may occur where there has been inadequate consideration of regulatory objectives, design 
of regulatory arrangements, as well as in the implementation of regulations (New Zealand 
Productivity Commission, 2014). 
Figure 6 below illustrates the network of healthcare regulators that may be found in 
jurisdictions like New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom. In the two blue boxes 
are the health service organisations and health practitioners who are the targets of various 
interventions. The red boxes depict the registration agencies, professional associations, 
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and health profession educators that generate or enforce standards for regulated health 
practitioners; in the dashed red box are the regulators tasked with independent 
investigation of consumer complaints, such as the New Zealand HDC, or to review the 
performance  of  registration  authorities,  such  as  Australia’s  AHPRA.  In  the  pink  ovals  are 
the organisations that perform accreditation surveys or quality audits for health service 
organisations,  such  as  the  UK’s  Care  Quality Commission, or the agencies tasked to 
assess  health  technologies  such  as  New  Zealand’s  Pharmaceutical  Management  Agency 
(PHARMAC); the agencies responsible for specification or negotiation of contracts with 
service providers; and the agencies that develop policies around the supply of the health 
workforce,  such  as  the  UK’s  Skills  for  Health,  Health  Workforce  Australia  and  Health 
Workforce New Zealand. In the dark blue box are the agencies that enforce general laws 
such as those for financial audit, competition, or employment; and in the dark blue oval 
are the agencies engaged in health service redesign, such as the NHS Institute or in some 
cases, private consultancy companies. The black arrows depict the focus of regulatory 
oversight, with registration authorities focused on health practitioners or educators, and 
the complaints regulators focused on registration authorities. Other agencies are focused 
on health service organisations with service redesign that is targeted to each level within a 
health service organisation. The area of blue crosshatch on either side of the health 
service organisation draws attention to the opportunities for interventions to interact with 
health practitioner regulation at the levels of the organisations, teams, and health 
practitioners. 
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Figure  6 The  ne twork of regulatory stakeholde rs in healthcare   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Health service organisations are the subject of direct or indirect oversight from these 
regulatory agencies, and consumers are the intended beneficiaries. Yet, there appears to 
be relatively less representation of the interests of consumers or health service 
organisations within the network. Consumers may complain to registration authorities, 
independent complaints investigators, or health service organisations about the quality of 
services (Paterson, 2002). However, they are generally not presented with any choice 
around the design of service delivery; for instance, whether they would prefer to receive 
tests and treatments at a single visit, or to make separate appointments with different 
service providers. Health service organisations are subject to many improvement policies 
and are likely to face significant complexity in decision-making generated by competing 
agendas among this network of regulators (Hood & Scott, 2000). 
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Pol icy goals and the potent ial for interact ions 
Regulatory  networks  in  healthcare  are  complex  with  an  absence  of  ‘super-regulators’  to 
draw regulatory functions together (Lewis, Rosete, & Mays, 2006). Different regulators 
could independently develop policies (Hood & Scott, 2000), such as professional scopes-
of-practice, accreditation for a particular type of service, or performance targets for an 
aspect of service delivery. Differing goals for service improvement or differences in focus 
among regulators could generate unanticipated interactive effects in service delivery. 
The goal of health practitioner regulation is to protect consumers by focusing on the 
competence of professionals in each health profession (McDonald, 2010). In contrast, the 
goals of service improvement include improving the quality, safety or efficiency of health 
service operations overall (McDonald, 2010; Powell et al., 2009). There is some evidence 
that management ideas about quality improvement have influenced health professionals, 
with medical leaders stressing the importance of environmental and systemic factors in 
the maintenance of safe, high-quality services (Leape, Berwick, & Bates, 2002; Reason, 
2004). There has also been some attention to how health practitioner regulation could 
influence the progress of service improvement through its effect on job design or the 
flexibility of the health workforce (Australian Productivity Commission, 2005). The US 
Institute of Medicine (IoM, 2001) has identified service fragmentation as the major 
source of quality problems, and recommends general management techniques such as 
teamwork, inter-professional communication, and clinical ICT to improve the 
coordination and quality of care. These management techniques are central to quality 
improvement programmes that have been led by both general managers and clinical 
leaders (Powell et al., 2009).  
These developments suggest some convergence of thinking about health service 
improvement. There could be a case for focusing the efforts of regulatory stakeholders 
around a combined goal, such as to improve both quality and efficiency, and enable 
innovation as long as it is consistent with consumer safety. However, the focus of 
registration agencies is on professionals within a specific health profession, while 
management reforms and quality improvement programmes are directed to the overall 
delivery of care.  
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Two areas for potential interactions could reveal much about the effect of health 
practitioner regulation on health service improvement. First, there could be interactive 
effects from differing policies among registration authorities. The independent creation of 
separately regulated scopes-of-practice could contribute to demarcation activities as 
health professions police their boundaries, generating complexity in inter-professional 
practice. If differing policies contribute to the fragmentation of care, then this could 
exacerbate quality problems in service delivery. Second, the policies of registration 
authorities could interact with those of other stakeholders, notably employers. 
Registration authorities, professional associations, and health profession educators are 
primarily engaged in the implementation of clinical training and practice standards among 
registered health professionals (Jost, 1997b; Price, 2002). There are overlaps in 
responsibilities between registration agencies and employers around the verification of 
qualifications and experience, and the management of performance (MoH, 2012). Weak 
cohesion between health practitioner training and the practice needs of service delivery 
could generate difficulties around the integration of new graduates into practice, or the 
matching of practitioner skills to new service designs. Changes to require registration 
authorities to oversee scopes-of-practice or competency could produce interactive effects, 
such as ambiguity around the roles of health practitioners, the authority of regulators and 
employers, permitted inter-professional supervisory arrangements, or accountabilities in 
clinical practice. These overlaps could operate synergistically, be a source of duplication 
or inefficiency, or generate conflict. 
Pol icy reviews of heal th pract i t ioner regulat ion 
I now return to the subject of health practitioner regulation in the context of policies for 
service improvement. Policy reviews tend to draw on traditional axioms about 
occupational regulation, with little consideration of the potential for interactions in the 
health workforce or with service improvement policies. I offer the tentative suggestion 
that it could be possible to proceed differently as has been illustrated in the case of the 
financial services sector in Australia. 
First, policy reviews tend to assume the traditional options of registration, certification, 
and licensure, although the lightest option of registration has been rarely used. A lighter 
feature of the New Zealand scheme is that consumers may complain to a consumer 
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watchdog  about  any  person  offering  a  healthcare  service,  and  the  practitioner’s  actions 
may be assessed  according  to  a  charter  of  patients’  rights  (MoH, 2009). Generally, 
registration schemes have been rare because they offer limited standards or expertise to 
support investigations of poor practice. It has been more common to adopt certification or 
licensure in which the tasks of setting standards and monitoring the performance of 
professionals have been delegated to professional associations (DHS, 2003; Ogus, 1995; 
Safriet, 2002). However, the differences between licensure and certification appear to be 
difficult to distinguish in healthcare. Licensure is common in the United States, where it 
is unlawful for persons who are not registered under a health profession scope-of-practice 
to perform health services (Bertness, 2009). In other English-speaking jurisdictions like 
the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand certification has been preferred (Kings 
Fund, 2007; McDonald, 2010). Certification is held to be a lighter scheme than licensure 
because  it  does  not  prohibit  individuals  who  are  not  ‘certified’  from  performing  services. 
Yet, under certification registered health practitioners must apply annually for practising 
certificates and report their areas of competency to their registration authority. Failure to 
do so could risk censure or deregistration by the respective registration authority (Allsop 
& Jones, 2005; Fels, 2007). Health professionals are also required by their registration 
authorities to perform work within their scope-of-practice or competencies (Medical 
Council of New Zealand, 2013b). While in theory there is no prohibition against 
unregistered persons providing health services in certification schemes, it is not clear that 
this is any more likely to occur than under licensure. 
Second, policy-makers have been guided by generic principles for regulatory best 
practice; for instance, the principles of the UK Better Regulation Taskforce (2003) have 
informed policy reviews in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand (Department 
of Health Extending Professional Regulation Working Group, 2009; von Tigerstrom & 
Ellena, 2005). According to these principles regulation should be proportional to the risks 
to be managed, have consistent rules and standards, be transparent to stakeholders, and 
target the problem with minimal side effects. Some of these principles are evident in 
recent changes to standardise regulation across the health professions, and in measures to 
improve the transparency and performance of registration authorities. However, it may 
not be possible to satisfy all principles equally and change is likely to be tempered by 
politics (Salter, 1999).  
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Third, in the context of the progressive expansion of regulatory regimes, it could be 
timely to reassess the implications for management of risk and the cost of this regulatory 
option. Inconsistent outcomes for the management of risk are evident in New Zealand, 
which has 16 registration authorities responsible for certification of health practitioners 
and five activities restricted due to their potential risk to consumers. However, these 
restrictions do not apply to over 35 health professions that are not included within this 
legislation (MoH, 2013a; 2013b). In both Australia and New Zealand, there are health 
professionals who practice outside of certification schemes and may perform these 
restricted activities, including defence force medics, physician assistants, and emergency 
medical technicians (Jolly, 2008; MoH. 2009; Williams, Brown, & Onsman, 2012). Risks 
could also arise when professional practice rules contribute to ambiguity or conflict 
around roles, authority, or accountability in health services (Brown et al., 2000; Brown et 
al., 2011). If the policies of independent registration authorities tend to fragment care 
around the inter-professional boundaries, this could have implications for quality 
improvement in health services. Given that these inconsistencies or conflicts could 
contribute to risks for consumers, the effectiveness of health practitioner regulation in 
consumer protection deserves more scrutiny.  
Self-regulation is considered cost effective for governments (Fels, 2007; Ogus, 1995), but 
extensive regulation of the health workforce and intensified government oversight 
suggest that this axiom deserves scrutiny. Registration requirements for longer training 
have increased both the cost of training and the remuneration for registered professionals 
(Fels, 2007; Humphris et al., 2010). Direct costs tend to fall on employers who pay 
registration fees for health professionals in accordance with industrial agreements, or for 
these fees to be passed on to purchasers. There is also potential for indirect costs in the 
clinical workplace (The Treasury, 2012), such as those associated with meeting 
requirements for professional development that may or may not relate to an 
organisations’  priorities for improving service delivery. In New Zealand, employers have 
complained about increased costs for annual practising certificates, following legislation 
for registration authorities to continuously monitor the competency of health 
practitioners. Government has responded by attempting to persuade the 16 registration 
authorities to make efficiencies by sharing their administrative resources (Health 
Workforce New Zealand, 2013b). As governments have expanded regulatory regimes or 
intensified their oversight, they have invested more public resources to monitor 
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registration authorities, investigate complaints, or operate health practitioner courts. 
Recent expansion of coverage and increased government oversight could have eroded the 
anticipated cost effectiveness of self-regulation by each health profession. 
Fourth, there could be potential for suppression of service innovation or improvement if 
such changes do not fit within professional practice rules. An Australian review pointed 
to difficulties for innovation around job design, while in the United States professional 
practice rules have been found to block new models of service delivery (Australian 
Productivity Commission, 2005; Christensen et al., 2000). These difficulties may not be 
unique to healthcare regulation. In the Australian financial services industry, regulatory 
oversight had been divided between specialist agencies for particular types of financial 
institutions like banks or insurance companies, and oversight of industry-wide issues like 
maintenance of a competitive environment. The limitations of this approach were 
apparent as innovations produced conglomerates offering both banking and insurance 
services. From 1998, Australia reorganised the regulatory agencies, tasking them to work 
together to achieve an optimal balance between competing regulatory objectives, 
strengthen their oversight of the sources of market failure, minimise the cost of 
regulation, and enable innovation as long as consumer protection is not compromised 
(Carmichael & Pomerisano, 2002).  
An analogous approach in healthcare might align regulatory objectives or rebalance 
authority among registration authorities and other healthcare regulators. Collaboration 
among the network of regulatory stakeholders (Braithwaite et al., 2005) might improve 
the design of training programmes for health practitioners, find consensus on policies to 
address difficulties in inter-professional practice, or create shelter arrangements to trial 
new models for service delivery. However, advancing these or similar agendas seems 
unlikely without further research to identify how health practitioner regulation could 
impede service improvement, along with political consensus as to the potential benefits of 
rethinking regulatory design in healthcare.  
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C ON C LUSION 
This chapter has provided an overview of the mechanisms in health practitioner 
regulation and improvement policies for health service organisations. It has revealed 
similar arrangements in English-speaking and similar developed economies, with policy 
directions for the inclusion of more health professions in regulatory regimes, increased 
government oversight of registration authorities, and policies to improve the performance 
of health service organisations. It has indicated that independent policy making among 
the network of regulatory stakeholders in healthcare might have unintended effects in 
health service organisations. Management reforms and quality improvement programmes 
have been identified as offering the best lens for observation of policy interactions with 
health practitioner regulation. For these policies, there is a well-developed literature and 
these changes engage the health workforce in their implementation. Therefore the effects 
of health practitioner regulation might be observable in published accounts of service 
improvement. 
The chapter also found reasons to doubt the usefulness of traditional accounts of health 
practitioner regulation. Historically, the regulation of medicine established a justification 
for self-regulation that has now been applied to most of the health workforce. This 
historical justification assumed a single health profession with practitioners mostly 
operating as sole traders in their relationships with consumers. In the context of many 
regulated health professions and most practitioners employed in health service 
organisations, this justification deserves scrutiny. Yet, there has been scant attention to 
how regulation focused on individual health professions could play out in a 
multidisciplinary workforce. Scholars have suggested that control of training may be used 
to  progress  a  health  profession’s  self-interest, and there is some evidence for self-interest 
in the use of referral rights and inter-professional complaints. Yet this could be the tip of 
an iceberg if registration status could be used to control various resources in the 
multidisciplinary workplace.  
Of the recent changes to health practitioner regulation, two were selected for further 
investigation. First, overlaps in scopes-of-practice appear to erode the authority of 
medical practitioners to organise healthcare work, to encourage independent elaboration 
of professional subdivisions and intra-professional practice rules by registration 
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authorities. Second, the continuing oversight of competency by registration authorities 
appears to extend their remit into the realm of health service management. The combined 
effects  of  these  changes  could  be  to  exacerbate  complexity  and  ambiguity  around  ‘who 
may  perform  what  work’,  ‘what  work  may  be  delegated’,  or  ‘who  may  supervise  whom’ 
among the health workforce. There is also the question of whether employers who appear 
to have little representation among the network of regulatory stakeholders have sufficient 
authority to resolve questions concerning rules generated from the regulatory level. 
Management reforms and quality improvement programmes in health service 
organisations were also selected for further investigation. These policies include changes 
to leadership, teamwork, electronic record keeping, streamlining of workflow, and more 
integrated models of service delivery. Practitioners from different health professions 
could be grouped together in multidisciplinary teams, technologies traditionally 
controlled by particular professions could be redistributed to others, or new roles could be 
created by mixing skills from different health professions. Changes of this sort could be 
difficult unless improvement policies align to professional practice rules for each health 
profession. Therefore these policies offer a promising lens through which to observe 
interactive effects between health practitioner regulation and health service improvement.  
This chapter has highlighted the importance of health service organisations and inter-
professional practice in contributing to patient safety and the quality of care. It also 
questioned whether independent policy-making by registration authorities would enhance 
or detract from inter-professional collaboration. To understand how health practitioner 
regulation could interact with health service improvement, it is necessary to delve deeper 
into the mechanisms of health practitioner regulation and how these could play out among 
the many professions in the health workforce. 
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5 
 R E GU L ATOR Y P RIV IL E G E A ND L E V E R A G E IN TH E 
H E A LTH WOR K F OR C E 
 
IN TR OD UC TION 
This chapter builds on the macro-level understanding of the mechanisms of health 
practitioner regulation, to trace the effects at the micro-level in the health workforce. It 
investigates the levers enabled by health practitioner regulation, constructing a lens that 
could  link  the  regulatory  level  to  events  in  health  services.  This  includes  the  ‘visible 
levers’  of  health  practitioner  regulation  that  are  commonly  specified  in  legislation,  and 
other levers that emerged in the 19th century construction of the health workforce. The 
focus is on how these levers enable the health professions to control a range of resources 
in  both  supply  chains  and  service  delivery  organisations.  ‘Resources’  refers  to  both 
tangible assets like clinical equipment or ICT,  or  ‘near  patient’  technologies  that  shift 
work from particular professions to other professionals or consumers, and intangible 
assets like specialist or generic expertise that enable a health service organisation to 
deliver services. These levers, which I  refer  to  as  ‘regulatory privilege’,  could  enable 
professional associations to leverage state sponsored self-regulation to control resources 
in their own interests. The visible levers of health practitioner regulation may be likened 
to flags erected on the surface of an iceberg, and as with the iceberg, the bulk of 
regulatory privilege could be less visible existing below the waterline in the application of 
professional practice rules in the realm of clinical practice. Contemporary discourse about 
the health professions is used to investigate how regulatory privilege could be used to 
control resources, and to consider some implications for the professions themselves and 
for the improvement of health services. 
Section 5.1 explains how regulatory privilege enables the health professions to 
communicate their strategies throughout the health sector. Section 5.2 begins the survey 
of  regulatory  privilege  looking  ‘above  the  waterline’  at  control  over  expertise,  training,  or 
titles, and the implied quality guarantee to consumers. Section 5.3 takes this survey 
  120 
below the waterline, to the control of clinical technologies and ICT. It shows how 
laboratories, medical imaging practices, and pharmacists have shaped technologies in 
directions that strengthen their services. Section 5.4 looks at the use of less tangible 
levers, at how special language and profession-led role definition may be used to 
demarcate work and impede inter-professional collaborative practice, drawing on 
illustrations from medicine, nursing, pharmacy, and therapy professions. Section 5.5 
explains the importance of the referral and inter-professional complaints systems to the 
maintenance of traditional divisions in the health workforce. 
5.1 C O NDUITS F O R R E G UL A T O R Y PR IVIL E G E  
This section explains how linkages in the health industry enable the transmission of 
strategies from professional associations both to members of the respective health 
profession, and to other stakeholders in the health industry. It defines a health profession, 
revisits the traditional notion that professional power is vested in unique knowledge, and 
concludes by outlining the range of resources that could be subject to control by the 
health professions. 
Before surveying the range of resources that health professions may control, it is 
necessary to explain how an occupation, social group, or individual health practitioner 
may  exercise  control  over  assets  that  are  owned  by  health  service  organisations.  Savage’s 
definition  of  a  profession  ‘as  a  network  of  strategic  alliances’  assists  by  showing how a 
health profession may operate collectively to progress matters of common interest to its 
members and at the same time enable those members to operate independently for other 
purposes:     
A profession is a network of strategic alliances across ownership boundaries 
among practitioners who share a core competence (Savage, 1994, p. 131) 
According to Savage, professions are distinguished by knowledge and skills, explicit or 
tacit, which are either unique to the profession or too costly for another profession to 
acquire. The profession network is comprised of a group or community of practitioners in 
which individuals operate separately for many purposes, but depend on the network to 
develop and maintain the core competencies that enable them to generate income. 
Members of the network are able to engage in an exchange of knowledge and services or 
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create production routines in support of their common interests, independently of the 
organisations in which they are employed. Individuals may contribute to the group 
through the development of new knowledge or techniques, and by ensuring that their own 
practice  and  that  of  colleagues  is  consistent  with  the  group’s  reputation  for  service  quality 
(Savage, 1994). This definition is important because it draws attention to the networked 
nature of the health professions, and their capacity to operate across or within the 
boundaries of various stakeholder organisations.  
Similarly Begun and Lippincott (1993) explain  health  professions  as  ‘communities’  that 
are led by an elite network of senior practitioners who may occupy positions of influence 
in health sector organisations, and simultaneously contribute to the leadership of their 
professional association, for instance in: education institutions, materials and technology 
suppliers, regulatory agencies, health services, and healthcare purchasers. This 
explanation is useful because it draws attention to the potential similarity of health 
professions to organisations engaged in strategic supply chains, in which a network of 
leaders may act in concert to pursue their common strategic interests (Chen & Paulraj, 
2004).  
While the networked character of health professions may explain their capacity to pursue 
strategies through many conduits for influence, it does seem sufficient to explain the 
persistence of the health professions or their authorities to exercise control over resources 
owned by others. Savage (1994) traces this authority to the ownership of unique 
knowledge assets within the profession network, i.e. because professions may leverage 
knowledge and skills that are either unique to a profession or too costly for others to 
acquire. Thus, if the production of an X-ray or checking of a prescription medicine 
requires knowledge uniquely held by a particular health profession, then only members of 
the respective profession can perform these tasks. However, unique knowledge assets 
seem implausible as a sufficient explanation for the persistence of historic divisions in the 
health workforce or the control over resources owned by others. While new knowledge 
and technologies may contribute to building health professions or creating new 
specialties, it does not explain why advances in education, clinical technologies, and 
information communication technologies (ICT) have not led to changes that supplant the 
19th century divisions in the health workforce.  
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Rather than rely on unique knowledge assets, health professions have successfully 
lobbied governments for statutory authority for self-regulation, which confers authority to 
both generate and enforce professional practice rules. Even when health practitioner 
regulation stops short of the licensure that restricts the performance of work to the 
members of particular health professions, regulation still enables professional practice 
rules to be enforced in ways that may control both health practitioners and resources. In 
an industry characterised by many regulated health professions, control over patient 
referrals and inter-professional complaints may be used to control both colleagues and 
members of competing health professions. Registration status may also be reinforced by 
other regulatory agencies, which have used it as a basis to define, assess or ration aspects 
of health service delivery. Therefore, the capacity for regulated health professions to 
exercise control over resources they do not own may in some instances relate to unique 
knowledge assets, but could also relate to their right to generate or enforce professional 
practice rules that restrict the use of various resources. This could have effect on 
organisations engaged in either supply chains or in service delivery. 
If health professions control expertise and specialised resources, this could be useful to 
health service organisations, enabling a division of labour in which managers focus on 
securing contracts, or managing the procurement of facilities, equipment and materials, 
while the health professions oversee the use of these resources in clinical practice. It 
seems plausible to imagine a harmonious arrangement of this sort, under conditions of 
generous resources or uncritical acceptance of service quality. Since the 1980s healthcare 
has become the focus of policies to contain expenditure, and public expectations for 
better quality of care. Governments have both strengthened health practitioner regulation 
and implemented quality improvement programmes in health service organisations. 
Quality improvement programmes call for managers to engage health professionals in 
reorganising resources to improve the overall quality of services for consumers. In this 
context ‘who may control these resources’ could be important, and conflicts could arise 
where the reorganisation of resources in health service organisations is inconsistent with 
the policies of the many independent registration authorities.  
Figure 7 below depicts four groups of resources that could be subject to regulatory 
privilege. In the red oval is the quality guarantee and control of titles at the heart of health 
practitioner regulation, and in the red rectangles are expertise and training. In the purple 
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rectangles are clinical technologies, clinical information and ICT; in the pink rectangles 
are the less tangible levers of special language and role definition; and in the blue 
rectangles, the referral agreements and inter-professional complaints that have 
implications for the coordination of work in healthcare.  
Figure  7: Leve rs in the  exe rcise  of regulatory privilege  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I use these four groups of levers to assist the narrative. The first group of regulatory 
levers  are  ‘above  the  waterline’  in  the  sense  that  they  are  commonly  included  in 
legislation and scholarly discourse on health practitioner regulation. These include 
expertise, training, quality guarantees and titles. The other three groups of regulatory 
levers are below the waterline because they involve the less obvious application of 
professional practice rules to control resources in clinical practice, and have received 
scant attention in the scholarly discourse. The second group of levers includes clinical 
technologies and ICT that are tangible resources, and the third group includes the less 
tangible resources of special languages and role definition. The fourth group includes the 
use of inter-profession referrals and complaints that contribute to maintaining the 
traditional divisions in the health workforce.   
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It is possible that health professions use these levers in various combinations to control 
resources, limit the clinical practice of other professions in the health workforce or shape 
the use of resources in health service organisations, depending on the opportunities or 
political circumstances. Light (2000) coins  the  term  ‘countervailing  powers’  to  explain 
shifts in the relationship between the health professions and the state over time, and 
points out that dominant behaviour by the health professions can lead to excesses that 
inevitably provoke the exercise of counter-measures from other social, political, or 
economic groups. Given these risks, the less visible the levers of regulatory privilege, the 
more valuable they may be. If regulatory privilege is pursued in everyday clinical 
practice, then it may be important to identify how this occurs, particularly if the effect of 
this regulation on health services appears to be difficult for policy-makers to assess (The 
Treasury, 2012).    
In the next four sections, I draw on illustrations from medicine, nursing, pharmacy, 
physiotherapy, laboratory science, and medical imaging to investigate how these levers 
that were evident in the emergence of the health professions may be reinforced by health 
practitioner regulation and continue to shape the use of resources in modern healthcare. 
5.2 AB O V E T H E W A T E R LIN E :  
T R ADIT IO N A L R E G UL A T O R Y L E V E RS 
This section considers some traditional levers of health practitioner regulation that lie 
above the waterline in the sense that they are commonly evident in legislation. These 
include the implicit control over expertise, the explicit control over training and titles, and 
the quality guarantee implicit in the regulatory objective of consumer protection. In each 
case there could be reasons to rethink the importance of these levers for consumer 
protection in the 21st century. Of particular interest is how these levers may relate to 
problems around flexibility in the health workforce or fragmentation in service delivery. 
E xpert ise 
There were historical reasons for a tight coupling of expertise, specialisation, and the 
regulation of professions, because few citizens were educated, and knowledge was 
difficult to generate or communicate. Thus educated professionals were important 
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resources to governments as they built the apparatus of the modern state to provide 
education, healthcare, and social welfare services (Berlant, 1975; Weisz, 2006). Today, 
research is less likely to be tightly coupled with clinical practice, and there is evidence 
that it is difficult to disseminate knowledge across boundaries between the health 
professions (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006). If the health professions exercise their 
regulatory privilege to resist sharing expertise across inter-professional boundaries and 
these difficulties are widespread, this is likely to impede the progress of service 
improvement that depends on collaborative practice and knowledge sharing among 
members of different health professions. 
Claims to unique expertise have characterised the development of the health professions. 
Health professions typically have foundation stories, in which early practitioners are 
celebrated for their role in contributing to the knowledge base of the profession, such as 
the work of Joseph Lister in developing aseptic techniques in surgery, Florence 
Nightingale in ensuring that nurses had the skills for accurate clinical observation, or 
Thomas  Bessell  Kidner’s  mapping  of  occupational  activities to rehabilitation for 
occupational therapists (Alexander, 1985; Dingwall et al., 1988; Friedland & Silva, 
2008). Through the 19th century, relatively few people were literate or educated, so state 
sanctioned self-regulation appears to have performed an important service for consumers, 
by identifying those practitioners who had a legitimate claim to knowledge and practice 
in the delivery of healthcare (Berlant, 1975).    
Today, social conditions have changed and expertise is no longer uniquely vested in 
bodies of knowledge developed or maintained solely by particular health professions 
(Johnson, 1995). While trained health professionals may be engaged in research, there has 
been a separation between those who make a career in research and those who are in 
clinical practice (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006). The process of clinical research has 
vastly expanded with multidisciplinary research teams engaged in translating new 
scientific knowledge into clinical applications, or in efforts to implement new knowledge 
into clinical practice (Woolf, 2008). Institutions, such as the Cochrane Collaboration, 
have evolved to assemble and synthesize the complex array of research findings so that 
they may be disseminated into clinical practice (Harrison, 1998). A health practitioner 
may have specialist expertise relevant to particular clinical circumstances, but the idea of  
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a health profession as the cradle for unique knowledge became outdated through the late 
20th century (Johnson, 1995). 
In the 21st century, the problem of how to translate clinical research into practice appears 
to  have  overtaken  the  historical  need  to  nurture  and  protect  a  health  profession’s  capacity 
to develop new knowledge. Even where research findings have been synthesized so that 
they may be useful to health practitioners, there appear to be difficulties with translation 
into clinical practice. Depending on the circumstances, these difficulties could relate to 
the practice environment, the professional, health practitioner regulation, the patient, or 
the quality of the guideline (Davis & Taylor-Vaisey, 1997). Consequently, policy-makers 
have begun to look for ways to improve collaboration between researchers, health 
professionals, and health service organisations (Greenhalgh et al., 2004; Sussman, 
Valente, Rohrbach, Skara, & Pentz, 2006). In contrast to the claims about unique 
expertise being vested in each health profession, the modern challenge appears to be how 
best to communicate expertise from multidisciplinary research institutes into practice 
settings, and across inter-professional boundaries (Currie & Suhomlinova, 2006; Ferlie et 
al., 2005). This task could be complicated by the persistence of historically constructed 
divisions and scopes-of-practice in the health workforce. 
As new knowledge emerges from multidisciplinary research, it is likely to generate 
opportunities to redistribute expertise in the health workforce. Instead of different tests or 
treatments being performed by practitioners from different health professions, new 
technologies could enable a range of tests or treatments to be delivered by a single health 
practitioner. While this could create an integrated service experience for consumers, the 
association of unique expertise with particular scopes-of-practice could slow, or even 
obstruct, the knowledge sharing required for such a redistribution of tasks. 
Training 
It is important that health practitioners acquire the appropriate clinical knowledge and 
skills for their roles, which is likely to involve teaching or supervision by experienced 
practitioners. Traditionally each professional association and registration authority has the 
authority to govern this training. However, this might not be the best way to prepare a  
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flexible workforce, where roles could need to adapt rapidly to accommodate fluctuations 
in patient demand, or to enable new service designs. 
In the 19th century the teaching or university hospital was an integrated cradle for 
research, teaching and clinical practice, with the medical profession in charge of each of 
these activities (Abel-Smith, 1964; Dingwall et al., 1988; Francis & Humphreys, 1999b). 
Since the late 20th century, the teaching hospital as a solution for training has come under 
pressure. Many health professions have shifted the locus of their training to education 
institutions in order to develop advanced practitioner roles and secure independence from 
medicine, as has occurred in nursing, radiography, physiotherapy and pharmacy 
(Desmeules et al., 2012; Furlong & Smith, 2005; Hardy & Snaith, 2009; Tonna, Stewart, 
West, & McCaig, 2007). In government-owned health services, there have also been 
policies for unbundling of the activities of research and teaching from clinical practice, as 
a means to focus hospitals on more efficient delivery of clinical services (Mintzberg, 
1997). The sustained policies for more community, or home-based services create a range 
of additional practice settings to integrate into training programmes (Epping-Jordon, 
Pruitt, Bengoa, & Wagner, 2004). 
Criticisms of hospital-led training were that the demands of service delivery took 
precedence over the needs of students, with students missing out on opportunities to learn 
or expected to work beyond their capability (Francis & Humphreys, 1999b). In the shift 
to combined profession and education-led training, students became surplus to the 
staffing needs of health services. This has its own difficulties as educators must find 
suitable placements with appropriate supervisors for students in both hospital and 
community settings (Budgena & Gamrothb, 2008; Collins, 2010; Lewkonia, 2002; 
Rodger et al., 2008; The College of Radiographers, 2004).  
There is some evidence of strain between regulators, education providers, and health 
service organisations. Governments have intervened to retain certificate level training for 
nurses in the United Kingdom and New Zealand, and to address employer concerns about 
the competency of nurse graduates in the United Kingdom (Farrand, McMullan, Jowett, 
& Humphreys, 2006; Francis & Humphreys, 1999a; Meek, 2009). Some universities have 
responded to calls for more collaborative practice among the health professions by 
introducing inter-disciplinary training experiences. So far, there is a lack of clarity as to 
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the effectiveness of these developments for improving inter-professional collaboration 
(Reeves et al., 2009). In the United States, there have been conflicts between the 
requirements of professional associations for doctorate-level training, the capacity of 
universities to offer clinical doctorates, and employers’  interests  in  shorter  qualifications 
to contain the cost growth of salaries (Collier, 2008). In the United Kingdom, the Council 
for Regulatory Excellence in Healthcare (CHRE) has begun to ask registration authorities 
why it is necessary for them to accredit training courses given that universities are already 
subject to other accreditation programmes (Harry Cayton, Chief Executive CHRE, 
personal communication, April, 2012).  
Health practitioner regulation could be an obstacle to more integrated training or flexible 
career paths for the health workforce. In theory, tertiary educators might develop training 
that enables different pathways into practice by enabling both registered and assistant 
practitioners to train for tasks that are not part of their present scope-of-practice (Duckett, 
2005a; Sibbald et al., 2004). The structure of university degrees could allow for major 
and minor subjects, cross crediting of courses, or progression through certificate, degree, 
and post-graduate qualifications to create a flexible framework for training or career 
paths. There seem to be at least three difficulties, however, in achieving such changes. 
First, the health professions occupy disciplinary positions in the structures of universities, 
and universities are also struggling with how to accommodate inter-disciplinary ways of 
working (Abbott, 2001; Sá, 2008). Second, each health profession school must meet the 
accreditation standards of their respective registration authority (Duckett, 2005a; Price, 
2002). Third, as Willis and King (2010) observed in the Australian setting, there does not 
appear to be a forum for regulators, educators, employers, or health workforce agencies to 
communicate around directions for workforce development. The situation is similar in 
New Zealand, while in the United Kingdom CHRE has instituted informal stakeholder 
conferences to discuss some issues such as the accreditation of health practitioner training 
(Harry Cayton, Chief Executive CHRE, personal communication, April, 2012). These are 
each significant challenges but the most powerful obstacle appears to be the legally 
sanctioned authority of each health profession to independently determine its own 
training. 
The oversight of training by registration authorities depends on the independent policy 
making by many registration authorities, each focusing narrowly on particular health 
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professions. This system may not produce sufficient adjustment in the preparation of the 
health workforce to meet the evolving needs of service delivery (Collier, 2008; Willis & 
King, 2010). It could be necessary to develop more responsive arrangements, with closer 
working between research institutes, registration authorities, educators, policy-makers 
and employers, along with loosening of the reigns held by registration authorities. 
Qual i ty guarantees 
The promise that care will meet quality standards and consumers will be protected from 
harm underpins the statutory recognition of self-regulation for health practitioners 
(Roberts & Dietrich, 1999). However, this promise may prove difficult to keep given the 
complexity of modern health services. For example, in New Zealand a Ministerial Task 
Group (2009) reported that health professionals, particularly those practising medicine, 
feel accountable for the quality of their clinical decisions, but also feel increasingly less 
able to influence decisions at various levels of the health system that could affect patient 
outcomes. Most health practitioners appear to be competent, and the major source of 
quality problems appears to relate to service fragmentation in which patients are 
transferred between different health practitioners creating disruptions to communication 
or delays in service delivery (Institute of Medicine, 2001; Jost, 1997a; Leape et al., 2009; 
Paterson, 2002). Ongoing development of subspecialties within the existing health 
professions could exacerbate the problem of fragmentation by making it more difficult to 
match health practitioners to patient needs (Dubois & Singh, 2009). Rather than relying 
on health practitioner regulation, contemporary interventions to improve service quality 
or patient safety are focused on the design of practice environments, development of 
clinical leadership and communication skills necessary for inter-professional 
collaborative practice, organisational learning from monitoring of adverse events, 
workplace training for all personnel around patient safety, and some development of 
functional flexibility among health professionals (Baker, Jeffs, Law, & Norton, 2005; 
Baker & Norton, 2004; Desombre, Kelliherw, Macfarlane, & Ozbilginz, 2006). The 
competency of health practitioners is one contributing factor in patient safety, but it could 
also be counter-productive if scopes-of-practice are poorly aligned to other interventions 
designed to improve practice environments and inter-professional collaboration. 
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Control of t i t les 
Title  protection  was  originally  designed  to  inform  consumers  about  a  health  practitioner’s 
qualifications, but there is now a proliferation of protected titles that could be confusing 
(Begun & Lippincott, 1993; Berlant, 1975). There is also a proliferation of workplace 
titles that provide  information  about  an  individual’s  role or work area, but may not reveal 
whether they are a registered health professional, or which qualification they hold; for 
example,  titles  like  ‘coordinator  rehabilitation’,  ‘community  care  organiser’,  ‘quality 
leader’,  ‘unit  manager’  etc.  ‘Dr’  is  a  title  that  may  no  longer  be  restricted  to  medical 
practitioners (Collier, 2008),  and  titles  such  as  ‘clinician’,  ‘Dr  nurse’,  ‘nurse  practitioner’, 
or  ‘physician  assistant’  may  not  clarify  matters  for  consumers.  Today,  protected  titles  do 
not seem to be necessary as a means to determine that a health practitioner is trained, as 
employers,  purchasers  and  insurers  verify  a  practitioner’s  qualifications  and  assess their 
experience (Bertness, 2009).  
Protected titles seem anachronistic in the 21st century, but they remain important to the 
regulated health professions (McDonald, 2010; Office of Professions, 2001). Some 
protected titles could operate more like brands that associate particular health professions 
to images of quality, authority or integrity, which could be useful to attract patients, 
influence political decisions around funding of particular services or technologies, or win 
public sympathy in industrial negotiations (de Chernatony & Dall'Olmo Riley, 1998). 
Among health professionals, advocacy to influence policy-makers or to shape consumer 
behaviour has been identified as a core competency useful for improving population 
health (International Council of Nurses, 2008). However, it could be difficult to separate 
professional expertise, professional self-interest, and the public interest when health 
professionals and consumer groups seek to influence health policy, for example, where 
midwives campaign for funding of home births, or when medical specialists publicly 
support the funding of new medicines (Gabe et al., 2012; Reiger, 2000). As Salter (2003) 
points out, there is a delicate balancing act in which policy-makers depend on the health 
professions to implement policies such as the rationing of health services, and consumer 
acceptance of service rationing depends on maintaining public trust in the health 
professions.  
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Health profession control of expertise, training, and titles was important in the 19th 
century world of knowledge generation and skills transfer among the few medical 
practitioners who had access to education, capital, and new technologies. The teaching 
hospital emerged as a cradle for the integration of research, training and clinical practice 
under the oversight of medicine. In contrast, there are quite different challenges in the 
21st century to bring new knowledge and technologies into a range of practice locations, 
and to overcome the fragmentation associated with historically based workforce divisions 
through redistributing skills among the health workforce. In these circumstances, there 
could need to be changes to health practitioner regulation and new mechanisms for 
aligning research, training, and clinical practice to the needs of consumers.  
5.3 B E L O W T H E W A T E R LIN E  
O N E : C O N T R O L O F T E C HN O L O G IES 
This section looks at the how innovations in clinical technologies or clinical information 
communication technologies (ICT) could be welcomed by a regulated health profession 
as a means to build their scope-of-practice, but resisted if the innovation erodes their 
control over their work. It begins by drawing attention to how computer professionals 
have had to adapt to technology innovations that disrupted their work. In contrast the 
health professionals could use their registration status to exercise more control over 
technologies integral to their scopes-of-practice, and this could be essential for the 
survival of a particular health profession. The section draws on illustrations from 
laboratory medicine, radiology, and pharmacy. It concludes by outlining how this use of 
regulatory privilege could be a limiting factor in the evolution of new business models in 
healthcare. 
Clinical technologies have been integral to the work of some health professions since the 
19th century (Carruthers & Carruthers, 2005). However, modern communication 
technologies and miniaturised components mean it is now possible: for patients to 
manage their own tests or treatments at home, for conditions like pain management or 
renal dialysis; for portable laboratory or imaging devices to be used by generalist health 
practitioners in clinical settings; for services to be delivered via telemedicine in which 
video links enable specialists to guide generalists through diagnostic or treatment 
procedures; and for wireless broadband to be used to monitor clinical data from 
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devices  attached  to  a  patient’s  wrist,  or  embedded  in  clothing  (Goldsmith, 2004; Mowatt, 
Vale, & MacLeod, 2004; Oncel, Sencan, Yildiz, & Kurt, 2002; Skeil & Thorpe, 2001; 
Wang, 2002).  
The challenge facing some health professions could be compared to the introduction of 
personal computers (PCs) and localised printers on the centralised ICT departments of the 
1980s. ICT professionals resisted these new technologies claiming that users lacked the 
skills to manage their own computing; there were risks for the security or integrity of 
corporate data; and distributed computing would be more expensive than centralised 
services (Benson, 1983). The question of whether end-user computing would prevail over 
the business model of centralised ICT departments was not decided by ICT department 
personnel, but among the technology companies that established standards for PCs, 
remote computerised devices, or software, and the consumers who purchased these new 
products or services (Morris & Ferguson, 1993). This contrasts with healthcare, in which 
companies could develop technologies but may not be able to implement these in clinical 
practice. This situation can arise because the standards around the use of clinical 
technologies, or who may use them, are largely shaped by professional associations and 
reinforced by other stakeholders such as education providers, equipment or materials 
suppliers who collaborate with particular health professions, and agencies that regulate 
the funding or quality of health services (Hwang & Christensen, 2008).  
As the next three illustrations show, unlike the ICT professionals, members of regulated 
health professions may leverage their regulatory authority to capture or shape the 
direction of technology development, and government intervention may be necessary to 
circumvent this. 
Medical laboratory technologies 
The trend in laboratories has been towards large, centralised services to improve the 
productivity of laboratory operations (Smellie & Roy, 2005). Like the centralised ICT 
departments of the 1980s that entered data and produced reports, high-volume 
laboratories are engaged in batch-style processing that depends on efficient systems to 
coordinate the collection and transport of specimens for testing, and the communication 
of results back to each referring health practitioner (Guidi & Lippi, 2006). 
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The advantage of large centralised laboratories for different types of clinical practice is 
difficult to assess, because this business model has developed around labour savings or 
process improvements in laboratories, rather than on the particular needs of referring 
health practitioners (Whittock & Leonard, 2003). Laboratories have been criticised for 
generating higher income by performing additional tests, which the referring medical 
practitioner may then need to investigate although these results could be unrelated to the 
patients’  symptoms  (Zinn, Zalokowski, & Hunter, 2001). Additionally, it is usual for a 
proportion of test results to be erroneous, with repeat testing necessary to determine 
whether results that deviate from norms are accurate or even relevant to the clinical 
condition of interest (Plebani, 2006). Coordination problems may be exacerbated as 
consumers need to be notified to attend additional specimen collection appointments, and 
the physical and temporal separation between laboratory specialists and their physician 
clients can hamper collegial communications (Guidi & Lippi, 2006). Typically, there is a 
delay between the timing of the patient consultation that generates the test request, and 
the opportunity to discuss results with patients. When this is combined with the presence 
of erroneous or irrelevant results that necessitate repeated testing, this may delay or 
complicate the progress of an episode of care (Plebani, 2006). 
Given these problems, it is not surprising that treating physicians have expressed interest 
in  ‘near  patient’  testing,  such  as  small  analysers  located  in  clinical  practice  settings or 
single use disposable test kits. Some studies show advantages of these technologies for 
monitoring of patients in clinical locations such as cardiology and emergency 
departments, or for rapid diagnosis in general practice (Blattner, Nixon, Dovey, Jaye, & 
Wigglesworth, 2010; Jones, Phillips, Fellix, & Tait, 1997; Nichols et al., 2000; Singer, 
Viccellio, Thode, Bock, & Henry, 2008). Laboratories have resisted requests for near 
patient test devices, pointing to the potential for personnel in clinical settings to 
compromise patient safety through errors related to specimen handling or the calibration 
of small analysers that are remote from the laboratory, and some have suggested that near 
patient testing ought to be subject to statutory regulation (Kost, 2001). Hospital 
laboratories have advocated for pneumatic tube systems to transport specimens for critical 
areas like emergency or neonatal departments. Yet, while this may improve transport, it is 
expensive and does little to address criticisms of sample handling in patient treatment  
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locations, or problems with the quality of communications between laboratory specialists 
and referring medical practitioners (Hawkins, 2007; Lee-Lewandrowski et al., 2003).  
The trend for centralised laboratory services creates economies of scale for the processing 
of tests, but has also stimulated interest in ‘near patient’ testing to improve the availability 
of diagnostic information in various clinical settings (Price, 2001). While health services 
have been slow to adopt ‘near patient’ testing, development of this technology is being 
funded by the US military and agencies looking for reliable, easy to use, and inexpensive 
devices or test kits for healthcare in developing countries (Yager et al., 2006). The 
sophisticated computer controlled analysers that are now used in laboratory services have 
simplified work processes, and generated more work for laboratory technicians rather 
than for more highly qualified laboratory personnel. ‘Near patient testing’ may bring 
further change with healthcare or medical assistants now performing tests in community-
based medical practices in some US states (Collier, 2008). 
Medical imaging technologies  
There are similar issues around the control of technology in medical imaging. Large, 
expensive scanners create a significant barrier-to-entry in medical imaging and contribute 
to high incomes for specialists who produce diagnostic reports (Gill, Ondalegui-Parra, 
Nathanson, Seiferth, & Pablo, 2005). At the same time, automated exposure settings, 
patient positioning guides and digital imaging have made examinations easier to perform 
or communicate to stakeholders (Woodford, 2006). The development of sophisticated 
automated equipment make it possible to delegate the performance of some radiographs 
to assistant practitioners (Tache & Chapman, 2006). Despite these technology 
enhancements the business model of centralised imaging departments has persisted, with 
radiology practices resisting generalised use of portable X-ray or screening machines and 
raising concerns about radiation safety, the availability or cost of registered technologists 
to attend remote locations, and the superiority of centrally produced images (Snow, 
Bergin, & Horrigan, 1990).  
As Christensen and colleagues (2000) explain, portable, low-cost, and low-intensity 
scanners are now available as a by-product of US military research. However, their use in 
healthcare has been blocked by radiology practices and hospital emergency departments, 
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which have a vested interest in the existing business model. However, there are also signs 
of change in some US states where physicians in community practice are permitted to 
employ assistants who are not licensed health practitioners to perform some X-rays, along 
with other tasks such as scheduling patient appointments, taking electrocardiograms or 
giving injections (Tache & Chapman, 2006).  
Medical laboratories and medical imaging departments are characterised by a range of 
sub-specialities and technologies. Thus, technology development could enable some work 
to be performed in clinical practice settings, while other work requires the resources of a 
specialist department. Even so, it is important to notice that ICT professionals could not 
exploit regulatory privilege to retain centralised computer services or block development 
of technologies for use by consumers, and left manufacturers free to develop distributed 
technologies and for computer users to influence this process. In contrast, as illustrated 
above for medical laboratories and imaging departments, referring medical practitioners 
and consumers may have little voice when the professional associations of regulated 
health professions determine who may use clinical technologies or where they may be 
used. This situation could be reinforced when healthcare purchasers seek savings from 
centralised services without considering how this could affect the overall cost or 
efficiency of services for referring practitioners and consumers (Lee & Lansky, 2008). 
Regulatory privi lege and technology development  
As these illustrations from laboratory and radiology show, the regulated health 
professions may resist changes in the use of technologies by claiming that other health 
professions lack sufficient expertise, that quality will be compromised, or that 
decentralised solutions will drive up the cost of services. Regulatory privilege may also 
be used as a lever in the development of new technologies. In Figure 8 below, the 
rectangles depict stakeholders in the development of clinical technologies: a technology 
company in green, a technology regulator in pink, a university medical faculty and a 
clinical department in red, and a teaching hospital outlined in blue. The arrows indicate 
the pathway for taking new technologies from ideas to implementation in clinical 
practice. Technology companies must demonstrate the safety and efficacy of a new 
technology, so that the technology may receive the requisite licensing or funding 
approvals for use in clinical practice. To assess safety and efficacy, it is necessary to find 
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a safe and ethical way to conduct trials with patients. This, in turn, depends on securing 
the cooperation of a specialist clinical department for the conduct of these trials. Such 
cooperation may not be forthcoming if the new technology poses a threat to the specialist 
department’s  preferred  business  model  or  the  control  the  department’s  professional  staff 
may exercise over their work. 
Figure  8: Pathways for deve lopment of new clinical technologies  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This process is best known in the field of clinical trials and licensure for pharmaceuticals 
where the mutual alignment of self-interest between pharmaceutical companies and 
medical specialists has been noted by researchers (Gafni & Birch, 2003). There appears to 
be scant attention to the way regulated health professions may block other technologies 
that could contribute to service improvement. Realising the benefits from technologies 
that might disrupt traditional workforce arrangements could require adjustments to health 
practitioner regulation.  
Clinical informat ion and IC T 
The  ‘medical  record’  was  a  management  innovation  of  the  19th  century  (Gorsky et al., 
1999). It continued as a system of paper records maintained separately in each hospital 
department with some information held centrally through most of the 20th century 
(Reichertz, 2006). From the 1970s, hospitals began to computerise the administrative and 
billing aspects of patient records and clinical departments began to implement their own 
systems (Reichertz, 2006). However, integrated electronic records have been less 
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welcome among the health professions as practitioners have had to adjust to standardised 
data entry and information sharing among colleagues or other health professionals, with 
the risk that this could support performance assessments or the redistribution of some 
work. This section shows how policies to reduce medication errors using ICT has and 
could continue to redistribute work from pharmacists to other personnel. 
Traditionally hospital pharmacists managed the purchasing of medicines and the 
operation of a central medicines store, maintained smaller inventories in each ward or 
patient treatment area, answered phone inquiries about medications, and prepared and 
delivered special medication orders for particular patients (Zaki, 1989). Nurses or medical 
practitioners  accessed  their  local  inventory  for  medicines,  recorded  or  ‘charted’  the 
medication  in  a  patient’s  medical  record  and  ‘administered’  it  to  patients,  and  phoned  the 
pharmacy for special prescriptions or urgent replenishment of the local inventory (Zaki, 
1989). Since the 1970s, hospital pharmacists have led in the introduction of computers to 
improve medicines purchasing and inventory management and to monitor the use of 
medicines. This has led to new roles for pharmacists in managing pharmacy ICT, 
providing sophisticated medication advisory services, and conducting audits of 
medication use (Pederson & Gumpper, 2008).  
Through the 1990s, US regulators led in encouraging the use of ICT to reduce the 
incidence of patient injury or death from medication errors (Davis et al., 2002; Leape et 
al., 1991). There is now computerised support for prescribing, dispensing, and 
administration of medicines.  
First, prescriptions may be entered directly into computerised patient records in patient 
care units, avoiding the need to make phone requests or transport paper prescriptions to 
the pharmacy. Capture of information at the point of prescribing means that local 
inventories can be smaller with most medicines supplied for each patient directly from the 
pharmacy. If pharmacists continue their traditional practice of checking each prescription 
and entering it into a pharmacy system, this involves large volumes of data-entry for 
medicines that were previously dispensed from local inventories by nurses or other health 
professionals. There has been a trend for pharmacy technicians to take on some of this 
repetitive data entry work. Another more contentious option is for prescriptions to be 
transferred directly into an electronic pharmacy system for supply to a patient care unit, 
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with perhaps random checking of prescriptions by a pharmacist. As systems for 
computerised prescribing become more sophisticated, prescribing practitioners could rely 
on this immediate electronic source  of  drug  information  rather  than  seek  a  pharmacist’s 
advice (Bomba & Land, 2006; Pederson & Gumpper, 2008).  
Second, in the pharmacy, automation means that medicines may now be picked from 
inventories by robotic systems and transported on computerised carts to the patient care 
unit; and, the routine tasks of supervising the robotic equipment and filling carts for 
transport to the care unit has been taken up by pharmacy technicians (Pederson & 
Gumpper, 2008).  
Third, computerised medication carts and infusion pumps can store information about 
prescriptions and track the dispensing of medicines to individual patients, automatically 
generating data on the use of medicines. This may support the role of the pharmacist in 
the analysis of medication use, but it is also possible that new personnel who specialise in 
clinical knowledge management could perform this work (Masys, 2002; Pederson & 
Gumpper, 2008). 
As these technologies enable improved management of medications, there are pressures 
to redistribute clinical work. Daily electronic prescribing generates more data entry, 
which can be taken on by pharmacy technicians, who may now receive longer training 
and be included under health practitioner regulation (Noyce, 2006). At the same time, 
some of the work of pharmacy technicians who once replenished local medicine 
inventories can be transferred to clerks or nurses who transfer medicines into care unit 
medication carts (Summerfield, Seagull, Vaidya, & Xiao, 2011). At present, electronic 
prescribing systems are unsophisticated, generating unnecessary and distracting alerts, but 
as these systems become easier to use, they could reduce the need for pharmacists to 
review prescriptions (Chaffee, 2010). This might not be a welcome development for 
pharmacists, since the task of reviewing prescriptions appears to help them to maintain a 
sophisticated knowledge of the medications important to their role as advisors to 
prescribing practitioners (Novek, 2000). Pharmacists have used ICT to reduce the 
mundane tasks in inventory management and to generate new work in clinical audit and 
advisory roles. However, government-backed efforts to reduce patient injury from 
medication errors have dramatically accelerated automation in directions that appear to 
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squeeze the work of pharmacists between the growing roles for pharmacy technicians and 
opportunities  for  clinical  work  at  the  patient’s  bedside  that  is  also  claimed  by  medicine 
and nursing (Weiss & Sutton, 2009). 
Changes to robotic and computerised systems involve significant investments and 
champions for change (Bomba & Land, 2006). Yet, pharmacists could be reluctant to 
champion changes. It appears that scope-of-practice rules mean that pharmacists may feel 
legally obligated to check every prescription before dispensing a medicine from a 
pharmacy inventory (American Society of Health Systems Pharmacists, 2009). 
Pharmacists are also likely to be anxious about changes that involve the transfer of their 
work to technicians, or place them in a competitive situation with medical practitioners 
and nurses in their relationships with patients. 
In Figure 9 below: the blue boxes depict the overall workflow between a central 
pharmacy on the left and a hospital ward on the right; the green boxes depict the potential 
for automated systems to be introduced into this workflow: the brown boxes indicate how 
each of the options for automation depicted in the green boxes affects pharmacists, 
technicians and ward personnel. The brown arrows locate two areas of difficulty for 
pharmacists. The arrow on the left, points to pressure for pharmacists to either devote 
their time to extensive data entry or hand some of this work to pharmacy technicians. 
This data entry work has increased as ward personnel order medicines from the pharmacy 
instead of taking them from ward-based inventories, which increases the daily dispensing 
work in the pharmacy. The arrow on the right, points to the opportunities that could be 
available for pharmacists to use their clinical knowledge to prescribe medicines for 
patients on the wards. However, this work lies within the traditional domain of medicine 
and is also subject to claims by nursing. 
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Figure  9: Progress ive  pharmacy automation and pressure  on pharmacists  
 
 
 
 
Pharmacists are not alone in facing a mix of opportunities and challenges from increased 
use of ICT and robotics in clinical work. In radiology, managers can use the Internet to 
outsource reporting of images to countries with lower labour costs for reading digital 
images, and computerised analysis of digital images is being developed for diagnosis of 
some illnesses (Hadjiiski et al., 2004; Yu & Levy, 2010). Radiologists have protected 
their work by developing ways to use medical imaging technologies in minimally 
invasive procedures, such as improving blood flow to the heart; thus, shifting some work 
from operating theatres to radiology departments (Jolesz, 1997). When there is sufficient 
new work, there could be few obstacles to transferring work to new technologies and 
other health professions. However, new technologies could displace work for a health 
profession without there being new work for them to adopt. In these circumstances, health 
practitioner regulation could also prove inflexible, impeding improvements and risking 
the loss of some skills, perhaps those of some pharmacists, from the health workforce. 
Some technology innovations might be combined to form a new business model for 
primary care. For instance, if scope-of-practice regulations were loosened, personnel such 
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as medical assistants might make it possible for consumers to receive a common range of 
laboratory or imaging tests with results provided at the same appointment. If regulations 
around the ownership or operation of pharmacies were loosened, then consumers might 
also receive their medications at the completion of the appointment or subsequently by 
courier from a centralised pharmacy warehouse. New supply chain organisations are 
likely to be required to train these new health practitioners, calibrate equipment, provide 
quality audits, or warehouse the medicines and other supplies required by such a clinic. 
As Robinson and Smith (2008) point out, a new business model like this is unlikely to 
emerge without changes to scopes-of-practice, licensing of providers, or the way services 
are defined and purchased (Robinson & Smith, 2008).  
5.4 B E L O W T H E W A T E R LIN E  
      T W O : L ESS T AN G IB L E L E V E RS  
For other health professions where work is not so readily associated with the control of 
particular technologies, control of other resources could be important to differentiating 
their work. In the 19th century opportunities for women were mostly confined to the 
‘hands-on’  work  of  caring  for  the  sick.  The  challenge  for  nurses  was  to  redefine  the 
nursing  role  as  ‘professional  work’  (Dingwall et al., 1988); while, for occupational 
therapists, it was to establish a philosophy and language to differentiate their work from 
that of psychologists or physiotherapists (Friedland & Silva, 2008). This section looks at 
how regulatory privilege may be used to maintain special languages, or to define the 
direction of role development in the interests of particular health professions. It draws on 
illustrations from medicine, nursing, occupational therapy, and pharmacy. 
Use of special language 
The growth of profession-specific terminology has paralleled the growth of the health 
professions (Hall, 2005; Rosenbloom, Miller, Johnson, Elkin, & Brown, 2006). Special 
language  or  ‘jargon’  is  used  to  define  a  patient’s  problem,  make  inferences  and  determine 
interventions in accordance with  the  profession’s  claim  to  unique  knowledge  (Abbott, 
1988; Hall, 2005). Difficulties with special language have been observed in inter-
professional communication, multidisciplinary teamwork, and in the implementation of 
shared electronic patient records. 
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Health professions may have distinctive terms for seemingly similar tasks. Selecting 
medication  and  providing  it  to  a  patient  may  be  described  in  medicine  as  ‘prescribing  and 
administration’,  in  pharmacy  as  ‘dispensing’,  or  in  nursing  as  ‘administration’ (Thornton, 
Simon, & Mathew, 1999).  Terms  like  ‘deprivation’,  ‘adjustment’,  or  ‘behaviour’  may  be 
in common use, but have different meanings from a biomedical, psychosocial, or 
sociological perspective (Currie & White, 2012; Irvine, Kerridge, McPhee, & Freeman, 
2002). Special language can also be associated with legal obligations such as the notion 
that  ‘dispensing’  entails  checking  of  each  prescription  by  a  pharmacist  (American Society 
of Health Systems Pharmacists, 2009), or when medical practitioners feel obligated to 
direct  other  professionals’  work  due  to  perceptions  about  the  legal  precedence  of  a 
‘medical  assessment’  (Gilbert, 2005).  
The importance of special language is evident in nursing strategies to improve their 
professional status. From the 1960s,  the  ‘nursing  process’  was  introduced  as  part of a 
strategy to professionalise nursing, develop critical thinking skills among nurses, and 
establish a philosophical and language base for degree-based training and advanced 
practitioner roles (Furlong & Smith, 2005; Johnson, 1974). In contrast to traditional team-
based nursing where work was organised by a nurse manager, the nursing process 
paralleled medical practice by assigning an individual nurse to each patient with 
responsibility  for  generating  a  ‘nursing  diagnosis’  and  a  ‘nursing  care  plan’,  to  create  a 
consistent standardised approach to nursing documentation (McCallin, 2001; Tiedeman & 
Lookinland, 2004; Witz, 1994). This system also sought to change the relationship 
between medicine and nursing, by insisting that the medical practitioner assigned to a 
patient must communicate directly with the primary care nurse assigned to the patient 
(Reeves & Lewin, 2004; Witz, 1994). 
While  special  language  appears  to  be  integral  to  a  profession’s  development  and 
communication strategies (Abbott, 1988), it may create difficulties for inter-professional 
collaboration. In the case of the nursing process, this initiative disrupted the traditional 
system whereby doctors relayed information via the nurse manager, and doctors resisted 
this change due in part to the geographical and time constraints involved in trying to 
identify and locate a particular nurse to communicate with (Reeves & Lewin, 2004). 
Establishing separate nursing records was not conducive to collaborative record keeping  
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among the health professions (Leonard, Graham, & Bonacum, 2004; Urquhart, Currell, 
Grant, & Hardiker, 2010). 
In order to communicate effectively it is necessary for a team to develop a shared 
language. Yet the process of unpacking and comparing special languages entails risks, 
since  this  could  increase  transparency  around  ‘unique’  professional  knowledge,  risking 
inter-professional  criticism  or  generating  feelings  of  disloyalty  to  a  health  practitioner’s 
own health profession (Irvine et al., 2002). For an individual health practitioner, the task 
of adopting a shared language for work within the multidisciplinary team could be 
burdensome since their right to ongoing employment depends on remaining conversant 
with the language and concepts within their own health profession along with their 
registration status (Sheehan, Robertson, & Ormond, 2007). When special language 
denotes unique knowledge, regulatory status legitimises these claims, and career 
progression is structured within each health profession, there might be little recognition 
for individual practitioners who gain fluency in shared languages or skills in inter-
professional collaboration (Willis & King, 2010). 
Special language also contributes to difficulties with the implementation of shared 
electronic patient records. Slow progress has been attributed to difficulties with 
interoperability around technology standards, and the willingness of vendors or 
purchasers to invest in interfaces that enable communication between different clinical 
systems (Brailer, 2005). The development of either interfaces or integrated databases is 
necessary to underpin sharing of information generated in various community or hospital 
locations and stored in a range of formats such as coded data, images, sound, scans of 
hand written notes, or electronic text (McDonald, 1997). At the heart of technical 
difficulties with bringing this information together is the task of developing inclusive 
clinical vocabularies, securing inter-professional agreement around the meanings of 
terminology and levels of detail to be captured, and determining how to present clinical 
information in forms suitable for use by different specialties or professions (Humphreys 
& Lindberg, 1998; Rosenbloom et al., 2006).  
This task is further complicated by the prevalence of individually constructed text in 
clinical records that is difficult to manipulate within computers, and cumbersome for 
health practitioners to enter or retrieve (Rector, 1999; Rosenbloom et al., 2006). 
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Overcoming these challenges involves optimally exploiting available standards, 
development of coding systems for representing clinical information, and agreed 
conventions for translating it into forms that are suited to different health professions. 
Yet, this is also likely to require changes to the practice of health professionals, 
particularly if they are required to use coding systems, or to adopt terminology or 
meanings that are different from those of their own profession (van Ginneken, 2002). 
There are partial solutions to the challenge of developing shared languages for clinical 
ICT. Standardised coding systems exist for some areas of healthcare practice. The 
SNOMED system has its origins in pathology, the ICD10 system has been primarily used 
to record diseases, procedures, or mortality information for hospital patients, and READ 
codes have been developed to describe some interventions in outpatient or community 
care. There are also internationally accepted standards for the development of interfaces 
between clinical computer systems, like HL7 or Internet protocols (Lusignan & van 
Weel, 2006; McDonald, 1997).  
There are also other developments towards shared language and communication. The 
World Health Organisation’s ICF coding system has been adapted to create tools for 
communication in inter-professional teamwork across biomedical and psychosocial 
models of care, particularly in rehabilitation services (Cerniauskaite et al., 2011). Over 
the last ten years, education institutions have begun to offer inter-professional education 
in jurisdictions such as Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom; although, this 
is mostly limited to orientation of students to the roles of other health professionals, 
general communication skills, and an understanding of the importance of teamwork 
(McKimm et al., 2010; Thistlethwaite, Moran, & WHO, 2010). 
Special  language  has  been  an  essential  feature  of  a  health  profession’s  claim  to  unique 
knowledge and is reinforced by health practitioner regulation. Efforts to develop 
standardised and shared languages across the health professions are ongoing as part of 
implementing inter-professional collaborative practice and shared record keeping. As 
with any substantial change, investment is required to progress these developments in 
education institutions and in health service organisations. However, the interests of each 
health profession in maintaining its claim to unique professional knowledge could limit  
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their capacity to contribute to policy-directions for shared languages or inter-professional 
collaboration (Travaglia, Nugus, Greenfield, Westbrook, & Braithwaite, 2011). 
Role defini t ion 
Role definition refers to the process through which regulated health professions evolve 
their scopes-of-practice within the historically constructed divisions of the health 
workforce. This process seems invariably to involve securing more specialised or higher 
status work and shedding lower-status work to assistants or other occupational groups 
(Doyal & Cameron, 2000; McKenna, Hasson, & Keeney, 2004; Safriet, 2002). These 
developments are consistent with the struggle of non-medical professions to move beyond 
the class and gender divides of the 19th century, to establish career paths that are better 
aligned to the educational opportunities and expectations for social mobility in the 21st 
century (Safriet, 2002). However, profession-led role definition determines the 
parameters of healthcare jobs, and may contribute to difficulties in inter-professional 
teamwork, clinical leadership, and service management. It also has implications for 
service improvement, particularly if meeting changing demands in service delivery 
conflicts with the professional ideals about roles or practice boundaries. 
Profession-led role definition has generated shifts across the health workforce as general 
practitioners move into medical specialist work, non-medical advanced practitioners 
claim aspects of medical work, and lower status work is transferred to unregulated 
practitioners (Cooper & Aiken, 2003). Health profession leaders develop new areas of 
practice that are subsequently ratified by regulators, such as prescribing roles for nurses, 
independent practice roles for physiotherapists, or clinical advisory and prescribing roles 
for pharmacists (Benrimoj & Frommer, 2004; Courtenay, Carey, & Burke, 2007; 
Desmeules et al., 2012; Gardner & McCoppin, 1994; Pearson, 2007). The picture is 
similar in radiography where radiographers have sought formal recognition for the 
interpretation of radiographic images, and laboratories where scientists have taken up the 
work of providing advice about test results to referring medical practitioners (Hardy & 
Snaith, 2009; Wood, 2002).  
Policy-makers have encouraged the development of advanced practice roles for non-
medical health practitioners to overcome shortages in the medical workforce, often in 
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economically deprived communities (Cooper & Aiken, 2003). To create a basis for more 
flexible work practice, health professionals’ have  been  encouraged  to  ‘work  to  the  top  of 
their scope-of-practice’  or  to  develop  advanced or overlapping scopes-of-practice 
(Duckett, 2005a; Nancarrow, 2005). This means that some work may transfer or be 
shared across inter-professional boundaries, but these boundaries endure and restrict the 
range of work and career opportunities for each health profession. While professional 
associations and registration authorities have developed new roles that improve career 
prospects for some registered health practitioners, the overall effect has been a pattern of 
‘role  shifts’  that  also preserve the historical divisions or silos of the health workforce 
(Doyal & Cameron, 2000; Duckett, 2005a; McKenna et al., 2006).  
As new work has been claimed by advanced or specialist practitioners, other work has 
been shifted to less qualified practitioners. One effect is to create new points of 
fragmentation in care processes that might not align well to the demands of the practice 
environment, such as, when experienced assistants are required to seek approval from 
registered nurses before completing work they may have performed for years (McKenna, 
Keeney, & Bradley, 2003). As advanced practitioners change from accepting work 
delegated by medical practitioners to acting on their own initiative, this could generate 
conflict about who is entitled to make decisions and who is accountable for patient care 
(Brown et al., 2011). If health practitioners avoid potential conflict by not discussing 
decision-making authority or near misses occurring in collaborative practice, this could 
contribute to an environment of weak accountability for patient safety (Jeffs, Lingard, 
Berta, & Baker, 2012; Leape et al., 2009). These difficulties with points of fragmentation, 
authority and accountability could be expected, since profession-led role definition is 
naturally focused on securing opportunities within the historically defined hierarchy of 
healthcare work, rather than on how best to organise the health workforce to improve 
service delivery. 
Historically medical practitioners led in clinical decision-making, the allocation of 
healthcare work to assistants, and played a dominant role in the management of health 
services (Abel-Smith, 1964). From the 1980s, general management has been introduced 
to contain costs and align service delivery to population needs in New Zealand, Australia, 
and the United Kingdom (Bloom, 2000; Cumming & Mays, 2002). The complexity of 
modern health services, policy directions toward standardisation of service operations, 
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and the focus on fiscal constraint requires specialised management skills. Yet, the change 
to general management has been hampered by role confusion and different conceptions of 
leadership authority and decision-making processes (Degeling & Carr, 2004; Hunter, 
1994). Medical leaders and other specialist health practitioners mostly conceive decision-
making as being autonomous and related to treating particular patients, while general 
managers are more likely to think in terms of collaborative efforts to standardise 
management systems for the benefits of many patients (Degeling, Kennedy, & Hill, 2001; 
Degeling et al., 2003). 
Over the last decade health practitioners have been trained in quality improvement 
techniques and there have been calls for management training for medical practitioners to 
equip them to apply systems thinking to the improvement of service delivery (Bohmer, 
2010b; Braithwaite, Westbrook, Mallock, Travaglia, & Iedema, 2006b). The term 
‘leadership’  has  also  been  applied  widely  to  front-line clinical personnel as well as to 
those with formal management authority, apparently in a bid to align the thinking of 
health practitioners to policy directions (Martin & Learmonth, 2010). Despite these 
efforts, service improvement is likely to require rethinking of the design of the health 
workforce and models of service delivery (Bohmer, 2010b; Hwang & Christensen, 2008). 
It is not clear how individual health professionals may transcend the roles defined by their 
professional organisations and respective regulatory authorities to conceive or effect such 
change.  
Profession-led role definition also impedes other developments in the health workforce. 
As employers have introduced new roles to address workforce gaps (Hyde, McBride, 
Young, & Walshe, 2005), professional associations have responded with policies that 
limit how registered health practitioners are permitted to work with other occupational 
groups. For instance, New Zealand, UK, and US nursing organisations restrict the tasks 
that may be delegated from registered nurses to lesser qualified nurses or healthcare 
assistants (McKenna et al., 2004; Nursing Council of New Zealand, 2011; Parkman, 
1996); pharmacist associations in Australia and the United Kingdom have issued policies 
differentiating  ‘professional’,  ‘semi-professional’,  and  ‘non-professional’  work,  although 
in practice the differences may be difficult to discern (Hattingh, King, & Smith, 2009; 
McCann, Hughes, & Adair, 2010); and, UK, Australian, and New Zealand medical 
organisations have limited the accountability of medical practitioners in multidisciplinary 
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teamwork (General Medical Council, 2005; Mental Health Commission, 1998). Similarly, 
in response to changes to the management structure of health services, professional 
associations successfully lobbied for the introduction of new clinical leadership roles that 
sit alongside and are additional to general management roles (Fitzgerald & Ferlie, 2000; 
Millward & Bryan, 2005). The difficulty for service improvement is that these 
profession-centric  tactics  generate  rules  from  the  regulatory  level  about  ‘who  may 
perform  what  work’  and  ‘who  may  work  with  whom’  that  may  not  be  aligned  to  various 
service delivery environments. 
Scholars have advocated for health workforce planning based on patient needs rather than 
on estimates that relate the numbers of particular health professions to the general 
population (Hurst, 2006; Segal & Bolton, 2009). However, as Willis and King (2010) 
explain this is difficult because profession-led role definition is not focused on patient 
needs. Their illustration concerns the treatment of gynaecological cancers in Australia, 
where medical specialists in oncology or pathology may be identified as having particular 
expertise in gynaecological cancer care, but the general practitioners, nurses, 
psychologists, etc. who contribute to this care do not. This means that there is a lack of 
workforce data to support planning for these services, and no system of recognition for 
many health professionals who develop expertise in gynaecological cancers (Willis & 
King, 2010). Other scholars have observed that there is little evidence of profession-led 
role definition delivering new skill-mixes that mix traditional silo specific work and 
might support new delivery models or reduce service fragmentation for consumers 
(Bohmer & Lawrence, 2008; Mullan, 2002; Sibbald et al., 2004). Solving these problems 
is likely to involve changes to the profession-led role definition and training enshrined in 
health practitioner regulation, as well as to the management of human resources in health 
service organisations (Dubois & Singh, 2009).  
5.5 B E L O W T H E W A T E R LIN E T HR E E :  
O R G AN ISIN G W O R K 
The systems of referrals and inter-professional complaints operate below the waterline 
because they have received little attention in the discourse around health practitioner 
regulation. Skirmishes around some aspects of referral rights have bubbled to the surface 
in the late 20th century, for instance in overlapped scopes-of-practice between medical 
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and nurse practitioners (Safriet, 2002). There has also been some scholarly attention to 
the way health practitioners may use complaints against competitors (Jost, 1995). Overall, 
there has been scant attention to how these aspects of health practitioner regulation may 
operate to maintain historical divisions in the health workforce, or how they could be 
contributing to fragmentation of services for consumers.    
The referral system 
Historically, the referral system has been a decentralised way of organising healthcare 
work that placed the medical profession at the centre of decision-making (Berlant, 1975; 
Dingwall et al., 1988). It emerged along with specialist divisions in the health workforce 
at a time when treatment was combined with research, reflecting the complexity of 
healthcare due to the lack of knowledge and the paucity of treatment options (Bohmer, 
2010a; Weisz, 2006). In contrast, the modern challenge is how best to organise care for 
patients with chronic health conditions, where known treatments range from self-care, to 
medications or procedures involving various healthcare providers (Bohmer, 2010a; 
Epping-Jordon et al., 2004). Referral rights have bubbled to the surface of regulatory 
policy in the protracted struggles of nurse practitioners and others to take responsibility 
for the diagnosis and treatment of their own patients (Cooper & Aiken, 2001; Safriet, 
2002). Yet, regardless of which health profession holds particular referral rights, this 
system assumes individualised and complex decision-making around each patient, and 
these assumptions could conflict with the increasing standardisation of clinical practice 
and directions for separation of complex and routine clinical work (Bohmer, 2010a; 
Harrison, 1998). 
Referral agreements were integral to the historical construction of divisions in the health 
workforce, enabling medical practitioners to refer their patients to specialist colleagues or 
other  health  practitioners  without  fear  that  these  practitioners  would  ‘take  over’  the 
ongoing care of the patient. These agreements were predicated on the assumption that 
each patient is unique and that only a medical practitioner has the expertise to diagnose 
illness or determine treatment. Agreeing to referral arrangements with medicine enabled 
professions such as pharmacy, social work, physiotherapy, or occupational therapy to 
develop through the flow of patient referrals from medical practitioners (Abel-Smith, 
1964; Friedland & Davids-Brumer, 2007; Nicholls & Cheek, 2006; Savage, 1994).  
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As non-medical professions have developed advanced practitioner roles, they have sought 
to unilaterally amend referral agreements. Progress has been hard-won, as these 
professions have had to forge alliances with purchasers, overcome resistance from the 
medical profession, and withstand scrutiny of their practice. An illustration occurred in 
the direct access of patients to physiotherapy, which began as physiotherapists 
successfully argued that medical practitioners did not have a sufficient understanding of 
physical therapy to make appropriate referral judgements (Gardner & McCoppin, 1994). 
Australian physiotherapists were first to adopt this strategy when they decided that there 
would no longer be medical representatives on their registration authority, a move that 
was subsequently endorsed by their international organisation (Gardner & McCoppin, 
1994).  In  1999,  New  Zealand’s  Accident  Compensation Corporation (ACC) awarded 
self-referral rights to physiotherapists, and in the following eight years, there was a 60% 
growth in treatment volumes, a 214% increase in costs, but no commensurate 
improvement in the speed of recovery for consumers. Subsequently, reimbursements for 
self-referred patients were restricted (Copeland, 2009; ACC, 2009). It seems that 
physiotherapists also lack information or they may be over-optimistic about their 
treatments (Feine & Lund, 1997), and ultimately the purchaser (ACC) questioned the 
evidence base for some of the physiotherapy treatment (ACC, 2009).  
The award of referral rights to non-medical health professionals could improve access to 
care for routine health conditions, as could occur in nurse-led clinics for management of 
childhood eczema or diabetes care, or direct access to appropriate physical therapy to 
speed treatment (Copeland, 2009; Moore, Williams, Manias, & Varigos, 2006; Wong & 
Chung, 2006). However, consumers might still experience fragmentation in service 
delivery if non-medical professionals have only partial rights and the consumer needs 
doctors’  appointments  to  review  the  progress  of  their  treatment  with  other  health 
professionals, or to secure a referral for a different but related service. Recent 
government-led trials in Australia and New Zealand have shown that it could be possible 
to design roles and referral arrangements that reduce the fragmented experience of 
consumers. In these trials, pharmacists performed blood tests and adjusted doses for 
patients on blood thinning medications as part of dispensing repeat prescriptions 
(Stafford, Peterson, Luke, & Jackson, 2011). In this case, the patient must attend the 
pharmacy to receive refills of their prescription, so the innovation avoids two or three  
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appointments that would otherwise be required for laboratory tests and for a doctor to 
review results and amend the prescription before the pharmacist dispenses the 
medication. This is a micro-level innovation focused on a single medication, but a 
combination of many such innovations might ultimately reduce the numbers of separate 
appointments and contribute to a more integrated experience of care for consumers. 
However, care that is designed around groups of patients with similar needs is likely to 
involve changes to the system of individual assessments and referrals because it would 
enable an individual health practitioner or small team to undertake a wider range of 
routine work for a particular patient. While work on complex cases could proceed on this 
basis, routine care could proceed on the basis of well-constructed teamwork, service 
protocols, shared record-keeping, appropriate delegations and audit (Bohmer & 
Lawrence, 2008; Gouberman & Mintzberg, 2001). 
Fragmentation in service delivery is a significant problem for consumers, contributing to 
complexity and delays, in organising and attending appointments and ensuring that results 
are communicated between service providers (Bodenheimer, 2008). The US Institute of 
Medicine (2001) has identified service fragmentation as the primary source of problems 
with the quality of healthcare, and has recommended improvements through health 
service organisation-based policies for clinical work, investment in health resources, 
multidisciplinary teamwork, and use of information communication technologies 
(Berwick, 2002). There has been scant attention to how the decentralised process of role 
definition by each health profession could reduce, or exacerbate difficulties with service 
fragmentation. Policy-makers have tended to award parts of the referral system to 
advanced non-medical practitioners to address shortages in the medical workforce 
(Cooper & Aiken, 2003). However, this relies on profession-led role definition in 
historically constructed workforce divisions that could yet prove too inflexible to produce 
the skill combinations required to offer consumers a more integrated clinical service in a 
single appointment. 
The historical system of demarcated roles and semi-formal referral arrangements among 
the health workforce appears to generate significant complexity and transaction costs in 
modern healthcare. While each registered health practitioner may be accountable for his 
or her segment of this care story, there does not appear to be any one person or entity 
responsible for coordination. Ultimately, it could be necessary to reduce the extent of 
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inter-professional referrals through redistribution of work among the health workforce so 
that it aligns better to the needs of particular patient groups (Bohmer & Lawrence, 2008). 
This is likely to also involve other strategies for organising work, including greater use of 
organisational clinical policies, inter-professional work-sharing in multidisciplinary 
teams, clinical supervisory roles with delegation rights, and the use of clinical audits for 
management of quality (Gouberman & Mintzberg, 2001). However, this is likely to 
involve a departure from some aspects of health practitioner regulation in which each 
health profession defines roles and seeks inter-professional referral rights. 
Inter-professional complaints 
The referral system appears to have operated as a positive force in the development of 
new health professions and advanced practitioner roles. In contrast, inter-professional 
complaints may act as a constraint on role development, particularly in the inter-
professional practice environment.  
The right of a consumer to complain about services provided by a registered health 
practitioner is a central pillar of health practitioner regulation. It is intended to ensure that 
health practitioners maintain their competence and ethical conduct in their dealings with 
their patients (Roberts & Dietrich, 1999). Yet complaints may originate from professional 
colleagues as well as patients. A widely accepted advantage of self-regulation is the 
motivation of health professionals to monitor their own and their colleagues practice 
(Ogus, 1995). There appears to be support for this claim in a study of the sources of 
complaints to a large US registration authority, responsible for medicine and several other 
health professions. This study revealed a range of sources for complaints, including half 
from patients, their relatives or friends, and other health professionals involved in their 
care; with the remainder being reports or referrals from hospitals, insurers, or other 
registration authorities (Jost et al., 1993). Inter-professional struggles over boundaries are 
likely to occur away from public scrutiny due to the risk that the reputations of the health 
professions’  involved  could  be damaged. As Jost et al. (1993) noted, research into the 
operations of registration authorities is difficult due to confidentiality applying to both 
health professionals and consumers. Two illustrations of inter-professional struggles over 
boundaries were discussed in Chapter Four, including that between nurses and podiatrists 
in Australia, and between physiotherapists and nurses in New Zealand, and difficulties 
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between medicine and non-medical professions were also noted in section 5.4 of this 
chapter.  
In New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, registered health professionals are 
legally obligated to report concerns about the practice of colleagues (Department of 
Human Services (DHS), 2003; Kennedy, 2001; Paterson, 2002). This means that health 
professionals work in environments where confidential complaints could be made by a 
patient, colleague or some other person with an interest in the care process, or even used 
as a means to control competitors (Berlant, 1975; Bertness, 2009; Jost et al., 1993). There 
is also evidence that the complaints system has a powerful and potentially negative effect 
on competent and conscientious health practitioners, who may practise conservatively 
through fear of being publicly blamed or unfairly punished for mistakes (Runciman, 
Merry, & Tito, 2003; Waring, 2005). Thus conservative practice could include a 
reluctance to take on work around the inter-professional boundary due to the risk of 
attracting criticism or complaints from other health practitioners. These risks are 
particularly onerous for those individuals who pioneer advanced practice roles, and face 
obstacles at both service delivery and regulatory levels (Bertness, 2009; Brown & Draye, 
2003). Thus inter-professional complaints may reinforce inter-professional barriers to the 
development of new roles or innovative work practice in the health workforce. 
C ON C LUSION  
This chapter has investigated how health professions may use levers associated with their 
regulatory status to control resources in health service organisations. I have referred to 
this  process  as  ‘exercising  regulatory  privilege’.  If  the  exercise  of  regulatory  privilege  is 
applied to resources owned by health service organisations, then this could have 
implications for the implementation of management reforms or quality improvement 
programmes intended to improve health service delivery. I suggest that to assess the role 
of health practitioner regulation in health service improvement, it is important to 
understand the operation of each of these levers by each regulated health profession.   
The chapter began with an explanation of how the policies of registration authorities 
could influence stakeholders in healthcare. The primary linkage for policy development 
and communication is between professional associations, registration authorities, and 
registered health practitioners. However, influence could also operate indirectly through 
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the network of health professionals who hold influential positions in various healthcare 
stakeholder organisations, and contribute to policy-making within their respective 
professional organisations. I liken the regulatory privilege associated with health 
practitioner regulation to an iceberg with the traditional levers located visibly on its 
surface at the level of registration agencies, and the bulk of levers operating below the 
waterline in the realm of inter-professional practice.  
The first group of levers are those apparent in legislation and the discourse around health 
practitioner regulation. These include protected titles, custodianship of unique expertise, 
control of health practitioner training, the authority to deregister a practitioner in cases of 
poor practice, and the associated quality guarantee to consumers. The handling of 
consumer complaints has been strengthened, and protected titles do not appear to 
contribute to consumer protection in modern service delivery. While development of 
expertise has largely shifted to multidisciplinary research institutes, beliefs about unique 
expertise could present a barrier to the redistribution of knowledge among the health 
workforce or to the spread of innovations in clinical practice. In this context, the 
independent oversight of health professions by many registration authorities could prove 
too decentralised to deliver the flexible workforce called for by policy-makers. The 
quality guarantee is effective to the extent that the vast majority of health practitioners 
appear to be competent. However, regulatory privilege could also contribute to 
difficulties with the fragmentation of services for consumers, impeding changes directed 
to reduction of fragmentation, where these involve redistribution of work among the 
health professions. 
The second group of levers takes the survey below the waterline to the way health 
professions may control the development or deployment of clinical technologies and 
clinical ICT. This is evident in the way medical laboratories and radiology practices have 
focused on large-scale centralised technologies that reinforce the organisation of services 
around existing specialist departments, and resisted the development of distributed 
technologies that might otherwise transfer some of their work to other health practitioners 
in certain clinical settings. Health professionals have also led ICT developments to 
strengthen their clinical services, but used regulatory privilege to resist ICT-related 
change that risks too much information sharing or redistribution of their work. For both 
clinical and ICT technologies, the collaboration of the health professionals could be 
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limited to developments that retain profession-centric service models. Thus regulatory 
privilege could impede progress with some technology innovations that might otherwise 
enable more consumer-focused service models. While government intervention could be 
necessary to enable some technologies, as occurred in pharmacy, it could lead to the loss 
of particular professional expertise from the health sector. There appears to be a lack of 
policy attention to this mix of technology and health workforce questions in considering 
directions for service improvement.   
The third group of levers include the use of special language and profession-led role 
definition. Special language is strategically important to the health professions, but is 
associated with barriers to inter-professional teamwork and shared electronic patient 
records. There has been some progress with inter-professional coding systems directed to 
particular purposes, such as in rehabilitation care. Yet further progress depends on the 
willingness of the health professions to adopt coded forms of record keeping as well as 
terminology or meanings associated with other health professions. Profession-led role 
definition has led to advanced practitioner roles including work previously reserved to 
medicine and transfer of other work to assistants. It has been associated with role 
confusions such as conflicts over decision-making authority or accountability in inter-
professional clinical practice or service management. Special languages and role 
definition have been important to the health profession strategies to redress historical 
injustices in career opportunities. However, these levers tend to produce a degree of role 
substitution, while also reinforcing traditional divisions in the health workforce. There do 
not appear to be any mechanisms to produce consumer or service-related data for health 
workforce planning, or to generate roles that mix skills from different health professions 
to meet patient needs. Yet, new roles to straddle points of fragmentation in service 
delivery could be important to improving service quality. 
The fourth group of levers includes the referral system and inter-professional complaints. 
These levers may be used to reinforce the other levers that control the behaviours of 
health practitioners in clinical practice. Referral agreements have been important for the 
emergence of many non-medical professions, and amending or rescinding these 
agreements has been central to securing non-medical advanced practice roles. Health 
practitioners may use the complaints system against competitors. This leverages a health 
practitioner’s  anxiety  around  the  potential  for  blame  or  regulatory  censure  to  limit 
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unwanted practice change particularly around inter-professional boundaries, which 
creates risks for those engaged in practice innovations. It is plausible that the potential for 
criticism to be backed by inter-professional complaints acts as a powerful limiting force 
on individuals moving into new roles that might otherwise be beneficial to certain 
practice situations. Thus referrals and inter-professional complaints appear to be the twin 
levers that may be used to reinforce traditional boundaries in the health workforce.  
The referrals system has other implications that could be important in service 
improvement. Each referral follows a medical or advanced non-medical  practitioner’s 
assessment  of  a  patient  and  is  commonly  predicated  on  the  patient’s  return  for  further 
assessments or decisions. In this highly decentralised way of organising healthcare, there 
is potential for fragmentation of services at each point of referral or return of a patient. In 
many cases, patients could have to negotiate the progress of referrals and sharing of 
clinical information in order to expedite their own care. Policies for service improvement 
could need to consider a range of solutions including more standardised models of care, 
and novel skill combinations that reduce fragmentation of services by enabling more care 
activities to be delivered at a single appointment. 
While there is a consensus that health practitioner regulation protects consumers, it has 
been historically constructed and could be subject to change as social or technology 
conditions evolve. Regulatory privilege deserves attention because it appears to be an 
artefact of the historical construction around individual health professions. It could act 
powerfully to shape the progress of service improvement, so the question is whether the 
overall effect impedes service improvement or whether there could be sufficient 
incremental change to realise the intended benefits of management reforms and quality 
improvement programmes. Before considering this question, it is necessary to understand 
more about the environment of health service organisations and how management 
reforms and quality improvement programmes could be expected to deliver service 
improvement. Chapter Six examines the environment of health service organisations, the 
elements of redesign in these service improvement policies, and the potential for 
interactions with the levers of health practitioner regulation. 
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6 
R E GU L ATORY P RIV IL E G E A ND 
H E A LTH SE RV IC E C APA B IL ITY 
 
IN TR OD UC TION 
This chapter completes the explanation of how health practitioner regulation could affect 
health service improvement by focusing on the meso-level of health service 
organisations. The first half of the chapter traces the progress with management reforms 
and quality improvement programmes, which have tended to produce many localised 
improvements, but not the expected organisation or system-wide improvements. It 
identifies the redesign elements in these improvement policies and the implications for 
health professionals, clinical leaders and general managers. The chapter shows that a 
comprehensive implementation of improvement policies could depend on changes to the 
organisation of work among the health professions, and some new roles and career paths 
for health professionals. Yet it is not clear how this could proceed without changes to the 
policies of registration authorities. In the second half, the chapter investigates the 
organisational capability in health services for successful implementation of health 
service improvement. It shows how the exercise of regulatory privilege among the 
regulated health workforce could contribute to contested leadership, weak human 
resource management, poorly integrated information communication technology, and 
difficulties with the design and operation of multidisciplinary teams in health service 
organisations. Health practitioner regulation appears to limit both the options for 
reorganising healthcare work to support new service arrangements, and the organisational 
capability to implement such change.   
This chapter draws on material that makes extensive use of acronyms. This includes 
several brands of quality improvement programmes, including Continuous Quality 
Improvement (CQI), Total Quality Management (TQM), Business Process Re-
engineering  (BPR),  Toyota’s  Lean  Thinking,  often  referred  to  as  ‘Lean  Thinking’  and 
Motorola’s  Six  Sigma.  Patient  Focused  Care (PFC) was a form of BPR particular to 
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health services. Other acronyms include information communication technology (ICT), 
human resource management (HRM), and new public management (NPM). I use the 
expression  ‘organisation-based clinical policies and procedures’,  which  are  also  referred 
to in the literature as clinical guidelines and clinical protocols.      
Section 6.1 traces the progress with management reforms and quality improvement, and 
considers some implications for the organisation of healthcare work. Section 6.2 
investigates the strength of four health service management capabilities important to 
service improvement  clarity of leadership, use of HRM for workforce development, 
integration of ICT, and the design of multidisciplinary teams. 
6.1 T H E LIM ITS T O SE R VIC E IMPR O V E M E N T  
IN H E A L T H C AR E 
The rapid growth of industries in the 19th century produced organisations focused around 
function specialisation. From the late 20th century, a more educated workforce and the 
increased expectations of consumers have led to more consumer-focused designs for 
organisations (Adler, 1997). This section traces the progress with improvement policies in 
healthcare, the redesign elements in these policies, and the differing attitudes of some 
professional and management groups. It concludes that achieving organisation or system-
wide improvements could depend on addressing the regulatory sources of difficulties for 
stakeholders.  
Progress wi th service improvement 
Health reforms in New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom have been largely 
directed to concerns about the rising costs of healthcare and service quality (Degeling, 
Maxwell, Iedema, & Hunter, 2004; Degeling, Sage, Kennedy, Perkins, & Zhang, 1999). 
These reforms may be divided into three phases: the introduction of general management 
from the 1980s, the focus on re-engineering for quality improvement and cost 
containment in the 1990s, and the engagement of health professionals in quality 
improvement programmes since 2000. 
From the 1980s, management changes strengthened the capability for service 
improvement. Chief executives replaced the traditional leadership committees governing 
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hospitals  to  improve  organisations’  responsiveness  to  policy  directions  for  change.  This 
displaced but did not remove health profession leadership structures (Ashton, 1993; 
Bloom, 2000; Harrison & Ahmad, 2000). Capability was strengthened through new 
accounting systems and ICT to improve management and monitoring of service delivery 
(Currie & Guah, 2007; Doolin, 1999; Soliman, Soar, Van der Weegen, & Ayres, 1997). 
There was some experimentation with devolution of industrial negotiations to strengthen 
the role of HRM in the design of remuneration and working conditions (Barnett, 
Patrickson, & Maddern, 1996; Buchan, 2000). 
From the 1990s, there have been policies for reorganising health service delivery, 
including shifting services for some patients, such as in mental health and aged care, from 
hospitals to community-based care, and the implementation of ICT and quality 
improvement programmes to improve the quality and efficiency of hospitals (Bloom, 
2000; Braithwaite, 1995; Ferlie & Shortell, 2001; Leutz, 1999). Specialist hospital 
departments  were  grouped  into  ‘clinical  directorates’  to  encourage  managers  and  health 
professionals to focus on the care of particular groups of patients (Boyce, 2001). Some 
health professionals had to adapt to working in multidisciplinary teams, rather than in 
their specialist departments (Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 2006). ICT systems were 
implemented in specialist hospital departments improving the availability of information 
to clinicians and managers, although there was less progress with sharing of clinical 
information between these departmental systems (Hillestad et al., 2005). Through this 
period, quality improvement programmes introduced to health service organisations 
included CQI, TQM, and BPR, along with PFC that was a brand specific to the health 
industry.  
Since the 1990s, clinical directorates have become enduring structures in New Zealand, 
Australian and UK hospitals. Clinical directorates bring together specialist departments, 
wards and outpatient clinics to care for groups of patients, often around medical 
specialties, such as medicine, surgery, psychiatry, obstetrics and gynaecology, or 
paediatrics, with allied health departments grouped in a clinical support directorate 
(Braithwaite, 1995; Doolin, 2001; McNulty & Ferlie, 2002). Less commonly, clinical 
directorates have diverged from traditional specialties, for instance in grouping patients 
around mental states, difficulty with breathing, complex intravenous treatment, or the 
need for further tests (Lega & DePietro, 2005).  
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In contrast to clinical directorates, PFC units were a short-lived experiment that attempted 
to fully implement business re-engineering. Booz Allen Hamilton had developed PFC as 
a form of BPR for healthcare (Lathrop, 1993). It included: co-location of patients with 
similar clinical or resource requirements; clinical pathways that map care for routine 
cases; policies for non-medical personnel to initiate care without waiting for a medical 
assessment; redeployment of technologies and personnel from laboratory, radiology, 
therapies, or pharmacy to care units to minimise delays around routine tests or treatments; 
and, role redesign through cross-training of nurses with other non-medical professionals 
to enable integrated delivery of routine tests, treatments, and nursing care (Hurst, 1996; 
Lathrop, 1993). Accordingly, PFC was met with opposition from the regulated health 
professions. It demonstrated the complexity in wrapping routine care around patients at 
the bedside, outpatient clinic, or in community-based care. It highlighted the dependence 
on specialist departments, and regulated health professionals who stood to lose their 
power, professional identity and traditional career paths (Brider, 1992; Garside, 1993; 
Hurst, 1999). 
From 2000, quality improvement programmes emphasised improving quality and 
reducing waste, and the importance of engaging health professionals in the 
implementation. This included training health professionals in quality improvement 
techniques  such  as  ‘Lean  Thinking’  and  ‘Six  Sigma’  to  incrementally  improve  patients’ 
journeys or referrals among specialist clinical departments (O'Connell, Ben-Tovim, 
McCaughan, Szwarcbord, & McGrath, 2008b; Proudlove, Moxham, & Boaden, 2008). 
Much of the focus has been on alleviating the growing congestion in emergency 
departments,  which  involves  redesign  of  acute  admissions,  expediting  patients’  discharge 
from hospital, and strengthening community capability to support patients after discharge 
(Forero et al., 2010; Holden, 2011), Quality improvement programmes have also been 
applied in specialist departments like radiology, pharmacy or laboratories with the 
delegation of routine work to non-medical specialists and improved response times to 
service areas such as emergency department (ED) (Bate et al., 2008; De Souza, 2009; 
Young & McClean, 2008). Elements of redesign have been evident in initiatives to group 
patients around their complexity  or  resource  needs  in  ED,  matching  patients’  needs  to 
wards, some use of clinical pathways, efforts to delegate routine work to non-medical  
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health practitioners, care delivery through multidisciplinary teams, and some role 
redesign (Ben-Tovim et al., 2008; Fillingham, 2007).  
Through the 2000s, there has also been some attention to quality improvement for 
ambulatory patients with chronic illnesses such as depression, diabetes, musculoskeletal 
problems, respiratory illness, rehabilitation, and aged care. Changes included grouping 
patients with similar conditions, use of multidisciplinary teams to deliver care, inter-
professional sharing of electronic medical records, liaison between generalist teams and 
specialist departments, clinical policies to guide routine care, and case managers to 
oversee engagement with patients (Epping-Jordon et al., 2004; Wagner, 2000). 
Institutional barriers have been identified, including poor alignment of service contracts, 
and narrowly focused performance measures for health services (Goodwin et al., 2012). 
Along with these issues, there have been concerns about whether the skill-mix in the 
health workforce is optimal for the care of chronic rather than acute illness (Bodenheimer 
et al., 2009). 
Since 2000, in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand, there has also been 
some attention to the development of new roles in the health workforce. The most 
ambitious  was  the  UK’s  Changing Workforce Programme (CWP) that sought to break 
down demarcations in the health workforce to enable services to be wrapped around 
consumers (Bridges & Meyer, 2007). Among the health professions, there were concerns 
that this could erode professionalism (Copnell, 2010). However, the new roles appeared 
similar to traditional role definition among the health professions with role extensions for 
nurses and some other health professionals, and an increased use of unregistered 
healthcare assistants (Hyde et al., 2005). It is possible that the overall effect has been to 
increase the complexity of the health workforce, while also reinforcing its organisation 
around the traditional health professions (Martin, Currie, & Finn, 2009).  
Through three decades of successive brands of quality improvement programmes, there is 
a pattern of localised successes that may be hard to sustain (Elkhuizen et al., 2006; 
Holden, 2011; Radnor et al., 2012). Some organisations have implemented some 
improvements, such as decision-making protocols for 90% of patients at the  US’s 
Intermountain Healthcare, or nurse-led units for routine care for heart failure at the  US’s 
Duke University Medical Center (Bohmer, 2010a). More commonly, it appears that 
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organisations have difficulties with implementation. A US study of nearly 2000 hospitals 
found that the more hospital departments that engaged in a quality improvement 
programme,  the  worse  the  hospital’s  performance  on  quality  or  safety  measures  (Weiner 
et al., 2006; Weiner et al., 2005). The authors suggested that this could be related to the 
management of implementation. Another possibility could be that confining service 
improvements within existing specialist departments engaged health professionals, but 
intensified pre-existing difficulties with the coordination of care across these specialist 
departments.  
E lements of redesign in service improvement 
In the 21st century, many illnesses and injuries can be prevented or cured, and there is 
increased demand for support of consumers with chronic health conditions (Pruitt & 
Epping-Jordan, 2005). Anticipated changes to health services include separation of 
complex and routine cases, organisation-based clinical policies and standardised 
procedures for delivery of routine care, new delivery structures emphasising 
multidisciplinary teams, increased reliance on information sharing through ICT, and role 
changes for health professionals.  
Streamlined treatment for routine cases requires a departure from treating all patient visits 
as complex with each requiring a medical assessment, an approach that was appropriate 
to 19th century knowledge (Weisz, 2006). The traditional process of medical assessments 
followed by successive referrals to specialist departments for diagnostic or treatment has 
been  associated  with  service  fragmentation,  and  likened  to  patients  ‘wending  their  way 
through a series of specialised  job  shops’  (Bohmer, 2010a). Instead, redesign calls for 
routine cases to be identified, separated from more complex work, and cared for by 
multidisciplinary teams working to organisation-based clinical and delegation policies 
(Bohmer, 2010b; Grumbach & Bodenheimer, 2004). This could mean fewer services 
delivered by specialists in hospital departments, and more services delivered by 
multidisciplinary teams in ambulatory care settings with coordination of specialist 
expertise as necessary (Bodenheimer, 2008; Bohmer, 2010b).  
There are well-known management capabilities for quality improvement programmes and 
ICT implementation. These include leadership, influential champions for change, project 
  163 
management and resources, communication and training to engage personnel, inter- 
departmental cooperation, and an organisation culture receptive to change (Ngai, Law, & 
Wat, 2008; Trkman, 2010). Health service organisations would need to apply these 
capabilities to establish clinical policies and procedures for the separation of routine and 
more complex cases, diagnostic and treatment standards for routine care, and inter-
professional delegation of care. They would also need to provide resources such as 
repositories of clinical information, electronic patient records, clinical supervisory 
support, and clinical audit procedures (Bohmer, 2010a; McGrath et al., 2008). In New 
Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, government agencies and NGOs have 
publicised the quality improvement lessons of leading healthcare organisations, and 
offered training or consultancy services to health service organisations (Berwick, 
Hackbarth, & McCannon, 2006; Counties Manukau Health, 2011; Jones & Mitchell, 
2006; NHS Institute for Innovation and Improvement, 2011; O'Connell et al., 2008b).  
These elements of redesign in policies for service improvement are set out in Figure 10 
below. In yellow are elements linked to HRM capability, including: in the yellow oval is 
leadership authority; in the yellow rectangles are training and engagement of personnel, 
and roles and supervisory policies. In the green rectangles are elements related to the 
design of services, including, separation of routine and complex cases, organisation-based 
clinical policies and procedures, and multidisciplinary teams. In the blue rectangles are 
elements linked to technologies, including the management of information and ICT, and 
the deployment of clinical technology and personnel. 
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Figure  10: Elements of redes ign in se rvice  improvement 
 
 
 
 
 
Difficul t ies wi th stakeholder engagement  
Critics have questioned the appropriateness of applying certain management reforms to 
healthcare. Fillingham (2008) refutes this criticism, advocating the benefits of Lean 
Thinking for health service organisations. He points out that: demand for healthcare is 
predictable by season and day of the week; medical care can be improved by meeting 
standards for clinical best practice; while patients do differ, 6% of common conditions 
account for 60% of the work in a clinical care setting; and caring for patients involves 
processes, which can be improved. 
Even so, health service organisations could lack the authority to engage important 
stakeholders in service improvement, such as health professionals, registration 
authorities, tertiary educators, consumers or technology suppliers. Health professionals 
have been described as tribal, and may resist change they perceive as inconsistent with 
the interests of their respective health profession (Bate, 2004; Braithwaite et al., 2007). 
When considering particular change proposals, they are likely to refer to the policies of 
their health profession leaders or registration authority, and may refuse requests from  
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managers where they perceive conflicts with their regulatory ideals (Degeling & Carr, 
2004; Hurst, 1997).  
In New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, there is evidence that health 
professionals have differing attitudes to the elements of redesign in service improvement 
policies. Medical specialists have tended to oppose the implementation of clinical policies 
to standardise routine clinical work or delegate this work to multidisciplinary teams 
(Degeling et al., 2001; Degeling et al., 1999). The standardisation of clinical work has the 
potential to reduce the number of occasions that medical practitioners would complete 
medical assessments or make referrals for patients with routine health conditions. It 
would subject medical assessments to scrutiny by members of other health professions or 
managers, and this could facilitate transfer of control over routine work from medical 
practitioners to members of other health professions (Bohmer, 2010a; Degeling et al., 
2004). Registered nurses have also been reluctant to have their independence and quality 
of work subject to the scrutiny of managers or other health professionals. However, they 
differ from their medical colleagues in their support of clinical policies that establish 
standards for routine work, and in their support for the delivery of care through 
multidisciplinary teams (Degeling et al., 2001; Degeling et al., 1999). Among the allied 
health professions, many have viewed management changes favourably, as through the 
1990s, when new hospital structures gave them greater representation at the senior 
management level (Boyce, 1993, 2001). 
Among health professionals, attitudes to redesign elements could depend on the particular 
circumstances. In hospital wards, clinical policies to standardise care could strengthen the 
role of nurses as coordinators of the work of specialist departments (Degeling, Hill, 
Kennedy, Coyle, & Maxwell, 2000). However, nurses and allied health professionals 
could have to jostle for authority in multidisciplinary teams, in either outpatient or 
community settings (Nugus, Greenfield, Travaglia, Westbrook, & Braithwaite, 2010; 
Reeves et al., 2010). A comprehensive implementation of the elements of redesign could 
intensify these issues, requiring medical, nursing and allied health professionals to blend 
clinical autonomy with accountability to organisation leaders, and to support transparency 
in work practice to contribute to multidisciplinary learning around clinical standards 
(Degeling et al., 2004). 
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Service improvement is intended to wrap services around consumers and reduce 
fragmentation in their experience of service delivery (Berwick, 2002). Yet, consumers 
have seldom been consulted about their preferences for service delivery. There is some 
evidence that they would favour designs that provide a range of services and an 
accessible, authoritative point of care, as occurs in a visit to ED (Bechtel & Ness, 2010; 
Cleary, Horsfall, & Happell, 2009; Lowthian, 2013). However, recent experience 
suggests that in the absence of other sources of information, lobbying by the regulated 
health professions and engagement  with  the  media  could  shape  consumers’  perceptions 
about the redesign of services (Gabe et al., 2012). Specialist hospital departments could 
align with manufacturers of technologies that enable their business models to resist 
moving some work to other professionals or locations. Safety concerns could be raised, 
particularly as such changes take time to become established and routine.   
Since 2000 Lean Thinking assisted by some techniques from Six Sigma have been 
accepted as the means to realise health service improvements in New Zealand, Australia 
and the United Kingdom. Womack and Jones have been the leading experts on Lean 
Thinking and Jones has contributed to its adaptation to healthcare (Jones & Mitchell, 
2006). It is worth considering the difficulties anticipated for this quality improvement 
programme. According to Womack and Jones (1994), separation of routine work from 
specialist departments is likely to be resisted by departments that stand to lose power, and 
professionals whose roles, identity, or career paths could be threatened. Given the links 
between the regulators, health professions and industry suppliers such as tertiary 
education institutions or technology suppliers, it could be difficult to secure support from 
these stakeholders. The transformation of health service organisations from dominance by 
specialist departments to cross-departmental processes tailored to consumers could 
depend on whether dominant power coalitions among the health professions recognise 
that change is necessary, and whether health practitioner regulation enables managers and 
health practitioners to implement change (Degeling & Carr, 2004; Ferlie & Shortell, 
2001; McNulty & Ferlie, 2004). 
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6.2 E F F E C TS O F R E G UL A T O R Y PR IVIL E G E O N 
O R G ANISA T IO N A L C AP AB ILIT Y 
This section investigates the organisational capability important to implementing policies 
for service improvement. These include leadership, HRM, integration of ICT, and design 
of multidisciplinary teams. There are reasons to doubt this capability due to the operation 
of regulatory privilege. Fragmentation in regulatory authority appears to contribute to 
contested authority among health service leaders. Regulatory control of health 
practitioner training, competency, and career paths appears to leave little room for the 
HRM interventions. ICT capability may be limited by the influence of health professions 
among vendors and the attitudes of health professionals to information sharing in 
particular practice settings. The siloed development of competencies and career 
hierarchies among the health professions also poses difficulties for the design or 
operation of multidisciplinary teams. 
Heal th service leadership 
In the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, governments have intervened in the 
leadership of health service organisations with the expectation that having the right 
leaders was essential for service improvement (Degeling et al., 1999). In the 1980s, 
hospital chief executives were appointed to replace traditional leadership committees 
comprised of a medical superintendent, a principal nurse, and a general manager (Ashton, 
1993; Dedman, 2008; Harrison & Ahmad, 2000). Under the committee system, the 
medical superintendent was responsible for all medical and non-nursing health 
professionals, the principal nurse for all nurses and nursing assistants, and the general 
manager for corporate services such as finance, payroll, facilities, and kitchens (Boyce, 
1993). By the 1990s, services offered by hospital specialists and associated wards or 
clinics were grouped into clinical directorates to service groups of patients, such as for 
surgical  services  or  children’s  health,  while  diagnostic  and  therapy  departments  like 
laboratories or physiotherapy were commonly grouped to form a clinical support 
directorate (Ashburner, Ferlie, & Fitzgerald, 1996; Boyce, 1993; Braithwaite, 1995).  
These new structures are a blend of old and new elements with varying implications for 
the leaders of each professional group. It was common to retain senior roles for 
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directors of medicine and nursing, but for these roles to become advisory with no direct 
accountability for resource management in the clinical units (Ashburner et al., 1996; 
Braithwaite, 2004). The changes appeared to significantly affect medical specialists, who 
shifted from being accountable to the medical superintendent to an organisational 
accountability alongside nurse managers to a directorate leader (Braithwaite, 1995). The 
effect for nurses was to break up their large centralised management structure within 
hospitals, with ward or clinic managers now responsible to a directorate leader, titles such 
as  ‘ward  sister’  changed  to  ‘ward  manager’,  and  new  responsibilities  for  the  management 
of budgets and personnel (Bolton, 2003; Sambrook, 2007). The grouping of wards and 
specialist departments into clinical directorates was new in its consumer and resource 
focus. However, while this removed committee-style leadership at the executive level, 
committee-style leadership structures were replicated, less visibly, in each clinical 
directorate. 
There are both compromises and opportunities for diagnostic and therapy professions in a 
clinical support directorate. Generally, these departments gained independence through 
no longer reporting to a medical superintendent, and formal recognition in the new 
management structure (Boyce, 1993). For diagnostic departments like laboratories or 
radiology, split leadership arrangements could continue; for instance, with pathologists 
more likely to lead in networking among their medical specialist clients, and medical 
laboratory scientists more likely to take responsibility for the management of personnel, 
clinical technologies, and budgets (Price & Barnes, 1999). In some cases, smaller 
departments like physiotherapy, occupational therapy, or dieticians can be grouped 
together  as  ‘therapy  services’  (Boyce, 1993). Boyce (2001) explains that a group structure 
means competition among these health professions for the overall leadership role, but 
compared to being dispersed among clinical directorates it tends to protect their 
independence to organise their own work and professional development.       
Generally, multiple leadership accountabilities are replicated through levels and functions 
within health service organisations. Clinical directorates retain both the profession 
leadership roles that can link with professional organisations and facilitate the 
interpretation  of  professional  standards  into  an  organisation’s  design  of  clinical  work 
(Mintzberg, 1993), and the responsibilities for the implementation of government policies 
for service improvement. However, when incumbents are also clinically qualified they are 
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likely to carry dual accountability for improving performance and for upholding the 
policies of their professional association (Braithwaite, 2004; Fitzgerald & Ferlie, 2000). 
Multiple accountabilities to government policy-makers and to many registration 
authorities make decision-making continuously subject to potential contests, creating 
stress for managers whether they have a general management or a health professional 
background (Degeling & Carr, 2004). 
Faced with scant evidence of improvement following NPM-inspired restructures, policy-
makers in New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and Australia replaced directorate general 
managers with medically qualified leaders (Degeling et al., 2001; Degeling et al., 1999). 
Yet, as an Australian study showed, changing the disciplinary background of leaders was 
not effective for improving hospital performance (Braithwaite, Westbrook, Hindle, 
Iedema, & Black, 2006a). Indeed, research in New Zealand, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom has found that managers with a medical background are most likely to oppose 
redesign, particularly the standardisation of clinical work, transparency in clinical 
decision-making, and multidisciplinary delivery (Degeling et al., 2001; Degeling et al., 
1999), while leaders from non-medical professions tend to support these changes (Boyce, 
1993, 2001; Degeling et al., 2000; Degeling et al., 2001; Degeling et al., 1999). Yet, 
regardless of their disciplinary background, health service leaders are likely to encounter 
similar resistance to redesign from medical specialists and some other clinical personnel. 
Multidisciplinary teams can be even more complex as multiple lines of accountability to 
management and to many registration authorities play out in contests over leadership 
decisions, backed by the ever present potential to appeal to profession leaders within the 
organisation, professional associations or registration authorities, or to politicians (Reeves 
et al., 2010).  
Human resource management (HRM) 
Sophisticated training, performance management, and development of teams has been 
identified as important for improving quality and patient safety in healthcare. Yet, health 
services’  HRM  does  not  appear  to  emphasise these elements or align employee 
development to organisational goals (Leggat & Dwyer, 2005). This lack of attention to 
organisation  development  has been linked  to the definition  of health  professionals’  roles,   
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competencies, training and career paths by registration authorities (Lega & DePietro, 
2005). 
Health profession leaders in professional associations and educational institutions have 
influenced registration authorities in specifying roles and training for health professionals. 
Yet health profession agendas for role definition may or may not align to the demands of 
HRM or redesign in particular practice settings (Oandasan et al., 2006). Health service 
organisations have trained health professionals in techniques to improve clinical care, but 
many health professionals may find this knowledge difficult to apply (Braithwaite et al., 
2006b; Ovretveit et al., 2002). It seems paradoxical to have offered training in quality 
improvement, when there could be a lack of training to strengthen skills relevant to the 
clinical practice environment or career opportunities within particular health services. 
Generally, role development has been fragmented with new roles evolving through 
scopes-of-practice, expertise gained on-the-job, or the introduction of new practitioners 
such as emergency medical technicians or healthcare assistants. In many cases, 
practitioners in new roles have reported the need to justify their expertise to colleagues, a 
lack of managerial or professional support, and they may struggle to gain career 
recognition for skills not recognised by registration authorities (Bridges, Fitzgerald, & 
Meyer, 2007; Currie, Finn, & Martin, 2010; Sanders & Harrison, 2008; Willis & King, 
2010). 
The continuous oversight of competency by registration authorities could also undermine 
the role of HRM. First, standards set by registration authorities may or may not align to 
the mix of practice requirements for organisational roles (Conlon, 2004; Grossman, 1998; 
Lysaghta & Altschuld, 2000). The common reliance of registration authorities on self-
reported competency and professional development is likely to reinforce notions of 
professional autonomy that conflict with redesign elements for teamwork and 
organisational alignment of practice standards. It is a practice that is also inconsistent 
with international research that suggests that health practitioners find it difficult to assess 
their own competency or that of their colleagues (Davis et al., 2006; Reason, 2000). The 
precedence of attention to regulatory competencies may also distort the use of any 
professional development resources in health services (Sambrook, 2007). While 
‘management’  of  competency  from  the  regulatory  level  is intended  to protect consumers,   
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it is focused on competency within predefined silos and not on inter-professional 
collaborative practice (Reeves et al., 2010). 
Equitable remuneration for similar work is an important element in changing the basic 
unit of work for routine care, from loosely constructed inter-departmental collaboration to 
dedicated multidisciplinary teams. However, the role of HRM in designing remuneration 
policies important for teamwork is often minimal due to the practice of negotiating 
industrial agreements between governments and health profession unions in the United 
Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand (Buchan, 2000; Powell, 2004; Stanton, Bartram, & 
Harbridge, 2004). These negotiations proceed within the professional boundaries 
established by the registration authorities, which makes it difficult for employers to 
secure recognition for new roles or skill combinations that could be important to new 
career paths or service designs (Doyal & Cameron, 2000; Willis & King, 2010). Thus pay 
inequalities could exacerbate other inter-professional difficulties in multidisciplinary 
teamwork.  
In this context of profession-led control of role definition, training, career paths, and 
competencies, government efforts to redesign roles have met with limited success. In the 
United Kingdom and Australia role redesign has been identified as essential for 
productivity improvement in healthcare (Australian Productivity Commission, 2005; 
Hyde et al., 2005), and New Zealand has followed in establishing a health workforce 
agency to assist employers to introduce new roles (Health Workforce New Zealand, 
2013a).  However,  the  UK’s  CWP  programme  showed  how  the  role  of  health  services’ 
HRM  could  be  ‘crowded  out’,  as  health  professionals  led  role  design  within  each 
specialist department and government-led wage bargaining established the parameters for 
remuneration (McBride & Mustchin, 2013). In Australia, difficulties with workforce 
development to inform new service designs have been linked to a lack of HRM 
capability, but it is anticipated that strengthening HRM will depend on wider health 
system reform and restructure of the health workforce (Australian Productivity 
Commission, 2005; Conway, McMillan, & Becker, 2006). This scenario seems unlikely 
to progress without some rethinking around the design of health practitioner regulation. 
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Informat ion communicat ion technologies (IC T) 
Internationally, there has been slow progress with integrating clinical information systems 
to enable new service designs (Institute of Medicine, 2001; Kuziemsky & Reeves, 2012), 
and governments in New Zealand, Australia, and the United Kingdom have each 
attempted to address this problem (Morrison, Robertson, Cresswell, Crowe, & Sheikh, 
2011). At the heart of many technical problems lie difficulties related to regulatory ideals, 
which is problematic because to design computer systems it is necessary to have 
transparency  around  ‘who  actually  performs  what  work’,  rather  than  rely  on  ideals  about 
‘who ought  to perform  what work’. 
Since the 1980s, governments in New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom and 
elsewhere have set policies for strengthening ICT use in healthcare, at first to secure data 
for monitoring health service performance (Currie & Guah, 2007; Doolin, 1999; Soliman 
et al., 1997).  More  recently,  the  focus  has  shifted  to  sharing  of  patients’  clinical 
information to improve the coordination of services to consumers; for instance, see the 
Australian National Electronic Records Taskforce (2000), or the UK’s Wanless Inquiry 
(2002). In the United States, a Rand Corporation study has estimated that industry-wide 
adoption of shared electronic patient records and the order entry systems that computerise 
inter-professional referrals would enable health service productivity and safety gains of 
around 4% a year over 15 years (Hillestad et al., 2005). 
In many cases local networks of hospitals and community practices have been able to link 
administrative  and  clinical  systems  so  that  patients’  demographic  information  and  key 
diagnoses are shared, and health practitioners are able to access reports such as laboratory 
or radiology tests and hospital discharge summaries (Brennan, 2007; Kuhn & Giuse, 
2001; Southon, Sauer, & Dampney, 1997). This involves work with specialist 
departments and vendors to determine what information to share, how to format, transfer 
or exchange it, and how to rapidly update information so that it remains consistent across 
different clinical systems (Kuhn & Giuse, 2001). Internationally, New Zealand, Scotland, 
and Sweden appear to have the most advanced systems of connectivity between hospitals 
and general practices (Greenhalgh et al., 2010).  
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Figure 11 below depicts ICT systems common in healthcare: in the green boxes are 
systems for specialist services like radiology, laboratories, pharmacy, theatre, medical 
specialists, and therapies; in the blue boxes are systems for patient care areas like 
outpatients, emergency, general practice, and inpatient wards; in the red area are systems 
for order entry including result reporting, and decision support that may improve the 
coordination and flow of work by providing computerised support for clinical decision-
making and the referral system; in the orange area is the shared electronic patient record 
that generally operates at the level of local networks of hospitals and community 
practices;  and  in  the  brown  area  a  patient’s  summary record that may operate at a national 
level. 
Figure  11: Departments and inte rfaces in a hospital information system 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Information sharing may not be a priority among the health professions, and ongoing 
negotiation with various stakeholders is necessary to maintain links or interfaces between 
specialist systems. Specialist departments may be reluctant to interface their systems if 
they perceive this to involve compromises around system functionality, sharing clinical 
information regarded as too sensitive, or relinquishing control of their information 
technology to management (Kuhn & Giuse, 2001). New acquisitions of clinical 
equipment or software may require additional interfaces or repetitive data entry by health 
practitioners or clerical administrators. It appears to be common for ICT departments to 
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receive unplanned requests for interfaces that relate to computer programmes introduced 
by professionals often for profession-led audit or research; for instance, free software 
promoted for intensive care units by the Australia New Zealand Intensive Care Society 
(ANZICS, 2013). Success with managing health service ICT may also vary in accordance 
with local organisation cultures, particularly the attitudes of local health profession 
leaders who may be highly influential in the course of negotiations around interfaces or 
system implementation (Callen et al., 2007). 
Profession-centric supply chains are influential in the development of clinical ICT 
systems, because vendors build their reputations through the recommendations of health 
profession leaders and prioritise their system development through consultation with their 
health practitioner user groups (Mclaughlin & Webster, 1998). Differences in priorities 
between ICT user groups and government policies were evident in a failed attempt to 
introduce shared patient records in the English NHS, while vendors servicing after-hours 
clinics whose users benefit from sharing patient records built the necessary interfaces, but 
vendors for primary care providers gave this work a low priority consistent with the 
interests of their customers (Greenhalgh et al., 2010). Interfacing to support information 
sharing is a resource intensive task with ongoing maintenance to accommodate new 
software releases, vendor changes, changes to service requirements, or to remedy errors 
(van Ginneken, 2002). These technical complexities may be challenging enough without 
the additional complication of having to reconcile ongoing differences in inter-
professional priorities around information sharing.  
While maintenance of interfaces may be complex, it is even more complex to implement 
the order entry systems that computerise inter-professional referrals with their 
components for results reporting or decision support. These systems operate best when 
clinical departmental systems are more closely meshed or integrated than when they 
exchange messages or interface to update information, which may mean that health 
professionals need to agree to shared clinical terminologies, integrated data storage, and a 
common basis for presentation of clinical information (Kuhn & Giuse, 2001; van 
Ginneken, 2002). Order entry systems also involve practice change since they generally 
include protocols, or alerts to assist health practitioners to choose best practice options, 
and health professionals may resist using these systems if they slow work down, include 
guidance viewed as irrelevant or incorrect, or are perceived to be interfering with clinical 
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autonomy (Bates et al., 2003; Berg, Aarts, & van der Lei, 2003). A related problem is the 
preference of health professionals to record their clinical assessment or working diagnosis 
in their own text rather than using coded descriptions, but while this may preserve their 
clinical autonomy around record keeping it limits the usefulness of their clinical 
observations for information sharing, integrated multidisciplinary presentation of clinical 
information, or for performance reporting (Bates et al., 2003; Harrison, Koppel, & Bar-
Lev, 2007; van Ginneken, 2002; Walter & Lopez, 2008). 
There have been difficulties with reconciling regulatory ideals to local practice realities in 
the implementation of information systems that might otherwise improve the coordination 
of work between specialist departments. For instance, physician electronic prescribing 
systems may sideline nurses from their informal but important role in medication 
decisions or impose unanticipated work burdens on both pharmacists and nurses (Novek, 
2000). Similarly ward-based ordering of laboratory tests has been observed to interfere 
with  informal  practical  arrangements  around  ‘who  does  what  work’  among  referring 
medical practitioners, laboratory scientists, and pathologists (Mclaughlin & Webster, 
1998). These illustrations are not merely mistakes in system design that might be easily 
remedied.  Ambiguity  around  ‘who  may  perform  what  work’  appears  to  serve  the  interests 
of dominant groups, as they relinquish or reclaim work to manage environmental change 
(Nancarrow, 2005). However, ambiguity is the antithesis of the clarity required to transfer 
work processes onto computer systems, and at the heart of many technical difficulties is 
the potential for information sharing to disrupt the traditional working arrangements 
among the health professions (Aarts & Koppel, 2009; Berg et al., 2003). 
The design of mul t idiscipl inary teams 
Teamwork has been important for improving the coordination of care, such as to plan 
hospital  care  prior  to  patients’  discharge,  increase  the  range  of  services  in  primary care, or 
for review of patients in specialist cancer networks (Brown et al., 2011; Fleissig, Jenkins, 
Catt, & Fallowfield, 2006; Shepperd et al., 2013). Generally, loosely structured 
collaborative arrangements may find it difficult to focus members on team objectives 
(Hackman, 2002). In healthcare, dedicated multidisciplinary teams have also been used to 
reduce fragmentation in care by bringing together professionals who previously delivered 
care through their specialist departments (Iedema, Meyerkort, & White, 2005). The 
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longest experience with these teams appears to be in mental health services following the 
transfer of patients from large institutions to community-based care, and dedicated teams 
appear to be common in aged care or rehabilitation services (Lemieux-Charles & 
McGuire, 2006). 
Research that has compared services provided by multidisciplinary teams to that of well-
coordinated specialist departments suggests that teamwork might not be associated with 
service improvement (Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 2006). In healthcare, it appears to be 
difficult for health service organisations to design effective multidisciplinary teams. 
Effective team design has been linked to: a shared team goal, clarity around team 
membership; a team size of four to seven to enable timely consensus in decision-making; 
a mix of technical and interpersonal skills with sufficient skill overlap for sharing of core 
work; an appropriate distribution of authority among the organisation, the team, and team 
members to develop and sustain effective work processes; and, a supportive organisation 
context including training, shared information systems, and rewards that recognise team 
efforts (Hackman, Wageman, Ruddy, & Ray, 2000; Ovretveit, 1996). Yet it appears to be 
difficult to establish shared goals, optimal team sizes, effectively distribute authority, or 
provide sufficient organisational support for multidisciplinary healthcare teams.  
In order to collaborate toward a shared goal, healthcare teams need to transcend their 
differing philosophies and languages to agree the goals of treatment including the criteria 
for accepting or discharging patients (Irvine et al., 2002; Sheehan et al., 2007). This task 
may be further complicated as team boundaries and membership are often unclear, so 
teams may create special categories of membership (part-time or advisory) to 
accommodate members who only partly contribute to the teams main work task. This 
ambiguity around membership status exacerbates difficulties in reconciling 
interdisciplinary differences concerning the team task (Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 
2006; Ovretveit, 1996).  
Multidisciplinary healthcare teams tend to be large (Xyrichis & Lowton, 2008). It could 
be difficult to design an optimal team size when representatives of multiple disciplines 
are included, along with additional members from those professions whose scope-of-
practice  most  closely  maps  to  the  team’s  core  task.  For  instance,  a  community  mental 
health team may include psychiatrists, nurses, social workers, psychologists, and 
  177 
occupational therapists, and a UK survey found these teams had a mean size of 15 
members (Onyett & Heppleston, 1994). Effective work sharing may prove difficult either 
through restrictive scopes-of-practice or the exercise of regulatory privilege among team 
members. For instance, in mental health teams scopes-of-practice mean that medication 
management is likely to be restricted to nurses, while other health professionals dominate 
counselling or psychotherapy work, yet this squeezes nurses out of the psychotherapy 
work they may prefer (Clinton & Hazelton, 2000; Singh, 2000). This lack of task 
reciprocity has been linked to work related stress, and reported among nurses and 
therapists in rehabilitation care as well as mental health (Coyle, Edwards, Hannigan, 
Fothergill, & Burnard, 2005; Long et al., 2003). Limits around task reciprocity and work 
sharing have implications for patients who may experience interruptions, delays, or errors 
in the process of delivering care when the skill-mix limits handover of work between 
health professionals. 
It is difficult to establish an effective distribution of leadership authority, when 
professionals draw on their separate regulatory authority for their decisions (Bourgeault 
& Mulvale, 2006). It is common for medical practitioners to assume authority for 
decisions consistent with their historical dominance (Herrman, Trauer, & Warnock, 2002; 
McCallin, 2003; Nugus et al., 2010). In some cases medical control over decisions can 
create  delays  or  make  poor  use  of  the  team’s  skills; in others cases team members may 
each emulate medicine by making their own assessments and completing work based on 
independent understandings of their professional competencies (Iedema, Degeling, White, 
& Braithwaite, 2004; Reeves et al., 2010). Medical practitioners are more commonly held 
to account for their work than other health practitioners, so registration authorities have 
announced that psychiatrists will not be held accountable for the work of other members 
of their multidisciplinary team (General Medical Council, 2005; Mental Health 
Commission, 1998). A common response to leadership problems is to use two leadership 
roles with medical leadership around clinical decisions, and a coordinator to organise 
work (Long et al., 2003; Ovretveit, 1996). Yet even where two leaders work well 
together, differences around regulatory ideals or scopes-of-practice can mean a lack of 
task reciprocity that undermines efforts to agree care goals or the criteria for patient 
intake or discharge (Brown et al., 2011; Edwards et al., 2006). The result can look more  
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like the traditional practice of parallel working in accordance with the referral system 
than teamwork (Boon, Verhoef, O'Hara, & Findlay, 2004; Ovretveit, 1996).   
The support that healthcare organisations may bring to multidisciplinary teams appears to 
be limited. Managers may organise appropriate team facilities and equipment, but 
registration authority control over scopes-of-practice, inter-professional delegation, or the 
maintenance of competencies may rule out organisation-based team training that might 
otherwise  prepare  health  professionals  for  reciprocal  sharing  of  the  team’s  core  work 
(Kavanagh & Cowan, 2004; Oandasan et al., 2006). Profession-specific industrial awards 
also make it difficult to establish appropriately equitable remuneration or even to ensure 
that work is fairly distributed among team members (Clinton & Hazelton, 2000; 
Kavanagh & Cowan, 2004; Oandasan et al., 2006). 
This range of difficulties with team size, contested authority, and the tendency to revert to 
parallel working has been widely reported in the literature (Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 
2006). Some health professionals have suggested new hybrid roles designed around the 
team’s  core  work,  such  as  a  combinations  of  nursing  and  social work in mental health, or 
therapy and nursing in rehabilitation care (Brown et al., 2000; Long et al., 2003). Such 
role blurring to enable collaboration could be easier under conditions of fewer health 
professions or staff shortages (Hannigan & Allen, 2011; Nancarrow, 2005). Some 
researchers have drawn an association between larger teams and more innovation in 
services, although it is not clear how innovation affects outcomes or the overall 
effectiveness of teams (Xyrichis & Lowton, 2008). A larger range of specialists could be 
relevant to complex, rather than routine care. Overall, the research shows that it is not 
sufficient to simply co-locate health practitioners in the expectation that shared work 
practice will evolve or be a more effective means to coordinate services for consumers, 
particularly when health professionals report to different independent registration 
authorities (Lahey & Currie, 2005; Reeves et al., 2010; San Martin-Rodriguez, Beaulieu, 
D'Amour, & Ferrada-Videla, 2005). 
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C ON C LUSION 
The challenge of health service improvement is similar to that of other industries in 
seeking to take advantage of new technologies, and focus the contribution of specialists 
around the needs of patients. This calls for inter-related changes affecting leadership, the 
separation of routine and complex work, organisation-based clinical policies and 
procedures, multidisciplinary teamwork, some redeployment of personnel or 
technologies, the management of shared clinical information and ICT, new roles and 
supervisory arrangements, and the training and engagement of health professionals. 
Large-scale organisational change is hard and likely to entail years of sustained effort. To 
this end, governments have maintained consistent policy directions and invested in health 
service capability, including changes to leadership, organisation structures, financial 
management, teamwork and ICT. Despite this, there are reasons to doubt whether there 
are adequate mechanisms linking the regulatory and service delivery levels to support 
change, or that health service organisations have the capability necessary for 
implementation. 
Health practitioner regulation could effect health service improvement through the direct 
activities of registration authorities, the influence of professional associations in health 
service supply chains, and in the localised leverage of regulatory privilege by health 
professionals. Health service organisations have attempted to engage health practitioners 
in organisational transformation through recruiting clinically qualified personnel to 
leadership roles, training health practitioners in quality improvement, and collaborating in 
government initiatives for new clinical roles. Yet, the prevailing institutional 
arrangements do not appear to permit health practitioners to fully engage in service 
improvement. Indeed, to expect health practitioners to commit to changes that have 
uncertain implications for their security of employment, career paths, or professional 
identity seems implausible. Nor is it clear that health service organisations could readily 
trial new service arrangements without mechanisms to establish industry consensus 
around the directions for change, and to secure support from the regulatory level. New 
institutional arrangements could be required to address issues around roles, career paths, 
and professional identity, alongside mechanisms to enable workforce alignment to new 
arrangements for service delivery.  
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Health service organisations appear to be in transition from functional specialisation to 
new organisational forms, but at present, they remain closely tethered to professional 
structures both in service delivery and at the regulatory level. This appears to undermine 
the management capabilities necessary for the implementation of service improvement. 
This is evident in the uncertainty around leadership authority, with decision-making 
continually subject to contest or appeal to the regulatory level, and no evident means for 
resolution of these difficulties. In relation to HRM, the combined activities of 
professional associations, registration authorities, and tertiary educators leave little room 
for HRM to contribute to workforce development, the design of multidisciplinary teams, 
or to reward systems to encourage inter-professional collaboration. In ICT, progress has 
been slow as vendors rely on the endorsement of health profession leaders who tend to 
prioritise specialist clinical systems over the more integrated systems that improve service 
coordination. Given these limits in organisational capability and management authority, 
progress with service improvement is also likely to be limited.  
Over the last three decades, there has been significant progress with improving healthcare 
management and service delivery systems, although success has mostly been localised 
within specialist departments with less evidence of organisation-wide improvement. 
Health practitioner regulation could contribute in two ways. First, regulatory privilege 
permeates multiple levels in the health industry, reinforcing traditional ways of 
organising healthcare work. The absence of mechanisms, at both the regulatory and 
service delivery levels, to secure consensus around the directions for service 
improvement is likely to limit progress to localised improvements permitted by 
registration authorities. Second, even where directions for change are understood, 
regulatory privilege appears to undermine the management capabilities necessary for 
implementation. Thus regulatory privilege could contribute to explaining persistent 
difficulties with service improvement, despite sustained efforts, and attention to critical 
success factors in implementations.  
The next chapter investigates illustrations of service improvement to assess whether 
regulatory privilege contributes to explaining the events. 
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7
R E GU L ATORY P RIV IL E G E 
AS A N E XP L A N ATION IN SE RV IC E IMP R O V E M E N T 
 
IN TR OD UC TION 
Chapter Six completed an explanation of how regulatory privilege could contribute to 
difficulties with health service improvement by limiting the options for reorganising 
clinical work, and undermining the capability for change in health service organisations. 
Using illustrations, this chapter looks at whether regulatory privilege contributes to 
explaining events in health service improvement. Illustrations include options for service 
designs to focus care around patients, changes to improve the coordination of care within 
health services, and changes that directly affect the roles of health practitioners. In these 
illustrations, many improvements are evident and also some difficulties that appear to 
limit progress. As the review in chapter one shows, difficulties with management reforms, 
and quality improvement programmes have mostly been explained as deficiencies at the 
organisational level in the management of implementations. These have included aspects 
of organisational culture, leadership, management of change, and cultures of tribalism 
among the health professions. Yet the literature suggests that difficulties have been 
evident, even where health service organisations have adopted best practice in their 
implementations. This left room for additional explanations, and the account of the 
effects of health practitioner regulation developed in this thesis. This chapter assesses the 
plausibility of this explanation by considering whether it contributes to explaining the 
limitations with, or difficulties in, implementing the improvements sought in these 
illustrations. 
This chapter uses description, developed in chapter three, of how healthcare work is 
organised.  ‘Specialist departments’ refers to the hospital departments or community 
practices that have been formed around medical specialties, combinations of medical 
specialists and non-medical professionals as occurs in laboratories or radiology, or groups 
of allied health  professionals  such  as  pharmacists,  or  therapists.  ‘Multidisciplinary 
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teams’  include  members  of  different  health  professions,  co-located, and tasked to work 
together to provide routine care for particular groups of patients.  
Section 7.1 explains the selection of the illustrations used in this chapter and reprises the 
explanation built through chapters three to six. Section 7.2 begins at the meso-level with 
service designs, including clinical directorates, Patient Focused Care (PFC) units, and 
multidisciplinary teams. Continuing at this level, section 7.3 considers changes to 
improve service coordination, including inter-department information communication 
technology (ICT) and quality improvement programmes. Section 7.4 shifts to the micro-
level and considers regulatory changes for overlapped scopes-of-practice, continuing 
oversight of competency by registration authorities, and management-led design of roles 
for health practitioners. 
7.1 T H E IL LUST R A T IO NS AND P O T E N T IA L E F F E C TS O F 
R E G UL A T O R Y PR IVIL E G E  
This section overviews the criteria for, selection, and preparation of the illustrations used 
in this chapter. It concludes with a brief summary of what has been learnt so far about the 
effects of regulatory privilege, and how this could be expected to contribute to explaining 
events in the illustrations. 
Select ion of i l lustrat ions 
Seventeen illustrations were selected from the health services research literature and 
presented in sections 7.2 to 7.4 of this chapter. These include illustrations of service 
designs and improvements to the coordination of care, and changes affecting health 
professionals. 
There was relatively little material that met all the selection criteria. Recapping the 
explanation in Section 2.3, illustrations needed to concern health professionals or 
unregistered health practitioners described in Chapter Three. To identify effects that 
could relate to regulatory privilege, illustrations involving changes to service design and 
the coordination of care needed to include health practitioners from at least three different 
health professions. To contain the scope of the research, I focused initially on New 
Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, followed by other jurisdictions with a 
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similar history of health service improvement. Papers needed to provide enough 
description of the health professions, the intervention, the organisational context and the 
experiences  of  the  actors  to  support  an  explanation  for  the  events.  Authors’  explanations 
for the observed events were useful to assess whether the explanation of regulatory 
privilege contributed additional insights to account for these events. Finally, it was 
important to know whether the events observed were generally consistent with the 
literature, and that studies met scholarly standards.    
These criteria proved demanding. I found that many studies focus on a single health 
profession, or lack detail about the organisational context, the events, or the experiences 
of the actors. There have been few studies that consider the impact of regulatory changes 
on health services. Eleven of the illustrations come from the United Kingdom, which 
reflects  the  UK’s  larger  population  and  resources  for  research.  With  just  one  study  from 
Australia and none from New Zealand that met the selection criteria, five studies were 
included from other countries. The reasons for selection of particular illustrations are 
discussed in more detail below. 
In several cases, promising illustrations were located, but ultimately not selected, as they 
did not adequately meet the selection criteria. One New Zealand study of a clinical 
directorate (Doolin, 2002) was located, but it focused on medical specialists and 
managers rather than on clinical practice arrangements. One Australian study on PFC 
(Braithwaite, 1995) was located, but it focused on changes to the organisation structure 
rather than on the effects in inter-professional practice. There was more choice among 
studies on multidisciplinary teams, but despite the numbers of these studies, few provide 
specific information on the teams’  membership,  work  sharing  arrangements,  or  the 
experiences of the team members. One UK study considered relevant subjects, such as 
inter-professional boundaries, scopes-of-practice and professional accountability (Brown 
et al., 2011). However, it did not  include  the  detail  sought  about  the  teams’  composition 
or work sharing. 
Relatively few of the studies on quality improvement programmes were suitable for 
inclusion due to a lack of specific detail on the implementation and the actors. An 
example is a book of case studies by Bate et al. (2008) in which findings are presented 
thematically, focusing on the organisational contexts rather than on the work of the health 
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professionals.  There  were  few  choices  for  illustrations  of  clinical  ICT.  Doolin’s  (2004) 
New Zealand study involved a clinical accounting system rather than a system to enable 
inter-professional collaboration. I also considered an Australian study that compared the 
implementation of clinical systems linking wards to radiology and laboratory departments 
in two hospitals (Callen et al., 2007). However, the focus is the organisation culture and 
the attitudes of medical professionals, rather than on changes to work practice among the 
health professionals.  
Similarly, there was limited choice of material concerning the effects of changes to health 
practitioner regulation. Despite the international trends for overlapped scopes-practice, it 
appears that evaluative research has only been commissioned in the Netherlands. While 
educators have produced research on defining and assessing competency standards for the 
training of health professionals, there has been scant attention to how competencies set by 
registration authorities relate to clinical practice environments. Management-led role 
change was equally problematic due to the tendency for papers to focus on single 
professions or roles. 
The selected illustrations of service designs included: two of UK clinical directorates; two 
of PFC units, one from the United States and one from the United Kingdom; and three of 
multidisciplinary mental health teams in the United Kingdom. The choice of mental 
health teams reflects the sustained policy directions and funding for evaluation studies in 
these services. Selected illustrations of improvements to the coordination of care included 
two of quality improvement programmes, one of re-engineering from the United 
Kingdom, and one of Lean Thinking from Australia. These studies captured the 
similarities in quality improvement programmes, despite a decade of separation. Also 
selected were three illustrations of interdepartmental or cross-functional clinical ICT 
systems, one concerning laboratories and wards from the United Kingdom, one about 
medication management from Canada, and one from Sweden that linked hospital and 
community providers for maternity care. Selected illustrations for changes directly 
affecting health practitioners included: two for overlapped scopes-of practice, the first an 
evaluation study from the Netherlands and the second a regulatory review from the 
United Kingdom; two for continuous oversight of competency, one from the Netherlands 
and one from the United Kingdom; and one of management-led role change from the 
United Kingdom. 
  185 
Among these illustrations, there were many instances of improvements. Indeed, there 
appears to be a publication bias in favouring the reporting of successes, particularly in re-
engineering and lean thinking (Elkhuizen et al., 2006; Mazzocato, Savage, Brommels, 
Aronsson, & Thor, 2010). Overall, the research suggests little evidence of organisation or 
system-wide improvements. The few studies that attempt to assess effects on costs, or 
measures of service quality and patient safety suggest little difference (Bowns & 
McNulty, 1999) or higher costs (Walston et al., 2000; Walston et al., 2001). Other 
researchers have noted that gains might not be sustainable, even where the health service 
makes a sustained effort (Ovretveit & Staines, 2007). Some authors suggest that 
successes might only be sustained when quality improvement is applied across specialist 
departments in healthcare (Mazzocato et al., 2010) and throughout the health system 
(Joosten, Bongers, & Janssen, 2009). As explained in the introduction to this thesis, the 
evidence of difficulties or limitations to improvements, even where health services have 
adopted best practice in the management of implementations, leaves room for considering 
an explanation related to health practitioner regulation. 
Preparat ion of i l lustrat ions 
Most of the selected illustrations come from papers published in scholarly journals. I 
began by summarising these papers with attention to the purpose of the research, the 
improvement policy being implemented, the health professionals involved, the reported 
events, the experiences of the health professionals, and the research findings. One 
difficulty was that these published accounts had not been designed to identify the levers 
of regulatory privilege or elements of redesign identified in this thesis. In some cases 
particular levers appeared to be present, in other cases the presence of some levers could 
be inferred from the events. Two of the illustrations in Section 7.4 came from reports 
published by UK government agencies, and these were prepared in the same way. Two 
illustrations of quality improvement programmes were included. The first came from a 
scholarly book on the re-engineering of a UK hospital and the second from four papers 
describing  the  use  of  ‘lean  thinking’  in  60  hospitals  in  New  South  Wales,  Australia.  For 
these summaries, I focused on the common areas of process improvement, including 
emergency departments, emergency admissions, planned surgeries, and discharges. Once 
completed, the summaries were condensed to create the brief summaries or vignettes 
presented in Sections 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4 of this chapter. For fifteen of the seventeen 
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illustrations, summaries are longer than the vignettes and these are included in 
Appendices B, C and D. 
Regulatory levers and effects in service improvement  
Before considering the events in the vignettes, I briefly reiterate the explanation built 
through Chapters Three to Six. I then outline how regulatory privilege could be expected 
to affect service improvement in the selected illustrations. 
Chapter Three showed that the organisation of modern health services owes much to the 
19th-century construction of the health professions, medical regulation, hospitals and 
community services. This intertwined construction means that changes to improve health 
services could involve changes to the health workforce and its regulation, as well as to 
health service organisations. Much of the discourse about changes concerns medicine and 
nursing, but taken together the allied health professions comprise a significant and 
growing proportion of the health workforce. Each of these groups contributes to shaping 
the options for organising healthcare.  
Chapter Four showed that policies for health practitioner regulation and health service 
improvement appear to have been developed in isolation. The trends to bring more health 
professions into regulatory regimes and encourage non-medical advanced practitioners 
could intensify the potential for unintended policy interactions among the many 
registration authorities. There could also be interactions between the policies of 
registration authorities and regulatory agencies encouraging health service improvement. 
Unintended interactions could be evident in health service organisations, and observable 
in illustrations of service improvement.    
In Chapter Five, an explanatory lens, referred to as regulatory privilege, was developed to 
show the ways in which registration status could be leveraged with effects on the health 
workforce, and the control of certain resources in health service organisations. The levers 
of regulatory privilege were identified as emerging in the historical construction of the 
health workforce and subsequently being reinforced through health practitioner 
regulation. These levers included control of training, clinical technologies, clinical 
information and ICT, special languages, role definition, referral agreements, and the 
potential for inter-professional complaints to registration authorities. Levers could be 
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used in various combinations, depending on the health profession and the circumstances. 
The exercise of regulatory privilege by health professionals could present barriers to 
embracing service improvements otherwise made possible through 21st-century changes 
to social conditions, particularly in education, knowledge, and technology. 
Chapter six traced the progress with service improvement, which revealed a pattern of 
many localised improvements with less evidence of organisation-wide improvements to 
safety, quality or cost. The chapter showed that the redesign elements in service 
improvement could be poorly aligned to the present organisation of work among the 
health professions. These included inter-related changes affecting leadership, separation 
of routine and more complex work, organisation-based clinical policies and procedures, 
multidisciplinary teamwork, some redeployment of personnel or technologies, 
management of shared clinical information and ICT, new roles and supervisory 
arrangements, and training and engagement of health professionals. Management 
capability for service improvement also appeared to be weakened by regulatory privilege. 
This included contested leadership, weak human resource management (HRM), 
competing professional agendas in ICT, and obstacles to the design of effective 
multidisciplinary teams. The poor alignment of redesign to healthcare work and the lack 
of organisational capability could explain why improvements tend to be localised to 
specialist departments in traditional service structures. These localised improvements 
might not lead to organisation-wide improvements, due to the differing priorities 
accorded patient cases among specialist departments, or among health professionals in 
inter-professional practice. 
This explanation of how regulatory privilege could limit service improvement could be 
expected to contribute to explaining events in the selected illustrations. The levers of role 
definition and control of training were linked to a lack of HRM capability in health 
service organisations. This capability is important for new service designs, aligning roles 
to the needs of patients, inter-professional work sharing, training to support practice, 
developing new career structures, and establishing policies for supervision and 
professional accountability for practice. These levers could contribute to explaining the 
events in Section 7.2, on multidisciplinary teams, Section 7.3 on quality improvement 
programmes, and Section 7.4 on overlapped scopes-of-practice, oversight of competency, 
and new roles in health services. 
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The lever of control of clinical technologies was linked to the historical development of 
particular health professions. Specialisation around certain technologies has produced 
advances in patient care, such as in laboratory testing, medical imaging, and medication 
management. Health professions tend to favour retaining control of important 
technologies within their respective specialist departments or practices. This could 
undermine the evolution of technologies that enable the routine work of specialist 
departments to be delivered in different locations or by practitioners from other health 
professions. This lever could contribute to explaining the events in the vignettes on PFC 
in Section 7.2, and the inter-departmental ICT illustrations in Section 7.3. 
The lever of control over special languages was linked to difficulties with communication 
in inter-professional practice and multidisciplinary teams. Difficulties with integration of 
electronic patient records have been linked to inter-professional language differences and 
reluctance to use standardised, abbreviated text that can contribute to integrated electronic 
patient records. This lever could contribute to explaining events in Section 7.2 on PFC 
and Section 7.3 on ICT.  
The lever of control over clinical information and ICT has implications for information 
sharing, clinical record keeping, and the coordination of work. These levers could explain 
the difficulties experienced with ICT systems enabling order entry and results reporting 
between wards and departments, and in designing integrated electronic health records for 
consumers. The ICT vignettes in Section 7.3 include material related to these issues. 
The lever of referral agreements is the primary means of organising work among the 
health professions. These agreements mostly reserve the right to determine and allocate 
work to medical practitioners. Referral agreements could obstruct efforts to separate 
routine and complex work, and to use organisation-based clinical policies and procedures 
to guide non-medical practitioners to deliver routine work. This lever could contribute to 
explaining events in Section 7.2 on clinical directorates, PFC units and multidisciplinary 
teams, Section 7.3 on quality improvement programmes, and Section 7.4 on government-
led efforts to redesign roles for health practitioners. 
To observe the lever of inter-professional complaints, vignettes would have had to 
include events either inside registration authorities or the human resource departments of  
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health service organisations. Even in the absence of this information, events in Sections 
7.2 about PFC units and 7.4 could suggest the presence of this lever.   
7.2 OP T IO NS F O R SE R VIC E D ESIG NS  
This section looks at how well three different service designs align routine inter-
professional care to patient groups. To varying degrees, each design shifts service 
delivery from a focus on specialist departments toward inter-professional care of patient 
groups. Drawing on the experience of Lean Thinking in other industries, resistance could 
be expected from specialist departments that stand to lose power and individuals who 
need new career paths to recognise their inter-professional work around particular groups 
of patients (Womack & Jones, 1994).  For each design, I assess the plausibility that 
regulatory privilege could contribute to explaining the limits or difficulties with these 
service designs.  
The section begins with two vignettes about clinical directorates, which are a common 
structure for organising hospital care in New Zealand, Australia, and the United 
Kingdom. The next two vignettes describe PFC units that were piloted in early efforts to 
re-engineer health services. The final three vignettes describe dedicated multidisciplinary 
teams, which are a common service design to care for mental health patients in 
community settings. 
Clinical directorates 
An important step in service improvement is to create an organisation structure that 
focuses care around similar patient groups to minimise delays in routine care. Clinical 
directorates have become a common way of organising hospital services since the 
management reforms of the late 20th century (Boyce, 2001). The clinical directorate 
vignettes (below) illustrate the complexity of aligning inter-professional care to patients 
in clinical directorate structures. (For longer summaries of these studies, see Appendix B, 
pages 283-284). 
In a UK clinical directorate, there were 10 nurses on each ward, and other health 
professionals attached to wards, including up to 15 medical practitioners from five or six 
different medical specialist teams, three to four therapists (physical and occupational), 
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two social workers, two pharmacists, and two care coordinators. Inter-professional work 
was coordinated through weekly multidisciplinary meetings for the patients of each 
medical specialist team, with each meeting to be led by the respective medical team 
leader. However, there was inconsistent attendance among medical practitioners and 
nurses. Meetings were often cancelled when medical specialists did not attend, so most 
information sharing occurred in profession-specific meetings. Some health professionals 
attempted to glean information from reading ward notes, although the social workers 
reported that this was unsatisfactory. Nurses attempted to communicate directly with 
medical practitioners about particular patients, but medical practitioners preferred a more 
centralised system of communication. Inter-professional communication tended to occur 
in brief or terse corridor conversations, often initiated by medical practitioners who 
treated non-medical practitioners as representatives of their respective health professions, 
rather than as team members. Messages were also relayed through care coordinators or 
nurses. These opportunistic verbal exchanges were problematic for the continuity of care 
when the health practitioners were interrupted or forgot messages. Medical practitioners 
viewed collaboration as an activity within medicine, while nurses expressed views more 
inclusive of other health professionals. The authors concluded that the care coordinator 
role was a useful development, but that difficulties with practice locations, hours of work 
and differing views about collaboration among the health professions limited inter-
professional care on these hospital wards (Reeves & Lewin, 2004). 
Another UK study focused on the inter-professional collaboration between nurses, 
therapists (speech language, physical and occupational) podiatrists, dieticians, and social 
workers in the delivery of rehabilitation care. Nurses remained in the wards or clinics, 
while the other health professionals moved between these areas and their respective 
clinical department. This study followed the progress of patients recovering from hip 
fractures, rheumatoid arthritis, or stroke as they transferred from acute care wards to 
rehabilitation wards and outpatient clinics. While there were instances of highly 
collaborative work between the nurses and the therapists, there was widespread confusion 
around  roles  or  responsibilities,  leading  to  contests  for  control  over  patients’  assessments, 
coordination of care, and the incorporation of therapy treatments into daily nursing care. 
These contests contributed to fragmented care, repetition of work, and delayed recovery 
for  patients.  Nurses  complained  that  the  therapists  failed  to  recognise  nurses’  skills  in 
rehabilitation, or to communicate their therapy instructions; while therapists 
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complained  that  nurses  undermined  patients’  progress  by  not  reading  or  adhering  to 
therapy instructions. Nurses were divided over whether their role should be to co-ordinate 
the  therapists’  work  or  to perform therapy work. Some nurses expressed a desire for 
recognition and training in rehabilitation care. The authors concluded that there is a need 
for more transparency in the skills required for rehabilitation care, and recognition of this 
need by health service organisations, educators, and the registration authorities (Long et 
al.,2003). 
In both of these vignettes, the service designs focus the work of specialist departments 
around particular groups of patients and try to bring inter-professional care to the 
patient’s  bedside  or  clinic  appointment.  The  allocation  of  particular  health  professionals 
to groups of wards is likely to increase the opportunities for inter-professional 
collaboration  for  the  patients’  benefit.  In  both  vignettes,  a  combination  of logistical and 
inter-professional difficulties was evident. 
In the first vignette, Reeves and Lewin (2004) point out the logistical difficulties, 
including differing departmental locations and hours of work for the specialist medical 
teams, nurses and allied health professions. While nurses are located on particular wards, 
the medical specialists and allied health professionals work across different medical 
wards. Underlying these clinical directorates is the traditional organisation of the 
healthcare workforce, in which the various levers of regulatory privilege may be applied 
to maintain the independence of each group of health professionals. While allied health 
departments may allocate professionals to particular clinical directorates, they are also 
likely to utilise all their staff to meet demand organisation-wide. If the allied health 
professionals were permanently dedicated to each clinical directorate and expected to 
provide services through evenings or weekends, larger numbers of these professionals 
would be required. However, there is unlikely to be enough specialist work to occupy 
increased numbers of allied health professionals, unless they begin to share work with the 
nurses on the wards. Such changes could be difficult due to the control over role 
definition and training by registration authorities. Usually, the numbers of specialist 
health professionals remain the same, and demand is managed by delaying routine work 
where there are conflicting demands, which contribute to logistical difficulties in inter-
professional practice. In the first vignette, the new co-ordinator roles were introduced to 
improve inter-professional co-ordination of care. 
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Logistical difficulties make it easier for the medical, nursing and allied health 
professionals to largely operate in their own teams, with most information sharing in their 
respective team meetings. Reeves and Lewin (2004) also describe difficulties with inter-
professional collaboration that could relate to the regulatory levers of control of 
information, and referrals. Medical practitioners appeared to treat their communications 
with  other  health  professionals  as  ‘referrals’  or  ‘delegated  instructions’  and  not  as 
opportunities  for  collegial  discussion  of  the  patient’s  health  condition.  There  is  also  some 
evidence  of  control  of  information  because  the  patients’  notes  do  not  appear  to  function 
as a record that supports the contribution of all the health professionals.   
The second vignette above shows similar difficulties to the first vignette, even though 
care coordinators are in place. There are logistical problems due to the differing work 
locations, hours of work, separate record keeping, and differing ideas about collaboration 
among the health professions. Long et al. (2003) observed that the difficulties between 
nurses and therapists around inter-professional  work  had  negative  effects  on  patients’ 
progress, and recommended changes to health practitioner training at both the 
organisational and regulatory levels. This would seem to be a call for a simple change to 
training, so that both nurses and therapists have clarity about their shared skills, helping 
them  to  trust  one  another’s  judgement  and  share  work.  However,  the  explanation 
developed in this thesis suggests that such changes would not be simple. The pattern of 
role definition in the health workforce has been for advanced practice work within 
professional silos, with new competencies including work previously reserved to medical 
practitioners. There is scant evidence of registration authorities prioritising recognition of 
shared competencies in clinical work for particular patient groups, such as for those 
requiring rehabilitation care. While the World Health Organisation (2005) has made 
recommendations for training of health professionals in communication and teamwork, 
these are general skills and there is scant evidence of educators including shared clinical 
competencies  in  training.  Thus,  progressing  the  authors’  recommendations  is  likely  to 
depend on changes at the regulatory level. 
The resolution of difficulties with logistics and inter-professional practice observed in 
these clinical directorates might involve post-registration training open to interested 
health professionals, organisation-based policies to guide practices in specialist 
departments and multidisciplinary teams, and organisation-based training to orient health 
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professionals to work sharing in particular inter-professional practice settings. However, 
this is likely to involve changes to the operation of registration authorities, the 
organisation of training in health science faculties, and an increased role in training for 
health service organisations.   
Pat ient F ocused Care (P F C) 
The case for PFC units was premised on the idea that routine work could be designed 
around patients and that this could deliver gains in service quality and efficiency. It was 
informed by US studies showing that as little as 16 cents of every dollar spent on labour 
went  to  direct  patient  care,  and  that  the  ‘sea  of  faces’  caring  for  a  single  patient  could 
compromise the quality of care (Hurst, 1996; Lathrop, 1993). In the United Kingdom, 
similar studies showed that a routine procedure such as a chest X-ray could involve up to 
11 staff and more than two-hours of staff time (Heymann & Culling, 1996). The remedy 
was to shift routine work  from  the  specialist  departments  to  the  patient’s  bedside,  to  be 
performed by teams of cross-trained health practitioners in accordance with organisation-
based clinical policies (Lathrop, 1991). The next two vignettes show the progress with 
PFC pilots at Lakeland Regional Medical Center (LRMC) in the United States, and 
Leicester Royal Infirmary (LRI) in the United Kingdom. (For longer summaries of these 
studies, see Appendix B, pages 285-287). 
At LRMC, a PFC unit was established with 35 surgical beds and facilities for some 
laboratory, radiology and pharmacy work to be performed in the unit. In-house training 
prepared a two-person team of a registered nurse and a multi-skilled health practitioner to 
perform preadmission assessments, admissions, ECGs, respiratory treatments, basic 
physical therapy treatments, phlebotomy (taking blood for analysis), most dietary 
functions, equipment care, cleaning rooms, transporting patients, charging patient 
accounts and completing medical records. Post-implementation evaluations showed 
routine laboratory tests were completed 70% faster, measures for patient satisfaction, 
length of stay, mortality, quality of care or complications were similar or better than on 
the traditional units, and there were cost savings of 9.2% per occupied bed day. The time 
taken for X-rays was improved, although health practitioner regulation restricted the 
taking of X-rays to radiographers. Health professionals reported improved engagement 
with medical specialists or managers, but felt that some work involved reduced 
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autonomy,  or  was  ‘demeaning’  for  their  profession.  The  15  surgeons  were  unanimous  that 
patient care had improved, but some preferred to maintain their own medical notes, 
separate  from  the  unit’s  record  of  patient  care (Watson, Shortridge, Jones, Rees, & 
Stephens, 1991). 
At LRI, a PFC unit for performance of routine tests for outpatients was set up at the 
Balmoral Outpatients Centre. This was part of a strategy to change from three or four 
separate appointments for patients to a single appointment that integrated tests and 
consultations. The laboratory, radiology and cardiology departments monitored the 
quality of tests, and the human resources department assessed staff satisfaction in the 
clinic. Outpatients generated 66,000 tests per year. Prior to the implementation of the 
Balmoral PFC unit, 43% of test results were not available at the start of a clinic, and 28% 
of tests were repeated due to delays or missing results. In 1995, testing equipment was 
installed to service eight clinics, with a team of four cross-trained health practitioners, 
who  reduced  patients’  waiting  times  for  tests  from  90  to  10  minutes.  The  clinical 
personnel reported satisfaction from delivering a comprehensive service to patients, but 
experienced censure from professional colleagues due to anxieties about limited career 
paths,  and  being  seen  to  perform  the  ‘lower-status’  or  routine  work  from  the  scopes-of-
practice of other health professions (Newman, 1997). An evaluation of organisation-wide 
re-engineering at LRI (undertaken at the same time) showed that it was the PFC-inspired 
change in outpatient services that contributed most to cost savings as well as quality 
improvement (Bowns & McNulty, 1999).  
The  authors’  accounts  of  these  PFC  pilots  were  positive. At LMRC there were significant 
cost and quality improvements for surgical patients. At LRI, the experience for 
outpatients was transformative, with a single appointment replacing three or four 
previously required. Yet, PFC was a short-lived experiment rather than the beginning of a 
service improvement programme, and some reasons related to health practitioner 
regulation. 
At LMRC, there were limits to the design of routine work on the unit. Each two-person 
team had to include a registered nurse, and only a licensed radiographer could take X-
rays. Brider (1992) explains that US nursing organisations objected to an allied health 
professional  completing  a  patient  assessment  because  this  involves  ‘a  nursing  diagnosis’, 
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and the US Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Healthcare Organisations warned 
hospitals that their continuing accreditation would be contingent on cross-training  ‘tasks’, 
not  ‘professional  work’  such  as  ‘nursing  assessments’  or  ‘nursing  diagnoses’.  The  PFC 
pilots coincided with the shift to general management. Management roles were to become 
‘generalist’  rather  than  reserved  to  members  of  particular  health  professions  (Walston & 
Bogue, 1999).  However,  US  nurses’  organisations  insisted  that  the  PFC  unit  manager 
should be a member of the nursing profession (Brider, 1992). In the United States, the 
regulatory levers related to control of clinical technologies, control of special languages, 
and role definition appear to have constrained the options for PFC-style service 
improvement. 
The PFC-style reorganisation at LRI appeared modest in comparison to that at LMRC and 
some other UK sites. The laboratory, radiology and cardiology departments appeared to 
take on their new roles of monitoring the quality of services provided by the generalist 
health practitioners in the Balmoral Test Centre. However, it is not clear whether the tests 
offered at this test centre were subject to regulatory restrictions, or if so, how this was 
accommodated. In a review of seven UK pilots, Garside (1993) found health services 
introduced cross training of health professionals, for routine work, without sufficient 
attention to the effect on the specialist departments that had contributed some of their 
health professionals and clinical technologies to the PFC units. While a PFC pilot could 
appear modest, this type of service improvement could ultimately require organisation-
wide redesign of healthcare work and services. Such reorganisation could depend on 
changes at the regulatory level. 
As the largest health profession affected by PFC pilots, nursing organisations appeared to 
lead the protest against PFC-style service improvement. In the United Kingdom, there 
were legal difficulties and fears about the loss of professional identity. Nurses were 
required to decline work that was outside their scope-of-practice, there was uncertainty 
around the quality of on-the-job training, the accountability of employers for training and 
work  practice,  and  there  were  questions  about  whether  the  legally  protected  title  ‘nurse’ 
could be used by a cross-trained health professional (Hurst, 1997).     
At both LMRC and LRI, the health professionals involved in the pilots reported that they 
enjoyed  the  work,  but  were  anxious  about  performing  the  ‘lower-status’  or  routine  work 
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from the scopes-of-practice of other health professions (Newman, 1997; Watson et al., 
1991). These anxieties could be expected in the context of role definition by registration 
authorities, which has favoured uplifting work previously restricted to medicine over 
combining competencies from different non-medical health professions to serve particular 
patient groups. Progressing PFC-style service improvement would depend on the 
construction of career paths for health professionals to move between specialist roles 
focused on complex cases, and multidisciplinary teams or units focused on routine care of 
particular groups of patients.  
The evaluation studies from these PFC pilots suggested that rethinking the design of 
clinical work could deliver cost and quality improvements in health services. Given this 
potential, it is plausible to think that further experimentation could have refined the issues 
around role design, or that rotations through routine and complex work could have 
addressed career or competency concerns. However, these pilots also demonstrated that 
the redesign of health services might not be possible without changes to health 
practitioner regulation. 
Mul t idiscipl inary teams 
Multidisciplinary teams dedicated to providing routine services for particular groups of 
patients are a common design for service improvement. These teams were originally 
constructed through recruiting or redeploying health professionals from their specialist 
departments to care for a particular group of patients, such as those with a chronic health 
condition (Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 2006). In mental health services, it is common 
for multidisciplinary teams to provide routine care for community-based clients, and for 
specialist services to provide services for more complex problems or acute episodes of 
illness (Thornicroft & Tansella, 2004). The next two vignettes are of community mental 
health teams (CMHTs) in the English Midlands, and the south of England. In the third 
vignette, a Scottish CMHT is in the process of implementing an electronic record keeping 
system to improve sharing of patient information. (For summaries of these studies, see 
Appendix B, pages 287-290). 
Three teams in the English Midlands provided mental health services for patients in 
particular geographical areas. A steering group of stakeholders met monthly to oversee  
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these services. Each team held weekly meetings chaired on a democratic basis. Two 
teams delivered services from distributed office locations. There were difficulties 
agreeing  the  teams’  goals,  including  ensuring  that team members only treated clients from 
the  team’s  geographical  catchment.  Some professionals began to complete a range of 
tasks at a single appointment because this was efficient and convenient for the client, and 
advocated a new multi-skilled role for mental health professionals. Others objected to 
combined  roles  as  ‘meddling’  across  inter-professional boundaries, and a third group tried 
to steer a middle line. Many professionals expressed positive attitudes to teamwork, but 
most retained links with their specialist departments, and overall the professionals felt 
abandoned by management. The authors concluded that multidisciplinary team structures 
could have the unintended effect of encouraging health professionals to focus on their 
inter-professional boundaries (Brown et al., 2000). 
In the south of England, three CMHTs were introduced to improve the coordination 
of care between hospitals and general practices. Health service managers had appointed 
leaders, co-located the health professionals with their team members in the same 
premises, required that care plans be developed for each patient, and adopted a language 
of collaboration. Leadership was shared between a psychiatrist responsible for treatment 
plans and a nurse coordinating care. Two of the teams had difficulties agreeing to a team 
goal for patient care. After two years, the professionals still looked to their specialist 
department for direction or support, and were confused about their responsibilities or 
decision-making rights within the team. The third team was responsible for 
psychotherapy services. It rapidly agreed its goals for patient care, established team-based 
training and support for its members. The authors concluded that further management 
intervention was required to resolve difficulties around priorities, tasks, and core work for 
the other two teams (Gulliver, Peck, & Towell, 2002). 
In Scotland, three CMHTs were implementing an electronic patient record system. 
Each team had a designated leader, a lead practitioner for each patient, and inter-
professional care plans for each patient. The teams tried to organise their work on a 
democratic basis. They solicited opinions from each team member on each patient case, 
to establish a group consensus around the assessments or referrals for each patient 
discussed. Team membership status varied, which meant that the authority accorded 
individual practitioners varied or was renegotiated depending on the extent of that 
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practitioner’s  participation  in  team  activities.  Uncertainty  about  roles  and  responsibilities 
was evident in the management of client records. Policies for records management were 
not enforced, particularly concerning their removal from the office. Generally, there was 
a pattern of both informal and formal record keeping with drafts of assessments, reports, 
or referrals held back until consensus was secured with other team members. Sometimes 
amendments  were  made  to  drafts,  which  were  then  filed  in  the  patient’s  record.  The 
introduction of the electronic records system meant that records were immediately 
available to other health practitioners, changes to records were tracked, and it was more 
difficult for management to ignore policy breaches, such as the removal of client files 
from the office. Thus team members delayed entering records into the system. For 
instance, a nurse assessed a patient and verbally reported this assessment to the 
psychiatrist, but did not record it until after she had checked the consistency of her 
assessment  with  the  psychiatrist’s  report.  The  researchers  doubted the electronic system 
would accommodate the collaborative style of working in these multidisciplinary teams 
and changes would be required (Hardstone, Proctor, Voss, & Rees, 2004). 
Regulatory control of role definition, by each health profession, contributes to a lack of 
management capability to construct effective multidisciplinary teams. In the first vignette, 
confusion around work sharing and accountability was evident in the differing opinions 
about  ‘role  blurring’.  This  reflected  the  health  professionals’  differing  emphasis  on, or 
interpretation  of  their  clients’  clinical  and  social  needs, and their own understanding of 
their  respective  health  profession’s  role,  expertise  and  regulatory  responsibilities. 
Uncertainty or even contests around professional expertise and responsibility would have 
undermined the capability for work sharing. A further difficulty was that the teams 
ranged from eight to 11 members, which is larger than the four to seven members 
recommended for team designs to enable effective real-time communication and decision 
making (Hackman et al., 2000). The number of team members in the other vignettes was 
not reported. However, these teams are likely to have similar communication difficulties 
related to team size, because they include representatives from the same range of health 
professions.  
In the second and third vignettes, there was more management attention to formalising 
leadership and policies for inter-professional care plans. However, in all the vignettes the 
democratically styled team meetings demonstrate the uncertainty around roles and 
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accountabilities for team members. There were differing opinions around role blurring, 
difficulties agreeing to a team goal, changing team membership status among the health 
professionals, and difficulties  aligning  the  work  of  team  members  to  the  team’s  list  of 
clients. The exception was the psychotherapy team in the second vignette, which 
organised well around its task. This could be explained because there were no regulatory 
restrictions about which professions were permitted to perform this work (Professional 
Standards Authority, 2014), and therefore no regulatory roles or responsibilities to 
interpret and potentially disagree about. While the authors recommended management 
intervention to resolve difficulties with priorities, tasks and core work in the other two 
teams, it is not clear that managers would have the authority to resolve matters arising 
from differing interpretations over regulatory obligations among health practitioners in an 
inter-professional work setting.   
The third vignette shows how the lack of clarity about professional roles evident in the 
teams also leads to uncertainties about clinical accountability and record keeping. The 
lack of management authority concerning roles extends to the management of clinical 
information.  Organisation  policies  relate  to  the  movement  of  records  from  the  teams’ 
offices, but not to accountability for their production or clinical content. In the absence of 
an authoritative solution for record keeping, the health professionals delay recording their 
observations, and invest time in extensive co-production. In some cases consultations 
over assessments or referrals could be important. However, delaying the production of 
clinical notes could mean they do not accurately capture the actual observations made. 
Additionally, there is no record of the episode of care in cases where the client attends 
another service, such as the emergency department, while joint productions of clinical 
records are in progress. These delays are also likely to breach professional or legal 
standards that require prompt recording of observations or information provided by 
patients, particularly in chronic care where important clinical information may only 
become evident over time, and through several consultations with different health 
practitioners (Cowan, 2000). Hardstone et al. (2004) conclude that the electronic record 
system should be redesigned to accommodate the co-production style of record keeping 
in these teams. However, it could be useful to also address role clarification, work 
sharing, and accountabilities as an equally important part of designing a shared electronic 
records system. However, the lack of organisational authority to address these matters, 
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and the absence of arrangements at the regulatory level to facilitate policies for inter-
professional practice in multidisciplinary teams suggests this could prove difficult.   
7.3 C O O RDIN A T IO N O F SE R VIC ES 
Communication and patient flow in services can be improved through information 
sharing and better coordination of care. This section begins with three vignettes about the 
use of ICT to focus the work of specialist departments around patients. In the second half 
of this section, two vignettes show how quality improvement programmes have been used 
to improve  patients’  journeys  through  hospital  services.   
IC T to coordinate care 
Health ICT evolved in specialist departments from the 1970s, but there has been slow 
progress with linking these clinical systems together to improve the coordination of care 
(Hillestad et al., 2005). Regardless of these difficulties in hospitals, this agenda has 
expanded with policies for computerised sharing of clinical information among hospital 
and community providers (Bodenheimer, 2008). When implemented, there has often been 
insufficient  attention  to  how  computerised  communication  of  referrals  or  ‘orders’  can 
change work practice among health professionals (Callen, Westbrook, Braithwaite, & 
Mir, 2006). The first vignette is set in a microbiology laboratory with a new laboratory 
system that enables communication across the laboratory and with the wards. The second 
vignette shows the implications for pharmacists and nurses of a system to improve the 
management of medications. In the third vignette a web portal links pregnant women with 
hospitals and community practices. (For longer summaries of these studies, see Appendix 
C, pages 291-294). 
In the United Kingdom, a new laboratory system introduced transparency between 
the clinical departments of the laboratory, and allowed medical practitioners on the wards 
to order from a standardised list of laboratory tests and view results. Eighteen months of 
work was necessary to build agreements for this system among the laboratory 
departments. In the microbiology department, the system tracked the performance of the 
tests by the laboratory scientists, quality reviews of the test results by either the scientists 
or the pathologists, and the release of results to the wards. This new system challenged  
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the roles of laboratory scientists who saw themselves as deciding on, performing, and 
inventing  new  tests.  It  also  challenged  the  pathologists’  claim  to supervise all the 
laboratory work. Each group negotiated changes. The scientists retained the right to 
change the tests ordered by the wards and to control how the tests were performed. 
However, they lost their test development work, which they saw as compromising their 
career options, because tests became standardised in accordance with hospital policies. 
The  pathologists  leveraged  their  regulatory  authority  over  ‘the  diagnosis’  to  retain  control 
for  ‘approving’  each  test  result  for  release,  by  instituting  a  manual  ‘workaround’  so  the 
scientists  could  highlight  which  tests  needed  a  pathologist’s  review.  The  pathologists  also 
threatened that if certain changes were not made, they would discredit the system to 
pathologists in other health services. The managers negotiated changes with a view to 
securing improvements to information sharing, transparency around laboratory service 
delivery, and more standardised work practice (Mclaughlin & Webster, 1998).  
In a Canadian hospital, a medication administration system was introduced to 
reduce errors and improve efficiency. Pharmacists expected to enhance their roles in 
quality control and clinical advisory services, and nursing leaders expected that nurses 
could save time on medications and gain time for other clinical work with patients. There 
were unanticipated effects for both health professions. The replacement of ward 
inventories with daily supplies in medication carts generated an intolerable volume of 
data entry work for pharmacists. The medication advisory service, planned for wards by 
the pharmacists, failed, because when they shifted to the wards, the pharmacists found 
themselves isolated from the knowledge they had previously acquired through performing 
prescription  reviews.  The  system’s  two-hour window for medication administration had 
been agreed by hospital managers who were higher degree trained nurses. However, 
rather  than  free  nurses  for  more  time  with  patients,  these  rules  restricted  the  nurses’ 
discretion to exercise their judgement around competing work demands. To resist 
changes, pharmacists stressed their professional accountability for prescription reviews, 
and nurses their professional accountability for the administration of medicines. While 
the system was intended to enhance professional roles, it introduced standardisation of 
work  that  reduced  each  profession’s  opportunities  to  exercise  their  professional  discretion 
and control their work. This implementation occurred in the context of a pharmacy 
department that was relatively weak compared to nursing, and health service changes that 
  202 
had already stressed many of the nursing staff. This system was ultimately rejected, and 
replaced with one that enabled more flexible practice. Implementation of physician order 
entry was planned (Novek, 2002). 
In Denmark, a web portal was introduced to share clinical summaries, medications, 
test results, and appointment times among pregnant women, hospital specialists, 
midwifery clinics, and community general practices. The expectation was that access to 
information would be educational for the pregnant women and this would improve the 
women’s  contribution  to,  or  compliance  with,  care  regimes.  The  study  showed  that  the 
women  were  neither  ‘passive’  nor  ‘forgetful’  recipients  of  care.  To  the  contrary,  these 
women used the information in the web portal to demand information sharing among the 
health professionals, and to insist that health professionals remedy errors or omissions in 
the web record. Thus it became apparent that poor information sharing among the health 
professionals rather than patient compliance was the key problem in the delivery of care. 
One general practice and one hospital department withdrew before the four-year pilot 
concluded (Winthereik, 2008). 
Organisational context contributes to explaining events in each vignette. In the first, the 
purchase of a laboratory-wide system meant each laboratory department had to 
compromise; in the second, there was low trust among the health professionals due to 
recent hospital changes; and in the third, there appeared to be little incentive for providers 
to sustain commitment to information sharing for the pregnant women. Even so, each 
vignette demonstrated progress toward implementation of shared electronic records and 
coordination of care across providers. The health professionals resisted certain changes, 
and this could have been important, for changes did not improve services. However, 
resistance could also relate to anxieties that automation meant work could become less 
desirable or be lost to a health profession.   
In the first two vignettes, the authors describe events consistent with each health 
profession leveraging regulatory privilege to control their respective clinical technologies, 
the management of clinical information and ICT, and their directions for role and career 
development.  
In the first vignette, the laboratory scientists were partially successful in retaining control 
over the performance of tests. However, the range of tests was standardised, and they lost 
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control over work important to their career aspirations. The pathologists were more 
successful, as they used the new system to both retain and expand control over their work, 
and  over  ICT.  The  new  laboratory  system  introduced  transparency  around  ‘who  performs 
what  work’.  This  meant  professionals  on the wards had to enter test requests by a 
particular time, tests had to be performed promptly, and the time it took to return test 
results was visible to the referring wards and clinics. To visibly maintain their claim to 
overall control of laboratory work, the pathologists introduced a paper-based workaround 
to be completed by the laboratory scientists. A manual system like this undermines the 
intended operational efficiencies of the new pathology system, and could also be 
problematic for auditing if errors in the manual system are not traceable through the 
electronic system. Ultimately, it is possible that the pathologists could tire of their 
repetitive data entry work, and the system could eventually be implemented as originally 
intended, with laboratory scientists reviewing routine test results.    
In the second vignette, the pharmacists and nurses each used claims about their legally 
defined roles to resist changes around checking prescriptions and the administration of 
medicines. The medication management system also introduced transparency around 
closely inter-related work that had previously been subject to the discretionary control of 
different groups of health professionals. Decisions about which medications to prescribe, 
checking whether doses and combinations are safe and effective, and the timeliness of 
administration are inter-related work. As the second vignette showed, in the medication 
management system work became more integrated with standardised coproduction of 
medication charts and requirements to both pharmacists and nurses to meet standardised 
timeframes. This led to protracted disagreements between these groups that mostly work 
in separate locations, and previously had the discretion to work more independently. The 
pharmacists’  efforts  to realise the benefits of quality control over all medications also 
generated substantial repetitive data entry work in the pharmacy. The planned addition of 
physician order entry for medication added further work to the medication management 
system, and reopened  questions  about  ‘who  performs  what’  among  the  medical 
practitioners, nurses, and pharmacists.  
In the third vignette, the web-based electronic record did not produce the comprehensive 
patient record desired by the pregnant women. This could be explained through attention 
to the referral system. Following receipt of a referral, each health professional was 
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accountable for the performance of services and record keeping according to their own 
scope-of-practice. Particular information was shared through formal referrals and reports, 
and is likely to be a subset of the information generated by the health professionals. 
Contributing a record to, or reading material from the web portal created additional tasks 
for the health professionals. This led to questions about the relationship between the web 
record and the usual record keeping used to support practice. Questions included what 
information should be uploaded, and whether each health professional was expected to 
read this material. Shared records have implications for the record-keeping practices of 
contributing health professionals, which could include agreeing to standardised 
terminology to make content more accessible. Further work to establish integrated 
electronic records among providers could ultimately generate dilemmas for the health 
professionals such as those in the first two vignettes. 
Qual i ty improvement programmes 
In the United Kingdom, Australia, and elsewhere, governments have used quality 
improvement programmes to reduce patient waiting times in emergency departments 
(ED)s and for elective surgery, and the length of patients’  stays  in  hospital  (Forero et al., 
2010; Powell et al., 2009). The next two vignettes depict efforts to improve the 
coordination of hospital care focusing on EDs, emergency and elective admissions, and 
expediting  discharges.  In  the  first  vignette,  the  UK’s  Leicester  Royal  Infirmary  (LRI) 
undertook re-engineering in a policy climate of cost containment, concerns about waiting 
times, and reductions to bed numbers, in this case for the Obstetrics and Gynaecology 
services (McNulty & Ferlie, 2002). A decade later, in the second vignette, the Australian 
State of New South Wales (NSW) used NHS Lean Thinking to improve these same 
processes, in a policy climate of concerns about waiting times in ED, changes to require 
surgery patients to receive bookings or be returned to the care of their general 
practitioner, and a decision to increase the numbers of hospital beds. (For a longer 
summary of the LRI study, see Appendix C, pages 294-295). 
One  of  the  UK’s  pilot  sites  for  Business  Process  Re-engineering (BPR) was at LRI. 
There was extensive programme planning and evaluation, with implementation teams 
comprised of LRI personnel and management consultants. Emergency department 
patients were separated into routine cases to be assessed and treated by nurses, and more 
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complex cases to be managed by the medical practitioners. However, emergency 
specialists refused to hand work over to nurses. A strategy to reduce ED congestion by 
admitting hip-fracture patients directly to orthopaedic wards was scuttled by the 
emergency  specialists.  This  was  despite  the  orthopaedic  specialists’  desire  for  these 
patients to be directly admitted following an assessment by a nurse and a radiographer. 
Pre-admission clinics for day surgery cases in Ear, Nose and Throat were streamlined 
with the surgeons agreeing to policies for an administrator to order tests, and nurses to 
conduct pre-operative assessments with the anaesthetist. This led to the introduction of 
nurse-led clinics for routine endoscopy examinations, although few nurses were willing to 
take on this responsibility. Planning of pre-discharge care by a multidisciplinary team was 
used to expedite discharges, but few consultants agreed to delegate the discharge 
decisions to nurses. The orthopaedic wards were reorganised into acute and rehabilitation 
care with a multidisciplinary team responsible for timely organisation of the pre-
discharge tasks, although this depended on the therapists working on weekends to get 
patients discharged. While the Ear Nose and Throat surgeons refused to delegate 
discharge decisions to nurses, the Obstetrics and Gynaecology specialists agreed to nurses 
discharging patients and following these patients at home (McNulty & Ferlie, 2002). 
A decade later, Lean Thinking techniques were used in NSW to relieve ED 
congestion and surgical waiting times. This followed the introduction of Lean Thinking at 
Bolton Hospital Trust in the United Kingdom and overlapped a similar programme at the 
Flinders Clinic in South Australia. There was information sharing among the experts 
involved in these programmes at Bolton, Flinders and in NSW (McGrath et al., 2008). In 
NSW, a programme office was established. At this time, 40% of inpatients were admitted 
through EDs and patients often had several different health conditions. Sixty hospitals 
adopted criteria to separate routine from more complex cases in ED, with medical 
supervision of all cases. Emergency specialists retained control of all ED work, and to 
varying degrees senior non-medical professionals were permitted to manage some cases. 
Recommendations for reducing congestion included direct admission of well-known 
patients to wards, use of ED observation wards for 12-24 hours, and short-stay wards for 
admissions of up to 72 hours. In NSW, hospitals also authorised admissions managers to 
match complex cases to particular medical teams and wards (O'Connell et al., 2008a).  
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Ten to fifteen percent of surgery was cancelled due to the arrival of emergency 
cases; so separate day surgery units were established at 96 hospitals. Other initiatives 
included more accurate categorisation of waiting list patients and better distribution of 
patients across the available surgeons. There were recommendations to improve services 
by moving patients to the optimal ward or care team as soon as possible, pre-planning of 
pre-discharge care, and timely forwarding of discharge summaries to community service 
providers (MacLellan, Cregan, McCaughan, O'Connell, & McGrath, 2008; O'Connell et 
al., 2008a). In many instances, hospitals experienced difficulties with various initiatives, 
primarily because medical specialists refused to transfer or delegate work to other health 
professionals (MacLellan et al., 2008). A further difficulty was that once patients were 
assessed, their referrals followed traditional service designs, entering the competing 
stream of referrals to the specialist departments (McGrath et al., 2008). 
The programme teams in NSW and at Flinders reported similar root causes of 
difficulties with these quality improvement programmes. They found poor alignment of 
resources to patient needs, which was evident in the limited operating hours of specialist 
departments, and the differing priorities given to referrals concerning the same patient 
cases by the specialist departments, ED and wards (O'Connell et al., 2008b). They also 
explained that there was no common understanding among the health professionals about 
the expected clinical pathway for each patient, and that quality problems arose at the 
inter-departmental or inter-professional interfaces, including differences of opinion 
between various medical specialist teams and the ED. These were difficulties 
compounded by the lack of authority accorded to registrars (trainee medical specialists), 
nurses or multidisciplinary teams to undertake routine work such as ordering tests or 
assessments, writing prescriptions for discharge, or accessing community services to 
support discharge (O'Connell et al., 2008b). 
Many localised improvements were achieved in these quality improvement programmes. 
At LRI and in NSW, the management of emergency departments improved. Access to 
elective surgery was improved by separating the management of these patients from the 
emergency patients who needed surgery. In both vignettes efforts were made to expedite 
the pre-discharge care and arrange for post-discharge follow-ups, so that patients could be 
discharged. At LRI, an evaluation study found that despite these localised successes there 
was no organisation-wide improvement, and the authors concluded that LRI was already 
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a high-performing organisation (Bowns & McNulty, 1999). In New South Wales, the 
implementation of quality improvement programmes across 60 hospitals, along with 
increases to bed numbers, produced state wide reductions in waiting times for emergency 
care and planned surgeries (MacLellan et al., 2008; O'Connell et al., 2008a). 
In both vignettes, despite the intervening decade, the problems with maximising the 
benefits from quality improvement programmes appear similar. There were similar 
differences of opinion among medical specialists about whether to directly admit patients 
or provide preliminary treatment in ED, and similar reluctance among some medical 
specialists to delegate work to trainee medical practitioners or non-medical professionals, 
both in ED and on the wards. This suggests a lack of organisational authority to develop 
organisation-based policies to guide inter-professional or even intra-professional 
delegation. Another problem, also evident in the vignettes about clinical directorates, 
were the difficulties with matching resources to patients, due to limited hours of operation 
of medical specialist and allied health departments leading to patients waiting in ED 
wards for tests or consultations, and in inpatient wards for clinical work to be completed 
before hospital discharges could be effected.        
These problems are not new. In the early 1990s, PFC units sought to address similar 
problems with poor alignment of specialist departments to patient needs by establishing 
units to perform routine work and authorising non-medical practitioners to expedite this 
work. The explanation developed in this thesis directs attention to the historical 
construction of healthcare work and the ongoing control of this work by many 
independent registration authorities. Specialist departments focus their work during 
‘business  hours’  and  prioritise  the  requests  they  receive  to  efficiently  manage  their 
resources. At LRI and in NSW, there were changes to reduce congestion through the 
separation of routine and complex work in ED, through separate theatres for day 
surgeries, and by matching emergency patients to particular medical teams and wards at 
admission.  However,  each  patient’s  journey  could  still  be  delayed as they competed with 
other patients for each assessment and referral to a specialist service. Delegation of 
routine tasks to registrars or non-medical practitioners could reduce delays, although this 
depends  on  each  medical  specialist’s  understanding of their accountability to their 
respective registration authority or specialist college. Among the health professionals, it 
was  hard  to  establish  a  shared  understanding  of  a  patient’s  clinical  pathway  due  to  the 
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involvement of large numbers of professionals from different departments, working 
through different hours of work, and the effects of competing priorities around work 
requests. The constraint on achieving organisation-wide quality improvement lies in the 
organisation of the health workforce and the lack of flexibility among the many 
registration authorities to permit experimentation that could reorganise work.        
A key difficulty in improving patient journeys has been how to improve quality or 
efficiency in care processes without disrupting the claims to professional expertise or 
authority, or the inter-departmental boundaries among the health professions. These 
limitations are evident in assurances provided to health professionals at the Flinders 
Clinic in South Australia, where quality improvement was described as:  
…  ‘using  Lean  Thinking  to  improve  flow  and  reduce  waste  in  core  clinical  and 
support processes across the hospital. It is not, however, concerned with 
attempting to influence the professional content of clinical encounters. That is 
deemed to be outside the scope of the program, which is primarily concerned with 
flow  and logistics’  (Ben-Tovim et al., 2007, p. 11). 
It seems plausible that to realise organisation-wide improvement from quality 
improvement programmes, it will be necessary to include consideration of the policies for 
health practitioner regulation as well as those for improving delivery in health service 
organisations. 
7.4 R E G UL A T IO N O R M AN A G E M E N T F O R 
R O L E D ESIG N 
This section considers the micro-level effects of regulatory and government-led changes 
affecting the roles of health practitioners. The first two vignettes look at regulatory 
changes to encourage overlapped scopes-of-practice among health professionals. The 
second two vignettes concern the management of competency from the regulatory and the 
health service perspectives. The final vignette presents a government-led programme for 
role redesign in health services. 
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Overlapped scopes-of-pract ice 
As discussed in Chapter Four, there has been an international trend for recognition of 
overlapped scopes-of-practice among health professionals. The first vignette comes from 
an evaluation study of legislation encouraging overlapped scopes-of-practice in the 
Netherlands, while the second is drawn from stakeholder consultation about the options 
for regulation of overlapped scopes-of-practice in the United Kingdom. (For longer 
summaries of these studies, see Appendix D, pages 297-99). 
From 1997, the Netherlands followed the Canadian State of Ontario in establishing 
a legislative framework to accommodate overlapped scopes-of-practice and inter-
professional delegation. There was a legislative requirement for an evaluation study 
within five years of the change. Two thousand gynaecologists, trainee medical 
practitioners and nurses were asked about their experiences following the change to 
regulations. For around 75% of the health professionals, the changes were seen as making 
little difference to their clinical practice. For others, there were confusions about who 
may perform what work, how to engage in inter-professional delegation, or how 
accountability for delegated work would be managed. The new regulations encouraged 
the development of advanced practitioner roles and most saw this as an improvement over 
previous legislation. Some observed that the new regulations did not relate to the reality 
of the care environment. These regulations assumed a one-to-one supervisory relationship 
between medical practitioners and nurses, written communication of clinical instructions, 
and that health practitioners could assess their own and others competence. None of these 
assumptions corresponded to the reality of inter-professional practice. Older or more 
experienced nurses stated that they performed restricted work on their own initiative, and 
the researchers concluded this contravened Dutch law. Further conclusions were that 
more education was required, and that health service organisations should introduce 
policies to clarify the permitted work practice and the arrangements for inter-professional 
delegation (de Bie et al., 2004; de Bie et al., 2005). 
In the United Kingdom, the Council for Healthcare Regulatory Excellence (CHRE) 
consulted stakeholders about how best to regulate overlapped scopes-of-practice. They 
considered  the  introduction  of  ‘distributed  regulation’  in  which  registration  authorities 
would be required to consult with other registration authorities to oversee practitioners 
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with overlapped scopes-of-practice. CHRE saw advantages in establishing a single 
authoritative source of registration  standards  for  health  professionals’  training  and  work 
practice, when clinical work is common to different scopes-of-practice. However, they 
acknowledged the complexity of requiring the registration authorities to engage in the 
consultation necessary to produce common standards. CHRE concluded that each 
registration authority would continue to independently set standards for their own 
registrants (CHRE, 2010b)6. 
In  the  first  vignette,  the  authors’  concluded  that  organisation-based clinical and 
supervisory policies are necessary to clarify the permitted practice for health 
professionals. However, there are reasons to doubt that such a solution would be easy to 
implement, since registration authorities are responsible for role definition, training and 
the use of specific technologies or procedures for each scope-of-practice. The Dutch 
medical specialists had personal preferences about what they delegated, and appeared to 
have little interest in the new regulations. Among the nurses, practice varied from some 
who worked independently in contravention of the regulations to others who were 
reluctant to perform work now legally permitted, and some who were reluctant to perform 
work that was already in their scope-of-practice. It was evident that registered health 
professionals had different understandings of the regulations in relation to both their own 
practice and the requirements around inter-professional practice. In these circumstances, 
managers might lack the authority to establish or enforce the policies that could otherwise 
improve patient safety and service delivery. 
In the second vignette, the CHRE consultation demonstrates the difficulty of securing 
common policies among the registration authorities. The UK registration authorities were 
in the process of developing extended scopes-of-practice, but reluctant to adopt shared 
practice standards. This reluctance is understandable. It seems plausible that one 
registration authority could use its prior claim to an area of work as a means to set 
standards that are difficult for another registration authority to emulate. Thus, registration 
authorities have independently introduced new areas of work into extended scopes-of-
practice for their advanced practitioner roles. However, as long as there is no system for 
sharing standards for training and practice, there may be little foundation for health 
                                                 
6 CHRE became the UK Professional Standards Authority in 2012 
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service organisations to develop policies to improve the local implementation of inter-
professional practice. 
Health practitioner regulation tends to lag behind practice. In the first vignette, the Dutch 
regulations adopt an idealistic picture in which a medical practitioner supervised each 
nurse performing certain procedures, a picture not evident in the practice setting. This 
disjuncture between the regulations and the practice environment could be expected to 
contribute to confusion. Confusion was evident in the way health professionals cited 
various sources of authority for their practice, including the new regulations, their own 
training, their respective registration authority, a health service certificate, or clinical 
policies applying in their department or ward. It is also plausible that on-the-job learning 
prepared the more experienced nurses to independently perform restricted procedures. It 
seems reasonable that a responsible employer would ensure that relevant policies, 
training, and appraisal systems are in place. However, organisation-based policies could 
be problematic if the organisation relies on clinical practice that varies from that 
permitted by one or more registration authorities, or if senior health professionals refuse 
to comply  thus  demonstrating  management’s  lack  of  authority.  Given  the  legal 
precedence of the regulatory level, changes to improve collaboration among registration 
authorities and to redistribute some authority between the regulatory level and health 
service organisations could have the potential to address the difficulties evident in these 
vignettes. 
Management of competency 
Legislation requiring registration authorities to continuously oversee the competency of 
health practitioners is now common internationally. This requirement extends the 
responsibilities of registration authorities from oversight of entry-to-practice and 
complaints about practice to ongoing oversight of health practitioners’  competency 
(Allsop & Jones, 2005). The next two vignettes are drawn from studies of the 
management of competency in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. (For longer 
summaries of these articles, see Appendix D, pages 300-301). 
A Dutch study investigated how nurse competency was determined in practice 
settings, following legislative changes to continuous oversight of competency by 
registration authorities. There was a variety of opinions among medical specialists, 
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trainee medical practitioners, and nurses as to how to determine competency, and whether 
the responsibility for competency rested with an individual practitioner, the registration 
authority, or the health service organisation. One third of nurses indicated they were 
unclear about how to determine their own competency, and most said they had not 
received instructions about how to perform a risky procedure from a supervisor. Similar 
numbers of nurses cited either their nursing training or a health service certificate of 
proficiency as evidence of competency. The researchers concluded that issues around 
proficiency could be cleared up if health service organisations were to play a greater role 
in determining competency (de Bie et al., 2005). 
In  the  United  Kingdom,  a  study  by  the  UK’s  National Clinical Assessment Service 
(NCAS) showed that health service employers identified around 2% of medical 
practitioners annually whom they viewed as having difficulties that could affect their 
employment relationship or clinical competence. Difficulties that occurred in the 
workplace included theft or fraud, sexual misconduct with patients, deteriorating personal 
health, and substance abuse committed by the medical practitioners. Poor practice was 
evident through investigation of critical incidents; in audits of diagnoses, record keeping, 
consultations, or treatments; and in the observation of poor interpersonal behaviour 
toward patients, carers and other health service staff (NCAS, 2009). 
It is essential that health practitioners are appropriately trained and have ongoing 
opportunities to develop or maintain their competence. Traditionally, registration 
authorities have focused on entry-to-practice training for generalist or specialist roles, and 
adjudication of complaints about the practice of a registered health professional. Recent 
changes to require continuing oversight by registration authorities has mostly been 
implemented through self-reports of education activities by health professionals to their 
respective registration authorities. Yet the Dutch health practitioners are unclear about 
how  to  determine  a  nurse’s  competency  in  the  practice  setting.  This  is  similar  to  evidence 
that suggests that medical practitioners have limited ability to assess their own 
competence (Davis et al., 2006). It is also plausible that in reporting their competence to 
the registration authority, health professionals could focus on education courses that do 
not relate to their practice environments. Registration authorities rely on fees for annual 
practising certificates to fund their policy development. It seems unrealistic that these fees 
could generate the income required for registration authorities to define and maintain a 
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mix of competencies relevant to particular practice settings, or to assess each 
practitioner’s  competence. 
Organisational policies and support appear to be equally important for the maintenance of 
competence.  An  individual’s  competence  could  depend  on  whether  work  is  performed 
routinely or infrequently; the opportunities for practitioners to maintain or develop their 
skills; and the range of skills, experience or attitudes among the personnel who work 
together or of their supervisors. In the second vignette, the NCAS study showed that UK 
health service organisations had a range of ways to identify behavioural or competency 
issues. However, while disruptive behaviours could affect workplace performance 
(Martin, 2008), they might not meet criteria for competency issues as defined in scopes-
of-practice (Conlon, 2004). In these circumstances, recourse to a registration authority 
could be counter-productive. The issues could fail to meet thresholds for concerns about 
clinical competence, while still involving behaviours that undermine the effective 
operation of the health service. In order to balance authority for oversight of competency 
between the regulatory and practice levels, health service organisations should be 
accountable for establishing and enforcing appropriate workplace policies. It is plausible, 
in theory, that health service organisations could make progress with establishing policies 
through consultation with regulators. However, in the context of many registration 
authorities, for both generalist and specialist scopes-of-practice, and the fragmented 
sources of authority in each case, this seems impractical.                     
Role redesign in heal th services 
Role redesign in healthcare has been controversial. In the 1990s it was associated with re-
engineering and criticised for being focused on de-skilling or cost savings. Since 2000, 
role design has been associated with more resources for the health workforce, and 
extending roles for health practitioners to improve the quality of care (Hyde et al., 2005). 
The following vignette comes from a study of the  UK’s  Changing Workforce  Programme 
(CWP). (For a more detailed list of the roles created through the CWP, see Appendix D, 
pages 301-303). 
From 2000, the Changing Workforce Programme (CWP) developed new roles at 13 
pilot sites in the English National Health Service. A national programme office provided 
support and liaison with registration authorities and health service organisations. New 
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roles were developed with each health service and information about these roles was 
included in a national repository to assist with implementation elsewhere. By the end of 
2003, 40 new roles were established and 51 roles were still in development. Of the new 
roles, 29% involved extension of nursing roles and 31% involved work for unregistered 
health care workers. The remainder involved extended roles for therapists, pharmacists, 
scientists, administrators, unregistered social care workers, paramedics and doctors. There 
was  resistance  to  implementing  roles  seen  as  being  ‘imposed’  through  the  national  CWP 
repository rather than developed locally (Hyde et al., 2005).  
Three  types  of  ‘employee  relations’  problems  were  evident  when  roles  crossed 
professional boundaries. First, increased or unequal remuneration could be a disincentive, 
such  as  the  increased  cost  of  home  support  staff  performing  ‘healthcare’,  or  the  pay 
disparities between nurses and ambulance officers entering the new emergency care roles. 
Second, there were supervisory and accountability difficulties, such as who would be 
accountable  when  a  doctor  delegates  the  responsibility  for  taking  a  patient’s  consent  to a 
nurse. In this case, the health service agreed to be accountable for any adverse events in 
cases  where  a  nurse  obtained  the  patient’s  consent.  Third,  some  health  professionals 
resisted the transfer of work to unregistered health practitioners, such as when 
radiographers insisted that their assistants complete two years of training at a tertiary 
institution before being permitted to perform some plain X-rays. In contrast, pharmacists 
designed roles for pharmacy technicians as part of extending their services into mental 
health care (Hyde et al., 2005). 
Training varied from being conducted on-the-job to packages provided by tertiary 
educators. Some organisations readily implemented in-house training, which was 
associated with the health professionals having previous experience of hospital-based 
training. Training progressed better where health professionals were prepared to hand 
over work to other personnel. Managers preferred in-house training due to their concerns 
that educators were too inclined to make courses into diplomas, or to include skills that 
contributed little to particular roles. The authors noted that qualifications-based training 
was more portable for the health practitioners, and concluded that CWP had developed 
local capacity for role redesign that was previously unthinkable (Hyde et al., 2005). 
However, health service human  resource  management  departments  were  ‘crowded  out’  of 
new role development by the collaboration between the CWP programme, profession-led 
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specialist departments, and the registration authorities (McBride & Mustchin, 2013). 
The roles delivered through CWP are consistent with the general pattern of role 
development in the health workforce. Professional silos are stratified as advanced scopes-
of-practice are developed and routine work is delegated to assistants. Advanced scopes-
of-practice tend to include work previously restricted to medical practitioners. This 
process is easier when there are shortages of specialists or unmet demand, such as the 
increase of diabetes in the population, which led to nurses taking on some of this work. 
This outcome could be expected since, from its inception, the CWP liaised with 
registration authorities. While this may have removed the difficulty of complaints about 
new roles, it could also explain the traditional pattern of role development that emerged. 
The  case  where  taking  a  patient’s  consent  was  delegated  from  a  medical  practitioner  to  a 
nurse highlights another difficulty. While some health professionals could agree that the 
health service would be accountable for instances where work is delegated, there is no 
guarantee that registration authorities will agree with this interpretation. It is health 
professionals, not health service organisations that are accountable to registration 
authorities. Inconsistent interpretations of regulatory obligations concerning delegation, 
among health professionals, are likely to undermine efforts to develop organisational 
policies. 
Different perspectives around training highlight another imbalance in the design of the 
regulatory system. The health professionals need skills that are both recognised 
nationally, and relevant to particular specialisations in the workplace. A compromise 
could be helpful, such as having professional qualifications in accordance with 
registration authorities and shorter training packages open to entrants from different 
health professions and endorsed by employers.  
The CWP sought to break down inter-professional demarcations, but did not appear to 
seek engagement with human resource departments. A focus on inter-professional roles 
could have complemented the policies for management reforms and quality improvement 
programmes in health services. Yet, there was no attention to defining core work and 
accountabilities in multidisciplinary teams, or to roles that combine routine competencies 
from nursing and allied health for particular types of patients. Consumers who could be 
expected to benefit from new service designs and roles also appear to have little voice in 
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these matters. Role development seems unlikely to escape traditional professional silos to 
align with patient needs, unless there are mechanisms to bring the many registration 
authorities together with other stakeholders to achieve this goal. 
C ON C LUSION 
This chapter looked at how regulatory privilege could contribute to explaining events in 
particular illustrations of service improvement. The illustrations provided glimpses of the 
many improvements that have been made to health services in recent years. In many cases 
there were recommendations for further improvement through organisation-based policies 
for clinical practice and on-the-job training for roles or teamwork. These remedies mostly 
involved organisation-led change, and difficulties with implementation could be 
explained as problems with leadership, the management of change, or the engagement of 
health professionals. However, regulatory privilege directs attention to the lack of 
mechanisms for consensus building among the many registration authorities and how this 
could explain the lack of organisation- led initiatives to govern inter-professional practice. 
In the papers from which the illustrations were drawn, there was no reference to the 
elements of redesign in service improvement, or the levers of regulatory privilege 
identified in this thesis. Even so, there was evidence for their presence in the events 
described. The separation of routine and more complex work occurred in the PFC units, 
multidisciplinary teams, and quality improvement programmes. There were also glimpses 
of this separation as ICT could be progressively used to standardise work, meaning that 
some work could be transferred to assistant health practitioners. Overall health 
practitioners appeared to be adequately engaged in the changes. 
Two types of difficulties were evident in inter-professional work. First, there were 
problems  aligning  the  organisation’s  resources  to  patient  needs.  This  could  be  explained 
by the way regulatory privilege informs the organisation of healthcare work. Specialist 
departments could use various levers of regulatory privilege to control their work, such as 
centralising specialist technologies and health professionals to a departmental location, 
limiting the hours that services were offered, prioritising work according to their own 
resources,  and  restricting  the  services  available  at  the  patients’ bedsides or clinic 
appointments. This means that patients can be repeatedly assessed and referrals sent to 
specialist departments, but there are no means to establish shared priorities for particular 
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patient cases. Health professionals could respond by escalating referrals, but this tends to 
create a cascade of unintended effects across specialist departments, wards or clinics. 
These features of service delivery could explain the tendency for localised, rather than 
organisation-wide improvement. Moving health professionals out of their specialist 
departments could address logistical difficulties with coordination of inter-professional 
work. However, regulatory privilege plays out among team members, who do their best to 
interpret their respective contributions and regulatory obligations in these settings that can 
be remote from the support of their specialist department. Regulatory privilege could 
explain difficulties with the alignment of resources to patient needs, whether between 
specialist departments or among members of multidisciplinary teams. 
The second type of problem occurred in inter-professional practice, where professionals 
had difficulties with competency, inter-professional delegation, accountability, and work 
sharing. Recommendations included clarifying leadership roles, and using organisation-
based policies and training to guide routine work, assessment of competence, delegation, 
and accountability in inter-professional practice. These recommendations occurred in 
illustrations of clinical directorates, multidisciplinary teams, quality improvement 
programmes, and management of competence and overlapped scopes-of-practice.  
From the illustrations, it is not clear why organisation-based policies and training around 
competency and inter-professional practice were not already in place, but the presence of 
regulatory privilege could explain this. Each health professional is accountable to their 
respective registration authority for their practice. They are expected to conform to the 
role definition, training, use of technologies, and rules around delegation within their 
scope-of-practice. While clarity in leadership, and organisation-based policies could assist 
in guiding inter-professional practice, there is no source of authority for this in the 
distributed arrangement of registration authorities, and it is unlikely that managers have 
the authority to introduce or enforce such policies.       
The most disruptive improvement attempts appeared to be Patient Focused Care that 
incorporated all the elements of redesign. In these illustrations, organisation-led efforts to 
align resources to patient needs were not backed by mechanisms at the regulatory level. 
The second most disruptive improvement appears to ICT that shares clinical information 
among specialist departments and community practices. When ICT is used to share inter-
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disciplinary clinical information, disruption is subtle since this technology innovation has 
tended to receive support from both managers and health professionals alike. Yet system 
implementation demands some agreement to policies for inter-professional practice. 
When well-managed, this can be an incremental step towards integration, but otherwise 
manual  ‘workarounds’  could  undermine improvements. A common problem with PFC 
units and ICT is that as work is standardised, it could be transferred to assistants, or even 
incorporated into new inter-professional roles. However, there has been a lack of 
mechanisms for introducing training packages or career paths to support such 
developments.   
The limitations of the regulatory levers for role definition and training were evident in the 
illustrations around overlapped scopes-of-practice and government-led role development. 
These levers have produced role extensions and advanced practitioner roles enabling 
some substitution of non-medical practitioners for medical practitioners. While these 
roles could be seen as formalizing a certain degree of flexibility around inter-professional 
boundaries, they also tend to conform to the traditional organisation of work among the 
health professions. What these initiatives have not done is to create new roles that involve 
new combinations of skills from different health professions or sufficient overlaps in core 
skills to address difficulties in multidisciplinary teams, or to find new work for highly 
trained professionals whose traditional work is reduced through automation. Overall, 
these illustrations indicate many incremental improvements, but also that service 
improvement remains closely tethered to the organisation of healthcare work by means of 
regulatory privilege. If new organisational forms are to emerge that wrap services more 
effectively around patients, then new mechanisms are likely to be required at both the 
regulatory and organisational levels.   
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8 
C ON C L USION
 
This research began from the observation that the progress of health service improvement 
appears difficult. Many improvements have produced localised rather than organisation or 
system-wide improvements. Explanations have mostly focused on leadership, the 
management of change, and the organisational cultures in health services. A few US 
scholars  have  noted  an  ‘Augean  stable’  of  regulatory  barriers  (Herzlinger, 2006). 
However, there has been little attention to health practitioner regulation as a contributing 
factor in health service improvement. Nor was there literature around the notion of a 
regulated health workforce, rather than the regulation of particular health professions. 
This chapter concludes this thesis. Section 8.1 summarises the research methodology and 
main findings. Section 8.2 presents a new theoretical framework and other contributions 
to theory. Contributions to health policy are set out in Section 8.3 and contributions to 
health services research are in Section 8.4. Section 8.5 concludes with some implications 
for stakeholders and by explaining the limitations of the research findings.   
8.1 SUM M AR Y O F R ESE AR C H 
This section begins by reprising the main research question, the gap addressed in the 
literature, and the methodology. Next it summarises the main research findings that 
emerged through Chapters Three to Seven. Lastly, the section offers a set of concluding 
propositions for the consideration of researchers and policy-makers. 
Research quest ion and methodology 
Initial work with the literature showed that the explanations for difficulties with health 
service improvement are consistent with knowledge about organisational change. 
However, difficulties have been observed even when health service organisations adopt 
best practice in the management of change. This leaves room for a contribution to 
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difficulties from health practitioner regulation, and the main research question: 
Could health practitioner regulation have systemic effects that contribute to 
difficulties with policies for health service improvement?  
Due to the thin literature around this research question, I decided to undertake a primarily 
conceptual thesis project. Adopting a critical realist methodology enabled me to focus on 
identifying the mechanisms in health practitioner regulation and health service 
improvement, and understanding how these mechanisms could have effects that impede 
the progress of service improvement. The objective of the research was to establish a 
plausible explanation about how health practitioner regulation could contribute to 
difficulties with health service improvement. This involved identifying mechanisms 
inherent in institutional arrangements to explain the gap depicted in the figure below.  
Figure 12 shows the separation between key topics in the literature, with the topic groups 
depicted as interactive cogs. At the governance-level are health practitioner regulation 
depicted as the red cog and health services governance depicted as the blue cog, which 
are both directed to oversight of health service improvement depicted as the orange cog. 
The black arrow points to the explanation developed in this research that links these 
otherwise separate topics. 
Figure  12 The  knowledge  gap revis ited 
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There were similar arrangements for health practitioner regulation and health service 
improvement in the jurisdictions of interest, including New Zealand, Australia and the 
United Kingdom. These similar arrangements established a context for discovery of the 
mechanisms at play. Four sets of underlying questions guided the investigation as 
reported in Chapters Three to Seven. This began with a description of the health sector 
drawing on an understanding of its historical construction in Chapter Three. Next, I 
investigated the mechanisms in regulatory arrangements and the potential for interactive 
effects from separate policy making in Chapter Four. Chapter Five showed how the 
separate regulation of many health professions appears to play out as regulatory privilege 
among the health workforce, reinforcing the historically constructed work arrangements. 
Chapter Six outlined the directions for service improvement in healthcare, showing how 
regulatory privilege seems to undermine the management capability necessary to realise 
such change in health service organisations. In Chapter Seven, I assessed the plausibility 
of this explanation, about how health practitioner regulation could interact with and 
impede health service improvement, by showing how the explanation contributes to 
explaining events in selected illustrations of health service improvement. 
Main research findings 
Specialist groups of health professionals that date from this historical construction 
continue to shape the pattern of specialist hospital departments and community practices 
in modern healthcare. Professional divisions in the health workforce emerged as a 
response to 19th century social conditions, including a paucity of medical knowledge, 
restrictions around the work permitted for women, and the limitations of electrical and 
mechanical technologies. The persistence of the main health workforce divisions, from 
around 1900 to the present, has been a testament to their capability to adapt to new 
knowledge and technologies. Late 20th century changes to expand regulatory regimes and 
tertiary education also contributed, blocking the moves of employers to experiment with 
multi-skilled health practitioners.  
There are reasons to question whether the present organisation of healthcare work could 
be sustained in the face of further social change. Through the 20th century, medical 
knowledge evolved so that many illnesses and injuries can be prevented or cured, 
information technologies have made healthcare knowledge more accessible, clinical 
  222 
technologies have made routine care easier to deliver, and there is growing attention to 
how best to organise health services to support consumers with chronic health conditions. 
In relation to service improvement, there is a need for more attention to the way 
specialisation among the medical and allied health professions contributes to 
fragmentation in service delivery. Consumers are faced with managing many 
consultations with many different health professionals and providers, which contributes to 
delays, information loss, and repeated work. There is significant potential to make quality 
and efficiency gains through wrapping routine care around particular groups of 
consumers. However, this is likely to alter some of the work of specialist departments and 
community practices, have implications for health industry supply chains, and involve 
new career paths for health professionals. 
At the regulatory level, there is a complex picture of independent policy making with the 
potential for unintended interactive effects in health service organisations. The levers of 
health practitioner regulation were established for medical practitioners in the 19th 
century, and subsequently applied to other health professions. This produced a regulatory 
system in which the mechanisms of governance are directed to particular health 
professions and individual health practitioners, rather than to the oversight of a 
multidisciplinary workforce engaged in organisation-based service delivery. Further, I 
found reasons to doubt the efficacy of recent changes to strengthen consumer protection 
through continuously overseeing health practitioner competency from the regulatory 
level, and to increase workforce flexibility through overlapped scopes-of-practice. 
There are independent regulatory agencies overseeing improvement in health service 
organisations. Many improvement policies have focused on health service inputs, such as 
leadership, management systems, clinical guidelines, facilities, equipment, workforce 
planning, and process improvement. I selected management reforms and quality 
improvement programmes for further attention because these policies have engaged 
health professionals in reorganising service delivery and have attracted attention in 
research. This enabled me to consider the evidence for unintended interactions between 
health practitioner regulation and policies for service improvement in studies of their 
implementation in health service organisations. 
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The traditional account of health practitioner regulation did not appear adequate to 
explain the enduring historical divisions in the health workforce. Significant social 
change including the separation between clinical research and practice, and access to 
knowledge through higher education and information technologies, called into question 
the picture of the health professions as custodians of unique knowledge. Health 
practitioner regulation could itself have become a more powerful asset used to reinforce 
profession-centric policies, service design and supply chains throughout the health sector. 
The  concept  of  ‘regulatory  privilege’  showed how levers important in the evolution of the 
health professions could enable health professionals to exercise significant control over 
the organisation of work and the use of resources in health services. Control of 
professional  titles,  training,  and  registration  status  appear  ‘above  the  water  line’  in  the 
sense that these levers are specified in legislation. Three other groups were identified 
‘below  the  waterline’  because, like the bulk of an iceberg, they are less visible and play 
out in the realm of clinical practice. These included control of tangible assets like clinical 
technologies and information communication technology (ICT), less tangible assets like 
special languages and role definition, and lastly, the systems of inter-professional 
referrals and complaints important for organising work among the health professions. In 
combination, these levers could enable health professionals to achieve a degree of control 
over health service resources unlikely to occur in industries that are not similarly subject 
to occupational regulation. Regulatory privilege provided a lens that links the regulatory 
and practice levels to observe how health practitioner regulation could interact with 
health service improvement.  
In health service organisations, regulatory privilege could affect service improvement in 
two ways. First, it appears to shape healthcare work in ways that are poorly aligned to 
certain directions for service improvement. The mix of regulatory obligations and ideals 
creates barriers, making it difficult to secure consensus around directions for service 
improvement. These directions include separation of routine from more complex patient 
cases, delivery of routine care by multidisciplinary teams, organisation-based policies to 
guide inter-professional practice, redeployment of some specialist technologies and 
personnel, and integration of electronic record keeping. With regulatory authority 
distributed among many registration authorities, there appeared to be limited options for  
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achieving sufficient workforce alignment and organisational consensus around these 
directions for improvement.   
Second, health service improvement depends on management capability in health service 
organisations. Yet, regulatory privilege undermines the leadership, human resource 
management (HRM), ICT, and team building capabilities important for organisation-wide 
management of change. Leadership authority is characterised by contests among medical 
specialists, between specialist departments, and with general managers. Professional 
associations, registration authorities, and tertiary educators control role definition and 
training, which leaves little room for HRM to contribute to the development of roles or 
career paths. Information technology vendors depend on endorsements from specialist 
departments, which tend to prioritise enhancements to their specialist clinical systems, 
rather than the integration of systems to improve work arrangements and sharing of 
patient information. Design of effective multidisciplinary teams is equally problematic, 
since each registration authority is independently focused on the competencies for each 
health profession, leaving a void in the recognition of the shared clinical competencies 
important for inter-professional clinical leadership and team-based work sharing.  
Many improvements are evident in service designs, the coordination of care, and new 
roles for health professionals. Even so, these improvements tend to be localised within 
existing specialist departments, with less evidence of organisation-wide improvements. 
Organisation-wide improvement is likely to involve some redesign of healthcare work 
across the boundaries of specialist departments, to reduce the mismatch of priorities 
among these departments and the related problems with the quality and efficiency of care. 
This is likely to involve changed roles for specialist hospital departments and community 
practices, and new career paths that enable health professionals to shift between being 
specialists and completing cross training for shared work in multidisciplinary teams. 
However, there is a vacuum of regulatory and organisational mechanisms to support the 
evolution of such service changes, or to establish the inter-professional accountability and 
delegation arrangements, which could otherwise benefit consumers. Further progress 
seems to require new mechanisms to link the regulatory and organisational levels and 
align regulatory privilege to service improvement. 
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The final step was to assess the plausibility of this explanation, by considering whether it 
contributed to explaining the events observed in illustrations of health service 
improvement. The selected illustrations included: using clinical directorates, Patient 
Focused Care units and multidisciplinary teams to better align clinical work to patient 
care; the use of inter-departmental ICT and redesign programmes to improve the 
coordination of service delivery; and changes around competency regulations and new 
roles for health professionals. In each illustration regulatory privilege contributed 
additional insights to explain events. By directing attention to the lack of mechanisms at 
both the regulatory and organisational levels, the explanation of regulatory privilege 
revealed why remedies so far recommended for health service organisations could prove 
difficult to develop, implement or sustain. 
Concluding proposi t ions 
The research objective was to discover the mechanisms in social arrangements, and 
explain how health practitioner regulation could contribute to difficulties with, or 
limitations to health service improvement. Drawing on the research findings, I offer six 
propositions for consideration by researchers and policy-makers. 
As described in Chapter Three, there are historically constructed linkages in the health 
sector around specialist groups of health professions, health industry supply chains and 
inter-professional arrangements in modern health service organisations. Specialist groups 
have proved adept at incorporating new clinical and information technologies, often 
forming new sub-specialties. Yet, the historically informed design of this specialisation 
has emerged as a primary source of quality problems in modern healthcare. This leads to 
the first proposition that:  
the historically constructed organisation of healthcare work contributes to 
contemporary difficulties with service quality and efficiency. 
From the late 20th century, there have been changes to health practitioner regulation and 
policies to improve health service delivery. Yet as discussed in Chapter Four, there has 
been scant attention to the potential for unintended policy interactions to occur in health 
service organisations. This leads to the second proposition that:  
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in healthcare, there are unintended policy interactions that are likely to continue 
unless policy-makers consider new mechanisms to align the goals of registration 
authorities and other regulatory agencies to improve quality and efficiency in 
health services, and to enable innovation as long as consumers are protected. 
Traditional accounts of health practitioner regulation are based on assumptions of a single 
regulated profession and discussed in Chapters Four and Five. These accounts turn on the 
assumptions that each profession is the custodian of unique knowledge and that a social 
contract is necessary to ensure that individual practitioners apply this knowledge in the 
interests of consumers. However, changes to social conditions have made clinical 
knowledge available among the health professions and consumers. This leads to the third 
proposition that: 
health practitioner regulation is now a more important force in maintaining the 
organisation of the health workforce than unique knowledge assets. 
Chapters Five, Six and  Seven  identified  and  investigated  eight  levers  of  ‘regulatory 
privilege’  associated  with  health  practitioner  regulation,  which  appear  to  enable  the 
regulated health professions to control resources important in the design of work and 
service arrangements in healthcare. Regulatory privilege appears to conflict with certain 
directions for service improvement and to undermine the management capability for 
implementing new service arrangements in healthcare. This led to two further 
propositions. The fourth proposition is that:  
improving the effectiveness of management in health services depends on 
addressing the sources of conflict around authority, work arrangements and 
control of resources that arise from health practitioner regulation.  
The fifth proposition is that:  
in  healthcare,  an  explanation  based  on  ‘regulatory  privilege’  offers  a  more 
comprehensive and useful account to assess the effects of regulation and identify 
opportunities to mitigate these effects than traditional accounts of statutorily 
supported self-regulation.  
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Drawing these five propositions together leads to the sixth and final proposition that:  
by reinforcing the traditional organisation of healthcare work and compromising 
management capability in service delivery, health practitioner regulation 
exacerbates problems with quality and efficiency that arise from the organisation 
of services and limits the effectiveness of interventions to improve service 
delivery. Ironically, regulation designed to protect consumers from harm has an 
unintended effect of constraining opportunities to use advances in knowledge and 
technologies to improve services for consumers, in cases where such 
improvement would significantly change the organisation of healthcare work. 
8.2 C O N T R IB UT IO N T O T H E O R Y 
Contributions to theory emerged through the research. This section begins the 
relationship between social conditions and service arrangements in healthcare. Next, it 
presents a theoretical framework depicting how health practitioner regulation could 
interact with directions for service improvement through six sector levels. It then shows 
how the research can strengthen theory concerning the design options for occupational 
regulation.  The  section  concludes  with  implications  for  Mintzberg’s  profession 
bureaucracies and  Hackman’s  criteria  for  effective  work  teams,  when  these  theories  are 
applied in healthcare.  
Social construct ion of heal th services 
This research brings together material on the social construction and future directions for 
health services to explain how social conditions could inform health service 
arrangements. Table 4 below depicts changes in social conditions and service 
arrangements between the 19th and 21st centuries. Social conditions in the two upper 
quadrants include knowledge, research methods, technologies, education and resources. 
The service arrangements in the two lower quadrants include health professions, 
regulation, leadership of services, and coordination of services. Conflicts are evident in 
the lower right quadrant because service arrangements remain tethered to their 19th 
century origins despite changes in social conditions. 
  228 
Table  3: Social conditions and se rvice  arrangements 
 
 19th Century                 21st Century  
So
ci
al
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 
K nowledge  Focus on discovery, no cures  Prevention, cure & management of 
chronic health conditions  
Rese arch 
me thods  
Hospitals enable research, teaching 
& c l inical practice  
Separation of research, teaching & 
c l inical practice  
Te chnologies  Unre l iable, difficult to use c l inical  
technologies  
Highly re l iable, use fr iendly c l inical 
technologies  
Education Education mos tly for upper  
c lass men 
Educated populati on with increas ing 
Internet access to c l inical information 
Resources Limited with hospitals central  
to organis ing 
Dis tr ibuted capabil i ty enables 
community & consumer-led care 
Se
rv
ic
e 
ar
ra
ng
em
en
ts
 H e alth 
profess ions  
Control led by upper c lass men with 
others res tr icted to ass is tant roles  
Deve lopment of wor k force roles 
captured in profess ional s i los  
Regulation Se l f-regulation for medical 
practi tioners  
Regulation of many profess ions 
re inforces s i los & service fragmentation 
Le ade rship of 
se rvices 
Medical practi tioners lead with 
support of nurs ing leaders & general 
managers . 
Contes t among al l health profess ions 
and with management produces 
author ity vacuums in health services .  
Coordination 
of se rvices 
Refer ral sys tem is central with some 
de legation to ass is tants . 
Struggles around refer rals , inter -
profess ional de legation & accountabi l i ty 
Several social histories were useful,  including  Weisz’s  (2006) account of the emergence 
of  medical  specialties,  Abel  Smith’s  (1964) history of the administrative development of 
the  British  hospitals,  Carruther’s  and  Carruther’s  (2005) description of the growth of 
specialist departments in hospitals,  Berlant’s  (1975) comparative analysis of medical 
regulation  in  Britain  and  the  United  States,  and  Dingwall  et  al.’s  (1988) account of the 
professionalisation of nursing. Useful sources concerning recent health reforms included 
Harrison  and  Pollit’s (1994) account of the effects on health services and health 
professionals,  Safriet’s  (2002) discussion of the regulatory barriers to advanced practice 
for non-medical  professionals,  Degeling  and  colleagues’  research  on  the  differing 
implications of changes for medical practitioners, nurses and managers (Degeling et al., 
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2000; Degeling et al., 2001; Degeling et al., 1999), Christensen and colleagues work on 
how innovations could change the management of chronic health conditions (Christensen, 
Grossman, & Hwang, 2009; Christensen et al., 2000),  and  Bohmer’s  work  on 
organisation-based protocols for care teams (Bohmer, 2010a, 2010b). 
A new theoret ical framework 
I present a new theoretical framework that brings together four sets of research findings 
as depicted in Figure 13 below. At the top moving from left to right, the black arrow 
depicts the context of changes in social conditions between the 19th and 21st centuries. 
The white rectangle in the centre depicts the six levels through which effects from 
interactions between regulatory privilege and service improvement could occur. At the 
bottom from left to right, the green arrow depicts the eight elements of service 
improvement impacting modern health services. The vertical red arrow depicts the nine 
levers of regulatory privilege that interact with service improvement through each sector 
level. 
This framework has four theory components. First, the overall context is the socially 
constructed nature of health services outlined above. Second, regulatory privilege differs 
from existing theories in recognising that healthcare work involves many regulated health 
professions working together in health services organisations. In contrast, traditional 
theories assume a single profession and a relationship between an individual practitioner 
and a consumer. As Roberts and Dietrich (1999) explain traditional accounts call for a 
social contract between the profession and society in order to ensure that professionals act 
consistently  with  the  consumer’s  interests.  Critics  have shown how professions can 
exploit their regulatory status in ways that do not serve consumers and that regulation 
does not necessarily improve service quality (Kleiner, 2006). Regulatory privilege differs 
by showing how within health services, occupational regulation can enable professionals 
to exercise a degree of control over health service resources unlikely to occur in 
industries that are not similarly regulated. Third, the eight elements of service 
improvement emerged from a synthesis of the insights concerning changing social 
conditions, the recent history of health reform, and the scholarship on the future of health 
services that are discussed in more detail in Section 8.4. Fourth, the framework has six 
sector levels through which interactions occur, which has some similarity to Ferlie and 
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Shortell’s  (2001) four  levels  for  quality  improvement  that  included  the  ‘health  system  and 
environment’,  ‘organisation’,  ‘group  and  team’,  and  the  ‘individual  health  professional’. 
The levels developed in this framework differ by including teams and groups as part of 
‘service  design  options’,  adding  ‘service  coordination’  to  capture  ICT  and  quality 
improvement,  including  individual  health  professionals  with  ‘roles  and  practices’,  and  by 
adding  the ‘consumers’  who  experience the fragmentation of services. 
Figure  13: Framework of factors in health se rvice  improvement 
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Design opt ions for occupat ional regulat ion 
This research contributes to the institutional design options for occupational regulation, 
by showing the similarities between certification and licensure and the overlaps with 
employer responsibilities. Options for occupational regulation have been held to lie on a 
continuum from light to strong regimes. The lightest regimes are registration or reverse 
registration in which a government agency respectively maintains a register of qualified 
practitioners or a black list of those banned from practice. The middle choice is 
certification that has been preferred since it makes use of self-regulation by each health 
profession, but is not as strong as licensure. Under licensure only those practitioners 
holding a valid license may offer particular services. 
Figure 14 below depicts the overlapping functions in regulatory regimes. In the horizontal 
plane are the options for occupational regulation, including employers in black, reverse 
registration in orange, registration in green, certification in blue, and licensure in red. 
Depicted in the vertical plane is text describing the functional elements related to each 
option. Looking down this list of functions, the orange text appears once indicating just 
one function for reverse registration that is shared with the other regulatory regimes but 
not with employers. The black text indicates the functions that must be performed by 
employers and may also be common to registration, certification, and licensure regimes. 
The two green functions characterise registration regimes, adding the blue functions 
creates certification schemes, and adding the red functions establishes a licensure regime. 
Baker (2006) makes a case for the introduction of a threshold to guide when a 
competency matter qualifies for attention at the regulatory rather than the employer level. 
This research contributes by revealing the extent of the overlapping functions between 
registration authorities and employers and how these overlaps could contribute to 
explaining authority conflicts in health services. It includes the design and coordination of 
services in the list of functions, since the presence of multiple registration authorities 
leaves little room for organisations to lead in improving service arrangements. Finally, it 
shows how close certification is to licensure, particularly when scopes-of-practice and 
restricted acts are added to certification regimes. The research also found that the  
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distinction between regulatory regimes loses force in circumstances where institutional 
arrangements, employers and suppliers reinforce the divisions in a multiple profession 
workforce. 
Figure  14: Des ign options for occupational regulation 
 
Profession bureaucracies and effect ive work teams 
The  research  shows  how  Mintzberg’s  (1980) theory concerning profession bureaucracies 
could be adapted to explain difficulties with health service improvement. According to 
this theory, the performance of work in a profession bureaucracy is coordinated through 
the standardisation of knowledge and skills, a process that occurs outside the organisation 
in the professional association. In contrast, work in a machine bureaucracy is coordinated 
through the standardisation of tasks and work processes carried out by a corporate group 
within the organisation (Mintzberg, 1980). Gouberman and Mintzberg (2001) have 
explained that in healthcare, communication and cooperation needs to be improved due to 
the different cultures among groups of health professionals and their poor understanding  
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of  each  other’s  work.  This  research  adopts  the  perspective  of  a  ‘multiple  profession’ 
bureaucracy, which draws attention to the separate regulatory agencies that independently 
set standards for each health profession. This points to the need for a mechanism to 
coordinate inter-professional work that could include overarching regulatory 
arrangements and the introduction of some of the corporate design mechanisms of the 
machine bureaucracy. 
The  research  findings  show  how  Hackman’s  (1987) theory could be adapted for the 
design of effective multidisciplinary teams in healthcare. The design criteria include: a 
shared team goal, clarity around team membership; a team size of four to seven to enable 
timely consensus in decision-making; a mix of technical and interpersonal skills; an 
appropriate distribution of authority among the organisation, the team, and team members 
to develop and sustain effective work processes; and, a supportive organisation context 
including training, shared information systems, and rewards that recognise team efforts. 
In work with Hewlett Packard, Hackman et al. (2000) discovered that reciprocity in work 
sharing was also important for team members to contribute to team goals. Role definition 
is part of the regulatory privilege of the health professions, so employers need adequate 
authority to train health professionals so they can reciprocally share the team’s  core  work. 
In  these  circumstances,  design  of  roles  to  fit  the  team’s  task  would  be  an  additional 
design criterion.  
8.3 C O N T RIB UT IO N T O H E A L T H P O LIC Y 
This section shows how this research contributes to topics in the grey and scholarly 
literature in health policy. These topics include regulation for consumer protection, the 
health workforce, and the unintended policy interactions. 
Regulat ion for consumer protect ion 
Health practitioner regulation has received relatively little attention by scholars, and 
many sources come from government documents prepared to consult on amendments to 
regulatory regimes. Examples of such regulatory reviews include the New Zealand 
Ministry of Health (2009, 2012), the Victorian Department of Human Services (2003) in 
Australia, and the UK Law Commissions (2012). Self-regulation is generally considered 
  234 
cost effective since it encourages the health professions to set and monitor their own 
practice standards (Ogus, 1995; Taskforce on Industry Self Regulation, 2000). A few 
scholars have traced recent developments, such as the international trend to strengthen 
oversight of medical competence (Allsop & Jones, 2008), employer-based regulation for 
support workers (Birch & Martin, 2009; Saks & Allsop, 2007), shifts from legalistic to 
responsive management of patient complaints (Beaupert et al., 2014; McDonald, 2012; 
Paterson, 2002), changes in policy thinking from siloed management of the health 
professions to encouraging inter-professional collaboration (Lahey, 2012; Saks, 2010), 
and the emerging picture of co-regulation amid a network of regulatory stakeholders 
(Braithwaite et al., 2005; Healy, 2012).  
There have also been criticisms that health practitioner regulation enables professionals to 
pursue self-interest in ways that disadvantage consumers. Studies of the development of 
medical regulation in the United States showed how it significantly increased costs for 
consumers but had equivocal effects on quality (Friedman & Kuznets, 1945; Law & Kim, 
2005) and there have been similar patterns for recent research in the United Kingdom and 
United States (Bryson & Kleiner, 2010; Humphris et al., 2010; Kleiner & Krueger, 2010). 
This research introduces a different perspective. This involves understanding the 
intertwined construction of the health professions, their regulation and health services in 
the 19th century and how this relates to efforts to improve modern health services. The 
picture that emerges is of a regulatory system that favours improvements that can be 
incorporated into existing professional silos rather than those that might disrupt 
traditional workforce arrangements. This research produced three findings for consumer 
protection. First, the trend for continuous oversight of health practitioner competency 
from the regulatory level appears counter-productive, unless practitioners are working in 
relative isolation. Consumers could be better served by mechanisms to align practitioner 
competencies to the demands and opportunities of their workplace. Second, social 
conditions have changed such that professional self-regulation is not the only option for 
addressing information imbalances between professionals and consumers. Medical 
knowledge has advanced so that many common conditions are well understood, 
consumers are well educated and policy-makers could do more to enhance websites that 
assist consumers to access reliable and relevant clinical information. Third, fragmentation 
in service delivery that arises as consumers are referred between health practitioners is 
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now a major source of quality and safety problems. There needs to be more policy 
attention to ensuring that health practitioner regulation does not block improvements that 
could otherwise reduce this fragmentation. The theory of regulatory privilege developed 
in this research has identified nine levers for consideration. 
Heal th workforce 
The literature has mostly focused on shortages among particular health professions, and 
the complexity of health workforce planning (Bloor & Maynard, 2003; Zurn et al., 2004), 
the importance of understanding skill mix rather than the mix of health professions in the 
workforce (Buchan & Calman, 2004; Dubois & Singh, 2009), and the need for planning 
that relates skills to the needs of particular patient groups (Health Workforce New 
Zealand, 2014; Segal & Bolton, 2009; Willis & King, 2010). Governments have 
encouraged the development of advanced practitioner roles and overlapped scopes-of-
practice to improve the flexibility of the health workforce (Bertness, 2009; Hyde et al., 
2005). Role substitution, among medical and non-medical practitioners, and new roles 
have been expected to generate efficiencies (Safriet, 2002), but there is evidence that 
these strategies often increases costs and create different standards for performance of the 
same work (Bohmer & Imison, 2013; Cooper & Stoflet, 2004).   
A few authors recommend a different approach involving changes affecting regulation, 
the tertiary education sector and health service organisations. Duckett (2005b) points out 
that there are many opportunities for role substitution across the Australian health 
workforce, but progress depends on policy-makers identifying opportunities, adjusting 
regulation and payment systems, and making universities more accountable to health 
service organisations. Health service managers and educators also need to consider new 
workforce configurations, flexible career paths for health professionals, multi-skilled 
practitioner roles, teamwork and workplace training (Duckett, 2005a). However in the 
1990s, UK attempts to introduce new work configurations and multi-skilled roles failed, 
as health professionals and regulators feared loss of identity, jobs, career paths, confused 
accountability, and pay disparities (Hurst, 1999). Imison and Bohmer (2013) highlight the 
productivity potential from realigning policies, since: labour costs account for around 
70% of UK expenditure in health and social care; 60% of training budgets are spent on 
medical practitioners who comprise just 12% of the workforce; and the policies for more 
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community, multidisciplinary and home-based care depend on the non-medical and 
unregistered health practitioners. Yet, in the 2000s UK efforts to introduce new roles 
failed to deliver productivity gains or to reduce service fragmentation. Bohmer and 
Imison (2013) concluded that the lessons were to: redesign work ahead of workforce 
change; clarify new roles and responsibilities; deliver the potential of teamwork; provide 
statutory support for changes; and focus on the existing health workforce. 
This research contributes both regulatory and service improvement perspectives to 
developing a health workforce for the 21st century. It explains how policies for 
overlapped scopes-of-practice import aspects of licensure arrangements, have no 
mechanisms for flexibility in inter-professional practice, and can reduce rather than 
improve workforce flexibility. While advanced practitioner roles can be useful, they need 
to be properly integrated into service delivery. These roles are not a sufficient strategy for 
workforce development, since they tend to converge on medical work and increase the 
stratification in health profession silos. The result tends to be incremental boundary shifts 
but little overall change in workforce arrangements. The research contributes nine levers 
related to health practitioner regulation and eight elements of service redesign that could 
assist policy-makers and health service managers with workforce change to reduce 
service fragmentation. It identifies the health service management capabilities necessary 
to support workforce development and realise new service designs in healthcare. 
Importantly, this research shows how lack of management attention to health professional 
roles and work arrangements has limited the effectiveness of new service designs 
including: clinical directorates, greater use of outpatients and day procedures, 
multidisciplinary teams, efforts to shift care from hospitals to community-based delivery, 
and to encourage patient self-care. A key lesson is to focus on skill-mixes and role 
enhancements to improve the performance of these existing service designs. 
Pol icy interact ions 
There is a small, mostly grey-literature concerning the potential for unintended 
consequences  from  policy  interactions,  including  Hood  and  Scott’s  (2000) prediction that 
the  UK’s  new  regulatory  agencies  could  act in concert or in conflict depending on the 
circumstances,  Braithwaite  et  al.’s  (2005) description of a complex network of regulatory 
stakeholders  governing  health  services  in  Australia,  and  Lewis  et  al.’s  (2006) observation 
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that there is an absence of a ‘super-regulator’  to draw together the complex network of 
regulators governing UK healthcare. In a cross industry review of regulation, the New 
Zealand Productivity Commission (2014) has found that inadequate consideration of 
regulatory objectives, and the design and implementation of regulatory arrangements can 
generate significant costs in service delivery.  
This research contributes an in depth analysis of the effects of certain policy interactions 
in healthcare. It identifies systemic effects from the current design of health practitioner 
regulation, showing how it creates barriers to health service improvement through six 
sector levels. The intention is that this analysis proves useful to stakeholders given the 
continuing cost and population pressures to improve the delivery of health services. 
8.4 C O N T RIB UT IO N T O H E A L T H SE R VIC ES R ESE AR C H 
This research contributes to several topics in health services research. The literature is 
patchy, as research attention tends to follow health reforms. The section outlines the 
effects of health practitioner regulation on management capability, hospital directorates, 
multidisciplinary teams, service redesign programmes, and integrated patient information 
systems. The section concludes  with  the  research’s  contribution  to  explaining  the 
persistent difficulties with service improvement.   
Management capabi l i ty  
There has been some attention to difficulties with leadership and HRM, but otherwise 
scant consideration of management capability in health service organisations. Leadership 
training in the United Kingdom and Australia has been criticised for failing to relate to 
the collectivist and distributed reality of decision-making in healthcare (Fulop & Day, 
2010). Scholars point to a contested leadership environment in health services, due to: the 
regulatory ideals of health professionals (Degeling & Carr, 2004), the continuation of 
positions for profession leaders alongside general managers (Braithwaite, 2004), and the 
separate lines of accountability to different registration authorities (Reeves et al., 2010a). 
HRM capability has been neglected internationally, despite policy goals to improve work 
practice and productivity (Bartram & Dowling, 2013). In Australia researchers have 
found HRM departments support organisational hierarchies that have little relationship to 
the work of health professionals (Leggat, Bartram, & Stanton, 2011). In the United 
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Kingdom plans for HRM to lead work practice change failed, due to a lack of technical 
capability in HRM departments and the competing claims to manage the health workforce 
from state sector policy-makers, professional associations, unions and centralised wage 
bargaining, and clinical leaders in health services (McBride & Mustchin, 2013). A New 
Zealand and Australian study captured similar themes as health managers described an 
environment of constant, politically driven change and contested roles, and a preference 
for policy attention to workforce change rather than further restructures (Briggs, 
Cruickshank, & Paliadelis, 2012). 
This research adds to this thin literature, showing how regulatory privilege occupies much 
of the decision-making space sought by leaders. A wide range of resource decisions are 
largely controlled or limited by the health professions, including the use and location of 
clinical technologies and procedures, the language and design of record keeping, the use 
and design of clinical ICT systems, job designs, the construction of multidisciplinary 
teams, the rules for inter-professional referrals and delegation, the development of 
policies to guide clinical practice, and the limited scope of on-the-job training. While 
health  professionals’  prize  ‘autonomy’,  this  autonomy  is  restricted  within  the  regulatory 
policies for each health profession. This limits the capability of both generalist and 
clinical leaders to draw health professionals together and address the strategic issues 
affecting service delivery. Martin and Learmonth (2010) remind us that health reform was 
supposed to replace  the  consensus  style  of  ‘administrators’  with  strong  ‘leaders’.  Yet,  as 
this research shows, consensus seems to be a rational approach given the systemic effects 
of regulatory privilege that permit only incremental change within the traditional 
workforce arrangements governing healthcare.  
Directorate structures 
The international trend has been for hospitals to move from profession-based hierarchies 
to clinical directorates that bring together medical teams, wards and clinics to focus on 
particular groups of patients (Lega & DePietro, 2005). Yet Australian research has shown 
that directorate structures: deliver scant evidence of improvements in financial 
performance (Braithwaite et al., 2006a), show little performance difference from changes 
between general and clinically qualified managers (Braithwaite, 2004), and fail to engage 
with or have relevance for health professionals (Braithwaite & Westbrook, 2005). In 
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Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada, research reveals communication difficulties: 
as health professionals engage in brief exchanges, often dominated by medical 
practitioners, and occurring in corridors when professionals move between their 
departments and the patient care areas (Iedema, Long, & Carroll, 2010; Reeves & Lewin, 
2004; Reeves et al., 2009a); role confusion occurs among nurses and allied health 
professionals as they engage in collaborative practice (Caldwell & Atwal, 2003; Long et 
al., 2003); and health professionals use of knowledge brokering and power in negotiations 
concerning their contributions to inter-professional care (Currie & White, 2012; Nugus et 
al., 2010), 
This research explains the logistical difficulties for professionals in clinical directorates. 
These structures attempt to align resources with patient needs, but this tends to be limited 
to senior management teams and financial reports, with clinical work being little affected. 
The diagnostic and therapy departments continue to manage their workloads by 
prioritising referrals received from care units and clinics, regardless of the directorates. 
Nurses and junior doctors in the care units and clinics are continuously engaged in 
securing specialist resources for their patients from across the hospital. This fails to align 
the performance of clinical work to patients. In the early 1990s, some health services 
trialled solutions in the form of Patient Focussed Care (PFC) units that delivered routine 
work  in  the  patients’  care  unit  and  clinic.  These  pilots  demonstrated  improvements  to 
quality and reductions in cost and service fragmentation, but professional associations 
and regulators successfully protested the new multi-skilled roles and the hospital-based 
training. The changes attempted in PFC were complex with significant implications for 
the overall design of health services. This research has shown that progress with reducing 
service fragmentation depends on new institutional arrangements to facilitate 
collaboration at both the policy and practice levels, and building on lessons rather than 
abandoning attempts. 
Mul t idiscipl inary teams 
Multidisciplinary teams have been at the heart of policies to improve health service 
delivery. This research has focused on the use of teams to shift services from inpatient to 
community-based care, rather than efforts to improve traditional hospital teams such as in 
surgery or clinical handover meetings. Illustrations include multidisciplinary teams 
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dedicated to the care of consumers with chronic health conditions, such as in mental 
health, rehabilitation, and aged care, and policies to add non-medical professionals to 
general medical practices.  
In theory co-location should overcome many of the difficulties observed in hospital 
directorate structures. Yet, a review of the research has found that a dedicated 
multidisciplinary team may be no more effective for service delivery than well-
coordinated care provided by separate profession-based departments (Lemieux-Charles & 
McGuire, 2006). Literature reviews have also found that multidisciplinary teams 
experience difficulties with organising team processes, agreeing team membership and 
decision  rights,  and  that  members’  experience  role  confusion  about  how  to  contribute  to  a 
team task (Lemieux-Charles & McGuire, 2006; Xyrichis & Lowton, 2008). Some authors 
have identified institutional difficulties related to conflicts around training, scopes-of-
practice, leadership and accountability to different registration authorities (Brown et al., 
2011; Lahey & Currie, 2005; Reeves et al., 2010a). There have been calls for training to 
prepare health professionals for teamwork (Thistlethwaite et al., 2010), but so far there is 
little evidence that training directed to understanding roles and improving communication 
improves inter-professional collaboration (Braithwaite et al., 2012; Reeves et al., 2010b). 
This research explains why the co-location of team members and communication training 
fails to overcome the difficulties observed in hospital directorates. Teams need clear goals 
that all members can contribute to, team-based rewards, organisational support and 
training, an appropriate mix of technical and coordination skills, sufficient shared skills 
for reciprocal work sharing, and four to seven members so that teams can achieve 
consensus decisions in the process of delivering their work (Hackman et al., 2000). 
Generally, multidisciplinary healthcare teams: are too large due to including 
representatives from each contributing profession and additional members from the 
professions  most  engaged  in  the  team’s  core  work;  have  members  who  contribute  little  to 
the team’s  goals  and  maintain  their  caseloads  by  performing  work  for  other  clinical  areas; 
and lack clarity about team membership which leads to different speaking and voting 
rights among members.  Regulatory privilege explains the powerful forces operating on 
teams that: encourage vigilance around professional boundaries and identity, lead 
members to seek professional support from outside the team, and require lengthy 
meetings to establish consensus around diagnoses, treatment and record keeping. The 
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recommended remedies are for health service organisations to: define core work; 
establish practice guidelines; determine team accountabilities, provide on-the-job-training 
for leaders, team training to enable sharing of core clinical work, establish formal 
recognition for this training, and communicate these arrangements to regulators.  
Redesign programmes 
This research contributes to understanding the limited gains from investments in hospital 
redesign  programmes  that  had  been  expected  to  streamline  the  patients’  journeys through 
hospitals. Since the 1990s, researchers have found localised rather than organisation-wide 
gains from successive brands of service redesign, including Continuous Quality 
Improvement (Shortell et al., 1998) and Lean Thinking (Holden, 2011; MacLellan et al., 
2008; Radnor et al., 2012). There is some evidence that better outcomes are associated 
with persistence (Walston et al., 2001), and well managed implementations that engage 
clinical leaders (Ham et al., 2003; Weiner et al., 2005). There are also cautionary findings 
from large studies that hospitals engaging in Business Process Re-engineering had higher 
costs than those not re-engineering over a six year period, and that Total Quality 
Management has produced poorer outcomes on safety and quality indicators (Weiner et 
al., 2006; Weiner et al., 2005). 
This research contributes to explaining these localised gains and the lack of organisation-
wide improvement, despite over two decades of effort. Generally, redesign programmes 
can  improve  patients’  journeys by increasing the resources needed to coordinate work, 
such as creating separate services for elective surgery or patients requiring short stays, 
and introducing multidisciplinary meetings to plan care. However, these strategies do not 
change the traditional  work  arrangements  that  govern  service  delivery.  While  patients’ 
care is prioritised in emergency and admission departments, it is continually and 
independently reprioritised as referrals enter a competing stream for the attention of 
medical specialist teams, and the diagnostic and treatment departments. Ultimately, this is 
likely to intensify the traditional workarounds used to escalate priorities for particular 
patients. Based on their experience with Lean Thinking at Toyota, Womack and Jones 
(1994) warned that the two main barriers to redesign include: resistance from specialist 
departments that fear loss of work and prestige, and the need for staff to embrace new 
career paths involving moves between specialist and generalist roles. Regulatory privilege 
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shows how health service organisations have little capability to move routine work from 
traditional departments and to establish new career paths for health professionals. Yet, 
given ongoing pressure for cost containment, it is likely that organisations will need to 
tackle these issues in order to align workforce arrangements to patient needs. 
Integrated IC T 
There is a consensus that more integrated ICT will improve the coordination of healthcare 
(Morrison et al., 2011). Explanations for difficulties have tended to focus on 
implementation costs, problems with vendors, and a lack of interoperability between 
systems (Christensen & Remler, 2009). However, a review of progress in five countries 
found that strategic, organisational and human issues are more significant than the 
technical aspects of ICT (Deutsch, Duftschmid, & Dorda, 2010). Strategic difficulties 
include a lack of clarity about the purpose of a nationally transferable patient record, and 
how these records relate to business cases that favour improving systems in local provider 
networks (Brennan, 2007; Greenhalgh, Potts, Wong, Bark, & Swinglehurst, 2009; Sheikh 
et al., 2011). There has been slow progress with order entry systems to link clinical 
departments, including their poor fit to the complexity of clinical practice and 
contribution  to  medical  errors;  and  health  professionals’  fears  about  loss  of  autonomy,  de-
skilling, confused accountabilities, problems with confidentiality, inadequate training, 
and disruptions to traditional work arrangements (Aarts, Ash, & Berg, 2007; Aarts & 
Koppel, 2009; Georgiou, Ampt, Creswick, Westbrook, & Braithwaite, 2009; Lluch, 
2011). In seven countries Aarts and Koppel (2009) found low levels of integration 
between the clinical departmental and practice systems necessary to underpin effective 
order entry systems. Investigations at the micro-level have shown that integration of 
clinical ICT depends on agreements among health professionals concerning shared 
clinical terminologies, common data repositories, and how clinical information is 
accessed, presented and updated (Kuhn & Giuse, 2001; van Ginneken, 2002). Health 
systems appear to be immature with significant effort and learning required to overcome 
the difficulties (Coiera, Aarts, & Kulikowski, 2011). 
This research has revealed that the levers of regulatory privilege enable the health 
professions to control clinical language, clinical technologies, information sharing and 
record keeping in ways that could explain the socio-technical difficulties at the heart of 
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clinical  ICT.  Record  keeping  is  primarily  a  health  professional’s  record  of  their  work, 
designed to support subsequent work with a patient for members of the same health 
profession. Clinical information sharing is different and narrowly constructed to follow 
referral agreements among the health professions. The concept of an integrated record, 
shared among health professionals and patients, does not fit with these traditional record-
keeping arrangements. Consequently, the requirements for such records need to be 
specified and are unlikely to be met by interfacing existing clinical systems without also 
changing record-keeping practices. Indeed, poor design could mean that information is 
not presented in a manner useful to different users and that health professionals are 
required to maintain similar information in different systems for different purposes. 
Further, it is important to consider new career paths for health professionals as part of 
ICT implementation, since information sharing affects the work boundaries among the 
health professions. While ICT is a powerful tool that could contribute to the 
transformation of health services, it is not possible to realise this potential by simply 
replicating existing workforce arrangements in electronic systems. 
E xplanat ions for di fficul t ies 
There have been several explanations for difficulties with health service improvement, 
including the top down and political character of health reform (Le Grand, 2003), the 
political challenges of re-negotiating bargains between the state, the consumer and the 
medical profession (Salter, 2003), the coupling of vertically focused performance 
management with weak customer pressure and the complexities of change in large 
professionalised organisations (McNulty & Ferlie, 2004), and the deep seated tribalism 
among the health professions (Braithwaite et al., 2007). Observers have called for more 
effective leaders and culture change. However, scholars have questioned these solutions, 
pointing out that health service leaders lack the authority for change (Degeling & Carr, 
2004), and that there are conceptual difficulties around which aspects of culture would 
need to change (Davies et al., 2007). There have been calls for restructuring or 
redeveloping the health workforce (Duckett, 2005b; Imison & Bohmer, 2013), but this 
relates to meeting increased demand from an aging population, and does not appear to 
have been previously linked to the persistent difficulties with health service improvement.   
This research has examined the difficulties with health service improvement from a 
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regulatory perspective, which reveals the systemic role of health practitioner regulation in 
limiting improvements that could otherwise contribute to more effective and efficient 
service delivery. It identified the directions for change, and provided detailed 
explanations for unintended interactive effects in hospital directorates, multidisciplinary 
teams, service redesign programmes, integrated clinical ICT, and in the inter-professional 
clinical practice environment.  
8.5 IMP LIC A T IO NS AN D LIM IT A T IO NS 
This section outlines some implications from a New Zealand perspective. New Zealand 
has generally followed international trends for both health practitioner regulation and 
health service improvement. To stimulate discussion, this section briefly addresses some 
implications for policy-makers, district health boards (DHBs), and consumers. The 
changes contemplated are complex, DHBs face variations in population needs and 
workforce opportunities, and some new institutional arrangements are indicated. A brief 
discussion of how a facilitated consumer network could encourage more self-care is 
included, as it demonstrates possibilities that are limited by institutional arrangements 
rather than the capabilities of existing knowledge and technology. The section concludes 
with the implications for researchers and the limitations of the research.     
Pol icy-makers 
Like other developed countries, New Zealand has a range of regulatory and other 
agencies with policy and monitoring responsibilities for both the health professions and 
health service organisations (Cumming, 2011; Cumming & Mays, 2010). The 
environment for service improvement is similar, including: registration authorities 
responsible for oversight of health practitioner training, continuing practitioner 
competency, and overlapped scopes-of-practice; DHBs with hospital directorates, 
multidisciplinary teams, redesign programmes, and efforts to shift work from hospitals to 
community practices and to integrate clinical ICT; and, a workforce characterised by 
centralised industrial bargaining, shortages of particular specialists, and increasing use of 
unregistered health practitioners. The implementation of service improvement is costly 
and this research has linked limited success internationally to unintended policy 
interactions. New Zealand is subject to international trends in healthcare, yet its small size  
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could be advantageous for developing new institutional arrangements to produce better 
outcomes from policies for service improvement. 
There is public and political sensitivity around health reform in New Zealand. It is 
therefore important to socialise possible directions for health services, focusing on the 
ways to reduce service fragmentation for consumers and new career opportunities for 
health professionals. A first step would be to establish a policy forum to facilitate the 
development of new service arrangements. The forum would require sufficient authority 
and resources to engage a range of regulatory and policy agencies, registration 
authorities, DHBs, and consumer representatives. DHBs should be supported to lead in 
new service designs and workforce arrangements for their populations. Policy change is 
likely to include: adjustments between registration authorities, tertiary educators and 
health services, appropriate authority and accountability for DHBs and health service 
organisations, funding for organisation-based training, guidance concerning delegation 
among health professionals, incentives for universities to rethink degree structures in the 
health sciences, and some changes to health practitioner regulation.  
There are implications for health workforce planning and ICT. First, it is challenging to 
focus on new workforce arrangements while managing immediate risks around workforce 
shortages. Health Workforce New Zealand has made an impressive start with the plans 
around patient groups produced in 2011. Drawing on this research, it seems timely to 
focus on a smaller range of patient groups and to develop and socialise design scenarios 
that reduce service fragmentation. Priorities could include groups with health conditions 
related to social deprivation and aging, those in remote areas, and arrangements to enable 
more self-management  for  consumers’  with  stable  well-understood chronic health 
conditions. Second, New Zealand has performed well in health ICT, including national 
consumer identifiers and repositories of summary data, nationwide infrastructure, and 
programmes  for  consumers’  to  access  their  records.  A  recommendation from this research 
is that there is more focus on the socio-technical issues. This is likely to include: 
distinguishing between system requirements for integration of departmental clinical 
records, order entry systems, support of teamwork, and to enable consumer self-
management. This work needs to be undertaken regardless of the life cycle stage of a 
patient information system, because both new and existing systems generally permit 
substantial user definition in their implementation and use. Thus DHBs should be 
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encouraged to focus on integrating work practices and adapting their use of their local 
information systems to reflect new work designs. 
District Heal th Boards 
New Zealand DHBs are responsible for the effective and efficient delivery of health 
services to regional populations, including the integration of community and hospital-
based services (Ministry of Health, 2013). This is a complex task that involves straddling 
the agendas of multiple stakeholders and being bounded by national policy settings. The 
opportunities to reduce service fragmentation in DHBs are likely to vary according to 
their respective geographical, population service configuration and workforce profiles. 
While some changes are likely to depend on the support of policy-makers, DHBs appear 
best placed to identify the opportunities to reduce fragmentation in their clinical micro-
systems. As this research has explained, traditional work arrangements tend to prevail 
regardless of the co-location of service providers and health professionals. Thus, aspects 
of these arrangements detract from improvements that DHBs might otherwise realise 
through their clinical directorates, multidisciplinary teams, and integrated family health 
centres. Transfer of work from medicine to non-medical professions and assistants is 
likely to continue, but this can increase rather than reduce service fragmentation. DHB 
leaders can be fully engaged with immediate demands to address shortages among 
particular specialists, contain cost growth, and manage restructures. Even so, room must 
be made for planning and organisational development to reduce fragmentation in clinical 
micro-systems, and align resources to consumers to improve service quality and 
efficiency.  
Service fragmentation is common in routine healthcare. An adult with mild asthma is 
likely  to  have  been  tethered  to  three  monthly  doctors’  visits  and  prescription  requests,  and 
monthly visits to a pharmacy for several decades. When their pharmacy is closed, a 
consumer may not be able to fill a repeat prescription  without  an  additional  doctor’s  visit. 
Those with more complex conditions may be required to complete the same blood tests, 
prescription requests and pharmacy visits for many years. While a clinic nurse could 
perform some services, a consumer might find they are also required to visit the doctor 
due to various service restrictions. When consumers with chronic health conditions 
require adjustments to diagnoses and medications, this often depends on accessing 
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services restricted to hospitals and specialists with repeated tests and assessments. 
Consumers who attend an emergency clinic can be referred to the hospital due to 
restrictions around the performance of simple X-rays. A visit to the emergency 
department could be a rationale decision since in a few hours it could achieve the tests 
and specialist consultations that could otherwise take months. Appointing coordinators to 
improve service integration does little to change this pattern of repeated assessments, 
reviews and referrals related to workforce arrangements and policies that restrict the use 
of certain technologies. Each transfer of care also entails opportunities for error and 
additional costs for DHBs, consumers, and taxpayers. 
To reduce service fragmentation, it is necessary to: select a service for focus, define 
routine work, establish policies for clinical practice, make use of near patient testing or 
treatment equipment, train team members to perform the routine work, and adapt existing 
ICT to reflect the new way of working. This could begin with existing multidisciplinary 
teams that care for particular groups of patients, such as in rehabilitation, mental health 
and aged care. There are many other possibilities, such as in services for musculo-skeletal 
problems, pain management, diabetes etc. This approach calls for changes to the roles of 
specialists, so that they perform a few less direct patient consultations and spend some 
time in supporting community-based general practices and multidisciplinary teams. For 
example, a few specialists have begun to visit some general practices to conduct case 
reviews and transfer knowledge to the clinical staff. Other specialist support for 
community providers could include: remote calibration for equipment, periodic training 
in some routine diagnostic and therapy procedures, and multidisciplinary service audits. 
Leadership training would be important and include differentiating general management 
from clinical leadership, and clinical supervision from responsibilities to organise clinical 
work. These changes depend on the development of management capability to design 
teams, establish training and recognition for health professionals, make better use of their 
local clinical ICT systems, and ensure that health professionals are able to maintain both 
their traditional and their new skills for shared clinical work. 
Some of these recommendations will not be new to DHBs or service providers, since 
there have been many national and localised innovations to address workforce shortages 
and population needs over the years. However, localised changes can be overturned and 
even forgotten as key personnel move on, shortages are redressed and traditional work 
  248 
arrangements restored, and through the loss of institutional knowledge following 
restructures. It is therefore important that DHBs are able to engage in discourse with a 
national policy forum, and that useful innovations can receive policy backing to be 
systematised nationally as appropriate. It is hoped that the framework of factors in service 
improvement, developed in this research, could prove useful in the systematisation of 
innovations.  
Consumers 
There is now a well-educated aging population, familiar with mobile phones, computers 
and the Internet. They are likely to have already adapted to electronic systems and self-
service changes in banking and retail. When these consumers have a stable chronic health 
condition, they are more likely to have expertise in the management of their condition. 
Traditional health services involve consumers in one-to-one consultations many times. 
Yet, it is difficult for consumers to make sense of the clinical and care information 
available through verbal exchanges with each health professional (Honey, Roy, Bycroft, 
& Boyd, 2014). There are opportunities to use new service designs and ICT to reduce the 
number of these consultations by enabling consumers to both individually and 
collectively manage more of their own care.  
There are current policies to provide consumers with Internet access to their clinical 
information including diagnoses and medications. An implication of this research is that 
these systems need to be relevant to consumers, rather than simply providing access to 
existing records. While a working diagnosis, individual test results and trends, 
medications and referral reports  could  be  useful;  health  practitioner  accounts  of  patients’ 
narratives that could be dated or not verified by consumers and therefore less useful. 
More relevant would be access to reliable and relevant information about their respective 
condition, enhanced transparency around consultations with health professionals, and 
applications that support self-management of tests and prescriptions. More sophisticated 
websites for patient associations, such as for arthritis and asthma, could also contribute. 
These organisations can bring together highly motivated consumers to learn from experts 
and each other, but tend to rely on the voluntary time of health professionals and 
organisers. These organisations could be more effective if they had resources to offer  
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online information and video presentations, links to other service providers and a 
moderated chat room for members to ask questions and exchange information. 
We could imagine a future service that involved a facilitated patient network to support 
consumer self-management. Each consumer would have a web account to hold 
information on his or her diagnosis and protocols for care, along with access to clinical 
information about their condition. In this scenario, a consumer could arrange their own 
tests through suppliers or home-based equipment, and track the results and trends 
recorded on their web account. They could order their own medications, receiving 
supplies by courier from a pharmacy warehouse. At a face-to-face consultation, the health 
professional could highlight particular web pages or add instructions so patients could 
review and consider this information in their own time. Service providers could moderate 
a condition-related chat room for enrolled consumers, as well as organising real world 
group meetings or events. Advantages could include: ongoing access to educational 
material for consumers to engage with at their own pace, transparency around the 
information  offered  by  health  professionals,  periodic  surveys  to  check  patients’ 
understanding of symptoms and medications, and applications that automate the 
monitoring of patients progress. This could release scarce face-to-face healthcare 
resources for consumers whose conditions are less stable or periods where more intensive 
help is required. Such a system could also make use of a little used regulatory tool in 
healthcare by directly addressing the information imbalance between consumers and 
health professionals, as well as among the professionals engaged in service delivery. 
While this scenario is plausible given existing knowledge and technology, 
implementation would depend on new institutional arrangements to facilitate changes to a 
range of health profession-related regulatory restrictions on the use of medicines, 
technologies, and the ownership of pharmacies and general practices, and developing new 
information-management related roles for some health professionals.  
Researchers 
This research has scoped out a major gap in the literature concerning the links between 
health practitioner regulation and health service improvement. I hope the theoretical 
framework and other theory contributions could be of interest to researchers. The 
framework needs to be further researched to test its explanatory power in particular 
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circumstances. Some of the levers of regulatory privilege and elements for service 
improvement could prove more relevant than others. Researchers could consider testing 
some of the criteria in relation to studies of service improvement at any of the six health 
sector levels. My use of a critical realist methodology could also be of interest to scholars 
researching this methodology.    
Limi tat ions of the research 
There are limits to the research findings. Multi-level analysis suggests that the effects of 
health practitioner regulation could be systemic. However, this research has been focused 
on the development of a conceptual explanation. While it shows how regulatory privilege 
could add to other explanations about difficulties with health service improvement, this 
applied to particular illustrations. Further research would be required to refine the lens of 
regulatory privilege and to understand more about the regulatory levers and the 
circumstances for effects on service improvement. The research does not attempt to 
assess the relative strength of other theories that might also contribute to explaining 
persistent difficulties with health service improvement. 
The thin literature base and critical realist methodology called for a broadly based 
research design. This placed demands on the researcher to engage in extensive searching 
for, and sifting of, material to assess its relevance to the research question. Literature 
reviews were consulted to assist in understanding the available research, and also to 
mitigate the risk of inadvertently missing important material. However, it is possible that 
I missed material that could have influenced findings in a different direction. 
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APP E NDIX A : H E A LTH P R O F ESSION R E GU L ATORS 
New York State L icensed Professions 
Acupuncture Mental health practitioners 
Audiology - Creative arts therapists 
Chiropractic - Marriage and family therapists  
Clinical laboratory technology - Mental health counsellors 
- Clinical laboratory technologists  - Psychoanalysts 
- Cytotechnologists  Nursing 
- Clinical laboratory technicians - Registered professional nurses 
- Certified Histological technicians - Nurse practitioners 
Dentistry - Licensed practical nurses 
- Dentists Occupational Therapy 
- Dental anaesthesia/ sedation - Occupational therapists  
- Dental hygienists - Occupational therapy assistants 
- Certified dental assistants Pharmacy 
Dietetics – nutrition - Pharmacists 
Massage therapy - Pharmacy establishments 
Medical Physics Physical therapy 
Medicine - Physical therapists 
- Physicians - Physical therapy technicians 
- Physicians 3 year limited license Podiatry 
- Physician assistants Psychology 
- Specialist assistants Social Work 
Midwifery - Licensed master social worker 
Ophthalmic Dispensing - Licensed clinical social worker 
Optometry (Office of Professions, 2010) 
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U K Counci l for Regulatory E xcel lence (C HR E) 
General chiropractic council  - Chiropodists/ podiatrists  
- Chiropractors - Clinical scientists 
General dental council - Dieticians 
- Dentists - Hearing aid dispensers 
- Dental nurses - Occupational therapists  
- Dental technicians - Operating department practitioners  
- Dental hygienists - Orthoptists 
- Clinical dental technicians - Paramedics 
- Orthodontic therapists  - Physiotherapists 
General medical council (GMC) - Practitioner psychologists  
- Doctors - Prosthetics/ orthotists 
General optical council - Radiographers 
- Optometrists - Speech and language technologists  
- Dispensing opticians Nursing and midwifery council 
- Student opticians - Nurses 
- Optical businesses - Midwives 
General osteopathic council Pharmaceutical society of Nth Ireland 
- Osteopaths - Pharmacists in Northern Ireland 
Health professions council Pharmaceutical society of Great Britain 
- Arts therapists - Pharmacists in England, Wales & Scotland 
- Biomedical scientists  
(CHRE, 2010b) 
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Austral ian Heal th Pract i t ioners Regulatory Agency (A HPRA) 
 
From 1 July 2010 Pharmacists 
Chiropractors Physiotherapists 
Dental practitioners Podiatrists 
- Dentists Psychologists 
- Dental hygienists  
- Dental prosthetists From 1 July 2012 
- Dental therapists Chinese medicine practitioners 
Medical practitioners Medical radiation practitioners 
Nurses & Midwives Occupational therapists 
Optometrists Aboriginal & Torres Strait Island 
health practitioners 
(AHPRA, 2011) 
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APP E NDIX B : SE RV IC E D ESIGNS 
A U K medical directorate 
Reeves and Lewin (2004) observed the behaviour and experience of health professionals 
working within a UK medical directorate. The environment was characterised by large 
numbers of personnel organised according to their professions including medical 
specialists and trainee medical practitioners, nurses, pharmacists, physiotherapists, 
occupational therapists and social workers, and working with patients across dispersed 
clinical locations. The personnel attached to any one ward could include 10 nurses 
located on the ward, up to 15 medical practitioners from five to six different medical 
teams, three to four therapists, two social workers and two care coordinators. Formal 
information sharing was meant to occur in weekly multidisciplinary meetings led by each 
medical specialist team, but differences in the work of different health professions 
compromised participation. Medical practitioners often prioritised other work leading to 
cancellations of multidisciplinary meetings, and nurses complained that meetings 
occurred when they had to continue working on the wards. For social workers, it was 
apparent that this meeting and the ward notes were an inefficient means to acquire 
information about the patients who could benefit from their services, for instance to 
facilitate arrangements for discharge or community care. Inter-professional 
communication tended to be opportunistic, brief and terse, with doctors mostly initiating 
communication to allocate work or referrals and inclined to strip out the social niceties 
like greetings, and reduce other practitioners to representatives of their respective health 
professions. ‘Care  coordinators’  or  nurses  who  were  present  for  longer  periods  on  the 
ward  were  used  as  ‘go-betweens’  for  delivery  of  messages  between professionals. Verbal 
exchanges often occurred in corridors, which was problematic due to the potential for 
health practitioners to be interrupted and forget these messages. The design and 
maintenance  of  patient’s  records  made  it  difficult  and  time-consuming to glean 
interdisciplinary information from this source. There were also tensions around work 
practice with nurses attempting to implement nurse-led communication around each 
patient and doctors preferring to communicate with the ward personnel via the charge 
nurse. The clinical directorate structure is intended to encourage inter-professional 
collaboration around particular groups of patients. However, the authors concluded that 
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temporospatial issues in the organisation of work and differing views of collaboration 
among the health professions acted as a constraint on inter-professional collaboration on 
hospital wards (Reeves & Lewin, 2004). 
U K mul t idiscipl inary rehabi l i tat ion care 
In another UK study, Long, Kneafsey, and Ryan (2003) focused on multidisciplinary 
interactions between nurses, speech language therapists, physiotherapists, occupational 
therapists, dieticians, social workers and podiatrists engaged in rehabilitation care. The 
researchers followed the care provided to patients for up six months following hip 
fractures, rheumatoid arthritis or stroke, and following the progress of selected patients 
through general medical wards, specialist rehabilitation wards, and outpatient clinics. 
Nurses on the general wards treated patients through the acute phases of their care, and 
complained about a lack of access to rehabilitation resources. A variety of work practice 
was evident with some examples of high functioning integration of work where nurses 
decided to incorporate therapy treatments (physical, occupational or speech language) 
into ongoing nursing care, performed some therapy work where there were staff shortages 
among the therapists, and were open to care coordination being performed by either a 
nurse or a therapist. However, there was also widespread confusion around roles with 
contests for control over key tasks such as assessments, care coordination, or integration 
of therapy into nursing care, and these conflicts contributed to fragmentation of care, 
repetition of work, and delays to the progress of rehabilitation. Patients complained about 
the  repeated  assessments,  nurses  complained  about  therapists’  failure  to  recognise  nursing 
skills in rehabilitation or coordination of care or to adequately document their 
assessments, and therapists complained  that  nurses  undermined  patients’  progress  by  not 
reading  or  adhering  to  therapists’  instructions.  Profession-centric decisions around the 
priorities of patient cases, restrictions around the numbers of therapists, the Monday to 
Friday daytime working hours of the therapists, separate documentation of clinical notes 
among the professions, and ideals about roles each contributed to fragmentation of care, 
difficulties attending multidisciplinary meetings, multiple repetitive handovers, lack of 
reciprocity in  task  sharing  and  delays  to  patients’  progress.  The  study  concluded  that 
health practitioner training was not adequate to enable team-based clinical work, and that 
transparent skill sets, policies to support inter-professional work and audits could 
overcome tensions associated with role blurring. This would require recognition and 
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facilitation from health service organisations, educators and registration authorities (Long 
et al., 2003). 
P F C at Lakeland Regional Medical Center 
As executive leaders Watson, Shortridge, Jones, Rees, and Stephens (1991) were inspired 
to develop a PFC pilot to address problems with service fragmentation, cost and quality 
of care, at Lakeland Regional Medical Center (LRMC). Their pre-implementation 
analysis pinpointed the hospital’s  design  around  specialised  clinical  departments  rather 
than  the  preferences  of  the  hospital’s  medical  specialists  or  the  fluctuations  in  patient 
demand as the key source of these difficulties. Consequently, they concluded that the 
increased costs, delays and duplication of work associated with specialist departments 
outstripped the advantages of specialisation at LRMC. In 1989 a general surgical ward 
was remodelled to accommodate 35 beds, some radiology, laboratory and pharmacy 
functions, and new workstations with patient medication drawers and computers. A two-
person  team  of  health  practitioners  or  a  ‘care  pair’  comprised  of  a  registered  nurse  and  a 
cross-trained multi-skilled practitioner performed a range of services including: 
preadmission workups, admission procedures, ECGs, respiratory treatments, basic 
physical therapy treatments, phlebotomy (taking blood for analysis), most dietary 
functions, equipment care, cleaning rooms, transporting patients, charging patient 
accounts and completing medical records at discharge. Training for personnel on the PFC 
unit was provided in-house and included theoretical instruction, simulated performance of 
new clinical tasks, and completion of supervised competency tests with patients. By 1990, 
all pre and post-operative work for elective, urgent, and acute general surgery patients 
was carried out on this unit. Post implementation evaluations were positive with: routine 
laboratory tests completed 70% faster; significant improvement in the performance of 
radiographs despite the limitation that only a registered radiographer was permitted to 
perform these; measures of quality equal to or improved for patient satisfaction, 
continuity of care, length of stay, mortality, hospital acquired infection rates, 
complications and occurrence of temperature spikes; an overwhelmingly positive 
response from patients thought to be associated with improved continuity of care; and an 
external audit found cost savings of 9.2% per occupied bed day (Watson et al., 1991). 
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However, the perceptions of health professionals on the LMRC PFC pilot unit were 
mixed. While overall measure of staff satisfaction and experience of stress improved, this 
related to some aspects of PFC organisation and not to others. Stress related to work with 
senior medical practitioners, managers and other health practitioners improved, but stress 
increased  around  performance  of  ‘demeaning  tasks’.  Quality  of  work  life  improved  in 
relation to perceptions of opportunities for personal growth, but reduced in relation to 
perceptions of autonomy and complexity of work. The 15 surgeons were unanimous that 
patient care had improved and clinical policies and workflow sheets reduced the time they 
had to spend on the unit, but some surgeons still preferred to maintain their own medical 
progress  notes,  separate  from  the  nurses’  documentation  of  patient  care  (Watson et al., 
1991). 
A PFC test centre at the UK’s Leicester Royal Infirmary (Newman, 1997) 
In the United Kingdom, executives at Leicester Royal Infirmary (LRI) were also inspired 
by the  opportunities  to  improve  services  using  PFC,  in  this  case  an  out  patients’  clinic. 
Newman (1997) explained that pre-implementation analysis showed that outpatient 
appointments  comprised  49%  of  LRI’s  patient  visits  and  generated  66,000  diagnostic 
tests  per  year.  The  complexity  of  patient’s  having  to  visit  specialist  departments  for 
routine tests meant it was common for outpatients services to be spread over three 
appointments; for instance for a blood test, electrocardiogram and a simple X-ray, and for 
delays of weeks to occur due to waiting for results and scheduling of subsequent 
appointments. Furthermore, 43% of test results were not available at the start of a clinic, 
28% of tests had to be repeated due to missing results and delays, and consequently there 
were clinic personnel dedicated to chasing up test results. In 1995, testing equipment was 
installed to service eight clinics at the Balmoral Outpatients Centre through normal 
business hours, Monday to Friday. This created a one-stop-shop service where patients 
received their tests, results and a specialist consultation at a single outpatient 
appointment. A four-person team of cross-trained health practitioners performed routine 
tests and reduced the waiting time for patients from 90 to 10 minutes. The laboratory, 
radiology and cardiology departments monitored the quality of tests, and the human 
resources department assessed staff satisfaction in the clinic. The LRI personnel involved 
the PFC testing service reported satisfaction from delivering a comprehensive service to 
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patients, but experienced censure from professional colleagues due to anxieties about 
limited  career  paths,  and  being  seen  to  perform  the  ‘lower-status’  or  routine  work  from 
the scopes-of-practice of other health professions (Newman, 1997). An evaluation of 
organisation-wide service redesign at LRI showed that it was the PFC inspired change at 
outpatients that generated cost savings as well as quality improvement (Bowns & 
McNulty, 1999). 
Communi ty mental heal th teams (C MHTs) in the E ngl ish Midlands 
A study by Brown, Crawford, and Darongkamas (2000) observed three CMHTs 
constructed when health professionals were moved from hospital departments to care for 
patients in defined geographical areas. The teams had 8, 10 and 11 members with health 
professionals from nursing, occupational therapy, psychology, psychiatry, social work 
and support workers. A steering committee of stakeholders met monthly to oversee the 
operation of these services, while team members took turns to chair the weekly meeting 
of their team. Two teams worked from distributed locations. While many health 
practitioners  were  positive  about  teamwork,  there  were  difficulties  agreeing  to  the  teams’ 
goals  including  aligning  the  work  of  the  health  professionals  to  the  teams’  geographical 
boundaries. There were also different approaches to reconciling professional differences. 
One group saw professional boundaries, as a relic of the past that reflected self-interest 
and that role blurring or development of a generic mental health worker to replace the 
separate roles of nurses and social workers would be in the interests of clients. A second 
group thought professional boundaries should be reinforced because role blurring was not 
in  the  client’s  interests  and  would  confuse  lines  of accountability within the team. A third 
perspective was to take a middle line on role blurring by trying to be self-aware to ensure 
that role blurring did not progress too far. These differences affected work practice with 
some practitioners completing a range of tasks at a single appointment because if was 
efficient and convenient for the client, while others objected to such combined practice as 
‘meddling’  across  inter-professional boundaries. There were also perceptions of 
abandonment by management, so teams tried to establish their own democratically styled 
team meetings, but found it difficult to agree to team goals or to stop team members from 
continuing to service their own client lists even where this included clients from outside 
the  team’s  designated population. Most professionals retained links to their specialist 
departments, which could have affected their commitment to their multidisciplinary team. 
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The authors concluded multidisciplinary team structures could encourage boundary 
marking among the health professions (Brown et al., 2000). 
Communi ty mental heal th teams (C MHTs) in the south of E ngland 
Gulliver, Peck, and Towell (2002) studied three CMHTs in the south of England that 
were introduced to reduce the fragmentation of care between general practice and 
hospitals. The professionals were drawn from social work, psychiatry, nursing, 
occupational therapy and support workers. Leadership was shared with psychiatrists 
responsible for treatment plans, for liaison with the GPs, or representing the team to 
management or funders, while nurses coordinated care within mental health services. The 
health services encouraged teamwork through: co-location of team members, 
appointment  of  team  leaders,  policies  for  patient’s  to  have  an  inter-professional care plan, 
and by attention to the language of collaboration. After a year professionals appeared to 
be intensively patrolling their inter-professional boundaries. After two years, nurses and 
social workers reported that they were now taking on a wider range of duties, but felt that 
they had insufficient training to do this. Team leaders had gained in authority due to use 
of clinical audits, although many staff still looked to the medical senior psychiatrist as the 
overall decision-maker. One team that specialised in psychological therapy appeared to 
function best with a clear team goal, team-based training and support activities, and a 
higher reported satisfaction with teamwork. This contrasted with the other teams, where 
there was still confusion around team tasks and priorities, the role of managers, and the 
distribution of authority among team members to take on clients, and concerns about a 
lack of training in interdisciplinary working, uncertainty about how to document or 
manage inter-professional care, and ongoing attachment to professional departments. The 
success of the psychological therapies team, with its clear task focus, augers well for the 
service, but health service intervention appeared to be necessary to resolve uncertainty 
around tasks or priorities, and to specify core tasks in the other teams (Gulliver et al., 
2002). 
Record-keeping in Scott ish communi ty mental heal th teams (C MHTs) 
A study by Hardstone, Proctor, Voss, and Rees (2004) investigated the response of three 
Scottish CMHTs to the introduction of a shared electronic record-keeping system. Each 
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team had a designated manager, included nurses, social workers, occupational therapists, 
and psychologists, and were required to have a lead practitioner and an integrated inter-
professional care plan for each patient. Team meetings operated democratically with 
efforts  to  elicit  and  reinforce  the  ‘unique’  disciplinary  perspectives  of  members  for  each 
client. In the CMHT office, there was an almost constant informal exchange of 
information and experiences among team members, concerning patients, medications, 
team administration, and the health service organisation. Engagement in teamwork 
depended  on  each  practitioner’s  team  membership  status,  which  was  subject  to 
negotiation around his or her contribution  to  the  team’s  routine  daily  activities.  Formal 
patient  records  included  referral  letters,  assessments  and  reports  about  a  patient’s 
diagnosis  and  treatment,  but  there  were  also  informal  records  of  ‘to  do’  lists,  notes  on 
meetings, phone calls or patient assessments, and drafts or referral letters (typed by the 
secretaries) that could be discussed informally with other team members and revised. 
Some sensitive issues were discussed informally, and not included in clinical records due 
to concerns that individual practitioners may be held to account if they were ultimately 
available to a wider audience. This use of manual and informal records enabled pencil 
text to be erased and the record to be completed in pen, and over time this supported 
reification of clinical decisions and the management of patients with text in pencil erased 
and the record completed in pen. Physical forms could be worked on by individuals and 
reviewed by others as a co-production, before being reinserted into the clinical records, 
thus the  time  to  ‘publish’  assessments  and  decisions  could  be  delayed  to  develop 
consensus. On other occasions, time was saved when a health practitioner inserted their 
notepad record into the formal clinical record (Hardstone et al., 2004). 
As Hardstone et al. (2004) explain the computerised patient-record has limited support for 
provisional notes or co-production due to electronic tracking of authorship and changes to 
records. The health professionals sought to manage this problem by delaying data entry or 
update of records until consensus concerning the patient was finalized. In one instance a 
psychiatric  nurse  verbally  briefed  a  psychiatrist  but  entered  only  the  patient’s  contact 
information to the database for the psychiatrist concerning a patient, but delayed the data 
entry  of  her  assessment,  until  she  could  read  the  psychiatrist’s  report  to  ensure  her 
account was consistent. The introduction of electronic patient records left the team 
leaders with less discretion to ignore the breaches of clinical policy in the form of the 
informal record-keeping  practices  or  removal  of  the  patients’  records  from  the  CMHT 
  301 
office to reduce the travel time around visits to see patients. An advantage to the health 
service of the electronic system was that records could be immediately available to other 
parts  of  the  health  service,  including  the  legal  assessments  of  the  patient’s  mental  state, 
and  this  led  to  the  teams’  becoming  concerned  about  who  may  view  their  work.  The 
authors conclude that while outsiders might misinterpret the practice of doing some 
healthcare  work  ‘in  the  rough’  and  then  again  ‘in  the  neat’,  it  appears  to  be  a 
characteristic of multidisciplinary working, and that the electronic system may need to be 
adapted to the practice of the professionals (Hardstone et al., 2004). 
 
APP E NDIX C : C O ORDIN AT I ON O F C A R E 
A U K laboratory system wi th ward order entry 
Mclaughlin and Webster (1998) studied the introduction of a new laboratory system to 
enable sharing of patient information and computerised communications between the 
different laboratory departments with wards in a UK hospital. The system was designed 
to introduce standardisation around which test to perform or antibiotic to prescribe, and 
the study followed the responses of laboratory scientists and pathologists in the 
microbiology laboratory. Instead of sending a specimen and inquiry about organisms 
present,  the  system  provided  the  ward’s  medical  practitioners  and  nurses  with  information 
around tests that may be ordered, removing a decision previously made by the scientists 
and enforcing a more standardised range of tests. It also standardised laboratory 
procedures, with sub-tests performed by different scientists, guided by policies about sub-
tests to perform and entry of results each stage. Laboratory scientists felt particularly 
aggrieved  that  their  roles  were  being  ‘deskilled’.  Previously  they  had  decided  the  tests  to 
perform, performed whole tests, and also developed new test techniques, skills they 
viewed as important to their professional status and career opportunities. Managers 
viewed the system as simply enforcing the standards that had always existed and that the 
key skill of the scientists was to read the tests. The objections from scientists led to 
redesign of some aspects of the system and work practice, and allowed them to override 
the test selections made by medical practitioners or nurses on the wards. For pathologists, 
it was important that the system supported their claim to oversight of the work of the 
scientists and quality of test results supplied to wards. The new system treated review 
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of tests as a routine task that could be performed by either scientists or pathologists. It 
also held the clinical information that had previously been held in paper form by the 
pathologists. The pathologists employed four strategies to retain their claim to overall 
clinical authority in the laboratory, maintaining their claim to legal authority for 
diagnosis, using a threat to discredit the system to other pathologists as leverage to 
persuade the vendor to change the way the system presented tests for review, introducing 
a paper-based  ‘workaround’  for  scientists  to  identify  the  tests  that  required  a  pathologist’s 
review, and leveraging their clinical information held in the system to strengthen their 
advisory work outside of the laboratory. Yet the transparency introduced by the system 
meant that in order to maintain their claim to oversight of the laboratory work, the 
pathologists had to dedicate time each morning to reviewing test results to meet the 
expectations of ward personnel for timely access to results. Managers utilised the 
pathologists’  criticisms  in  their  negotiations  with  the  system  vendors,  but  had  to  work 
hard to persuade specialist personnel to share clinical information within the laboratory 
(Mclaughlin & Webster, 1998).  
A Canadian pharmacy system wi th ward funct ions 
This study focused on the implementation of automated medication management in a 
Canadian hospital. As Novek (2002) explains, hospital administrators who had higher 
degree qualifications in nursing wished to introduce more standardisation in medication 
administration on the wards to reduce errors and enable nurses to spend more time with 
their patients. Part of this strategy was the coproduction of electronic medication charts 
through pharmacists entering the prescription and nurses completing the chart as they 
administered medication. The system had been originally designed by a pharmacist, and 
was  intended  to  enhance  pharmacists’  engagement  in  quality  control  and  clinical  advisory 
services. The leadership team decided to improve medication management by allowing a 
two-hour window of time for prescribed medications to be administered, but the system 
had unacceptable effects on work practice for both pharmacists and nurses. First, the 
replacement of ward inventories with daily supply of individualised prescriptions in 
medication carts involved the pharmacists in significant work as they checked and 
entered  prescriptions  to  the  system  for  each  patient.  Second,  the  pharmacists’  plans  to 
introduce a medication advisory service failed because the pharmacists that had been 
deployed to the wards were too isolated from access to the clinical and medication 
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profiles previously reviewed as part of the process of checking prescriptions, so nurses 
made inquiries to the central pharmacy. Third, nurses found the two-hour timeframes for 
medication administration restricted their capacity to use their own clinical judgement to 
organise their work to according to circumstances on the wards. Thus the system reduced 
rather than enabled opportunities for both pharmacists and nurses to develop their 
professional practice or exercise professional judgement. It also led to acrimonious 
negotiations between nurses and pharmacists over data entry, and accountability for 
errors. In resisting the changes imposed through the ICT system, pharmacists referred to 
their responsibility to review prescriptions, and nurses emphasised their accountability for 
the administration of medications. The system was ultimately rejected and replaced by 
one that had more sophisticated administration cabinets and flexible options for 
administration of medicines. This implementation occurred in the context of a pharmacy 
department that was relatively weak compared to nursing, and health service changes that 
had already posed threats to the work of the health professionals. (Novek, 2002).  
Shared materni ty records in Denmark 
This Danish study followed the progress of a four-year ICT pilot to enhance state 
provided maternity services. An existing web portal provided patients with summarises of 
clinical information and records of their medications. This portal was upgraded to support 
information sharing among pregnant women and their healthcare providers in hospitals, 
midwifery clinics, and community-based general practice. The project team anticipated 
that the coordination of care would improve if the women were encouraged to participate 
more in their own care through access to clinical notes, scans and test results. The women 
were also expected to become  less  ‘forgetful’  about  bringing  their  own  ‘client  record’  to 
appointments. However, the study showed that the women were not the passive recipients 
of care and used their web-based access to records to identify and attempt to remedy 
problems with information sharing among the health professionals. Various information 
sharing problems became evident, and one general practice and one hospital department 
withdrew before the pilot concluded. Some health practitioners did not know how to 
access information on the web-based record, some records of events were available 
through the web portal, had not been shared between the systems used by the health 
professionals, some information was simply absence, and some records were erroneous or 
incomplete. The women began to bring their own copies of records or provide verbal 
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accounts of events, and to insist that health practitioners update or address the errors in 
the web record. At the outset, the project had conceived the relationship between health 
professionals and patients as the key boundary to be addressed, but the implementation 
demonstrated that the problematic boundary issues were between the hospital specialists, 
midwives and general practitioners providing care. This challenged the health 
professionals’  perception  about  or  construction  of  communication  problems  as  ‘problems 
with  patients’  understanding  or compliance’  (Winthereik, 2008). 
Re-engineering at the UK’s Leicester Royal Infirmary 
Re-engineering at Leicester Royal Infirmary (LRI) was undertaken through a period of 
policies for cost containment, bed reduction and the movement of services from hospitals 
to community settings. As McNulty and Ferlie (2002) explain, LRI planned to redesign 
hospital processes from admission to discharge, beginning with reducing the waiting time 
for patients in the emergency department (ED). The transformation team initially tried to 
use a system of triage by nurses to order tests such as X-rays and to separate patients into 
two  queues,  the  first  referred  to  as  the  ‘walking wounded’  were  to  be  treated  and 
discharged by nurses, and the second the patients lying on trolleys were to be treated by 
the doctors. However, the emergency medical specialists did not want their work taken 
over by nurses and argued instead that delays in ED were related to the 20% of complex 
cases and a lack of resources to treat these cases. After two years this inter-jurisdictional 
contest was settled in favour of the doctors, the vacancies among nursing staff had been 
filled but nurse-led clinics did not proceed and there was limited scope for nurses to order 
tests such as X-rays. A second strategy to remove congestion in the ED was also scuttled 
this time due to a contest between the emergency and orthopaedic medical specialists. 
The transformation team and the orthopaedic specialists wanted patients with hip 
fractures X-rayed and transferred directly from X-ray to an orthopaedic ward based on the 
decisions of an ED nurse and radiographer. This initiative failed due to disputes both 
within medicine, between medicine and nursing, and a reluctance of radiographers to take 
responsibility for X-ray diagnosis that is traditionally reserved to medical specialists in 
radiology. 
Another strategy to reduce congestion at LRI was to separate the simple elective surgical 
procedures that could be performed in a single day of admission from other more 
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complex cases that involved overnight hospital stays. This began with streamlining the 
tests and assessments at the ear, nose and throat (ENT) clinic and access to operating 
theatres. The clinic initiative proved successful with ENT surgeons willing to agree to 
clinical policies that enabled an administrator to arrange the standard tests and nurses to 
conduct the preoperative assessment with the anaesthetist. The streamlining of theatre and 
recovery work was less successful. Other surgical specialists resented the streamlined 
access to theatres for ENT patients and an intra-jurisdictional dispute erupted over control 
of post-surgical care between the nurses who worked in theatre recovery with the 
anaesthetists and the nurses on the ENT unit. After two years there was still some 
resistance to sharing information concerning theatre bookings and to transfer of bookings 
onto a computer. The success of streamlined access to day procedures was replicated with 
endoscopy clinics where medical specialists agreed to policies that enabled some work to 
be delegated to nurses, although few nurses were willing to take on their own endoscopy 
clinics. 
Two strategies were developed to expedite patient discharge from the hospital, the first 
involved using a multidisciplinary team to plan the pre-discharge work when the patient 
is admitted, and the second is to delegate decisions that a patient is ready for discharge to 
nurses on the wards. These strategies met with both success and resistance. The 
orthopaedic wards were reorganised into acute care and rehabilitation with a 
multidisciplinary team of nurses and therapists responsible for timely organisation of the 
pre-discharge rehabilitation assessments, although it took some time to persuade the 
therapists to change from their traditional Monday to Friday hours to complete this work 
on weekends. In the case of ENT, the surgeons refused to delegate discharge decisions to 
nurses. In contrast, on the obstetrics and gynaecology (O & G) wards medical consultants 
and nurses formed teams with nurses discharged patients according to agreed protocols 
and also made a follow-up  visit  to  the  patients’  homes. This  teamwork  approach had been 
agreed as part of the commissioning of a new building for O&G services that had fewer 
beds, and it also freed consultants to concentrate on surgery (McNulty & Ferlie, 2002). 
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APP E NDIX D: R O L E D E V E L OP M E N T 
Overlapped scopes-of-pract ice in the Netherlands 
From 1997, following some Canadian states, the Netherlands changed from a licensure 
for health professionals to certification with some restricted activities. This permitted 
medical practitioners to delegate 15 different types of reserved or restricted procedures to 
nurses. An evaluation study was required within five years of the new regulation taking 
effect, and the study was reported in de Bie and colleagues (2004; 2005).  Survey 
questions were used to assess the knowledge of the regulations and the associated practice 
experience of 2000 health professionals, including gynaecologists, trainee medical 
practitioners, and nurses. Over 75% of medical practitioners and nurses reported no 
difficulties with either giving or receiving clinical orders for these procedures. However, 
the researchers found some of these professionals knowledge or clinical practice did not 
comply  with  the  regulations  concerning  ‘what  work  may  be  performed  by  which 
professions’  (de Bie et al., 2004).  
While 75% of the practitioners surveyed knew which procedures required authorisation 
by medical practitioners, fewer at 50% knew how instructions should be communicated, 
or accountability ascribed between medical practitioners and nurses, and 60% were 
unclear as to how medical practitioners could supervise nurses. Orders for injections were 
usually given or received in writing, while orders for bladder catheterisations were 
usually verbal. In both cases, a single order could imply multiple performances of the 
procedure, and medical specialists expected nurses to use their judgement as to when or 
how often to perform these procedures. Among nurses, 34% believed orders were 
consistent with an organisational policy or a clinical protocol, and 50% said they received 
orders verbally through other nurses. Orders were generally not accompanied by guidance 
concerning their performance or potential complications. Access to assistance depended 
on whether a supervisor was nearby, and 75% of nurses said that they had seldom 
received any instruction from a supervisor. Most of the health professionals viewed the 
new regulations as an improvement over the old regulations, particularly for nurses. A 
small proportion of the professionals were critical or uncertain about the practicality of 
the new regulations. The problems reported included lack of clarity in the regulations, 
receipt of verbal or telephoned orders with subsequent written confirmation, difficulties 
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determining the proficiency of nurses or providing supervision or intervention, lack of 
one-to-one relationships among nurses and medical practitioners, and the pressure of the 
work environment (de Bie et al., 2004).  
Refusal by nurses to perform orders was reported in de Bie et al. (2005). Among the 
respondents 11-30 % reported difficulties with inter-professional delegation in the 
previous year. When nurses refused orders, most medical practitioners believed that this 
occurred because nurses believed they lacked the authorisation or proficiency to carry out 
the work. Among nurses, 63% agreed they had concerns about their own authorisation, 
and 41% about their own proficiency. However, when asked about their most recent 
problem with an order, 34% of nurses stated that they disagreed with the use of the 
particular medication or the dose to be given, and they sought to resolve these difficulties 
by consulting a colleague, getting a colleague to perform the procedure, or through 
discussion with the medical specialist. When asked for opinions about whether nurses 
could perform a range of procedures (some permitted under regulation and some not) on 
their own initiative, opinions varied considerably among both nurses and medical 
practitioners. The authors noted the relatively low frequency of these difficulties (de Bie 
et al., 2005).     
The researchers observed that regulation tends to lag practice and drew three main 
conclusions. First, more training was required concerning the regulation. Second, the 
nurses who disagreed with medication policies were working outside of their legal scope-
of-practice within the Netherlands, and had probably been influenced by developments in 
the United States. Third, the health service organisations should provide adequate 
safeguards for quality and safety, such as written guidelines or protocols (de Bie et al., 
2004; de Bie et al., 2005). 
Regulat ion of overlapped scopes-of-pract ice in the Uni ted Kingdom 
In  2010,  the  UK’s  Council  for  Healthcare  Regulatory  Excellence  (CHRE)  responded  to  a 
government  request  to  assess  whether  there  was  a  need  for  ‘distributed  regulation’  where 
a registration authority would be required to consult with another registration authority to 
set standards for or oversee roles where the scopes-of-practice extend into work already 
governed by another registration authority (CHRE, 2010c; Department of Health, 2006). 
CHRE posed the case of a podiatrist surgeon, where a health professional is registered 
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as a podiatrist with the Health Practitioners Council (HPC), but uses skills that are part of 
a  surgeon’s  scope-of-practice that is regulated by the General Medical Council (GMC) 
and the  Royal  College  of  Surgery.  Under  ‘distributed  regulation’,  the  HPC  would 
continue to regulate the podiatrist and would consult with the GMC or Royal College of 
Surgery about the surgical standards involved.  
The advantages of distributed regulation include: 
 Enabling comparable conduct standards to be developed across registration 
authorities.  
 Preventing cases of double jeopardy, where different health professionals, doing 
the same work, would be held to different standards by different health profession 
regulators. 
 Improving coordination among registration authorities.  
 Retaining single registration, avoiding the cost of registration with two different 
registration authorities. 
The disadvantages of distributed regulation include: 
 Confusion about which registration authority to appeal to when raising a concern 
about the practice of a health professional.  
 Undermining of public confidence if two health professionals, in similar roles and 
registered by two different registration authorities, are subject to different fitness-
to-practise standards.  
 Individual registration authorities being unable to understand the competencies of 
a role that is traditionally overseen by another registration authority.  
 Adding a layer of complexity to the regulation of health professionals (CHRE, 
2010a) 
After consulting registration authorities, CHRE concluded that the broad areas of risk to 
patients can be managed by the existing arrangements, because registration authorities are 
already equipped to regulate advanced practitioner roles for their own health professions 
(CHRE, 2010c). 
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Management of nurse competency in the Netherlands 
Following the 1997 changes to regulations in the Netherlands, de Bie and colleagues 
(2004) investigated how health practitioners determined competency in the process of 
inter-professional delegation of intra-muscular injections and bladder catheterisations 
between medical practitioners and nurses. Most gynaecologists reported that they 
expected nurses to perform restricted procedures just as well as gynaecologists could, 
while 50% of the trainee doctors thought nurses performed these procedures better than 
trainee medical practitioners.  
There were differing opinions about how to determine competency. Some medical 
practitioners thought that each health practitioner was responsible for his or her own 
competency. Around 50% of the gynaecologists and 42% of nurses said that the change to 
regulations made no difference to their practice. Yet, when asked about competency, 70% 
of the medical practitioners indicated that they were unclear about how to determine the 
competency of a nurse, with some assuming the health service ensured that nurses were 
competent,  and  others  assuming  that  nurses’  training  would  make  them  competent.  Some 
medical practitioners said that they seldom gave instructions when delegating these 
restricted procedures. For nurses, 33% indicated they were unclear about how to 
determine their own competence. Among those nurses who performed the reserved 
procedures, most said that they determined their own competence for each procedure. 
Half said their competency derived from nursing training, and half said they had a 
certificate of proficiency from the health service organisation. 
The majority of nurses said they performed reserved procedures on the orders of a 
medical practitioner. However, a substantial number also said they performed these 
procedures on their own initiative without orders from a medical practitioner, although 
this is illegal in the Netherlands. These nurses were more likely to be males, in full-time 
employment, or older than 45 years. It was apparent that some nurses assumed they had 
delegated authority for these practices due to working under clinical policy guidelines or 
protocols.  
Most of the health professionals surveyed thought the new regulations were an 
improvement on the previous regulations, particularly for nurses. However, the 
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researchers concluded that more education was required, and that confusion around the 
determination of proficiency could be cleared up if hospital management were to play a 
greater role in the process of determining competency (de Bie et al., 2004). 
Management of medical competency in the Uni ted Kingdom  
From  2001  the  UK’s  National  Competency  Assessment  Service  (NCAS)  provided  expert 
support to the National Health Service (NHS) in the management of the conduct or 
competency of medical practitioners. While the NCAS service has been used at least once 
by all NHS organisations, most annual inquiries relate to just 2% of UK medical 
practitioners. NCAS considers a sample of 1,475 cases occurring between December 
2007 and March 2008 to be representative of their first eight years of operation (NCAS, 
2009). This sample reveals the following sources of competency issues concerning 
medical practitioners in the NHS organisations:  
 Criminal or conduct issues for 33% of cases, mostly related to theft, fraud or 
financial matters, and some cases of sexual or aggressive misconduct.  
 Poor behaviour in 40% of cases, mainly involving poor communications with 
colleagues, within teams, with managers, or with patients. 
 Matters of individual clinical competency present in 54% of cases, and relate to a 
critical incident, diagnostic, record keeping, consultation, or prescribing skills.  
 Personal health concerns in 24% of cases that contribute to mood changes, 
anxiety, depression, stress, and alcohol abuse. 
 Governance and safety concerns in 36% of cases, related to risk management and 
quality assurance. 
 Issues that relate to the workplace environment in 11% of cases, mostly related to 
inadequate support for teamwork, or to workload (NCAS, 2009). 
Government-led changes to heal th pract i t ioner roles in the Uni ted Kingdom 
From  2000,  the  UK’s Changing Workforce Programme  (CWP) developed new  roles  at  13 
pilot sites within English NHS organisations. A national programme office provided 
support and liaised with stakeholders including registration authorities. New roles were 
developed collaboratively with each health service with information about the roles 
contributing to a national repository to assist implementation elsewhere. By the end of 
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2003, 40 new roles had been implemented and were to be supported with 12 months of 
funding, while 51 were still in development. Many new roles involved additional tasks for 
nurses (31%), or for unregistered support workers 29%), and there were some extended 
roles for therapists, pharmacists, scientists, administrators, or medical practitioners. 
Researchers had difficulty classifying the new roles, as roles that were new to one area of 
healthcare could already exist in another area, and different job titles did not necessarily 
denote  different  job  content.  For  instance,  an  ‘Asian  support  worker’  for  stroke  patients 
was  similar  to  other  ‘support  worker’  roles.  New  roles  were  developed  and  trialled 
locally,  but  there  was  resistance  to  implementing  roles  seen  as  being  ‘imposed’  through 
the national CWP repository (Hyde, McBride, Young, & Walshe, 2005).  
There  were  three  types  of  ‘employee  relations’  problems  with  roles  that  crossed 
professional boundaries. First, increased or unequal remuneration could be a disincentive, 
with significant wage increases when home support staff performed some healthcare 
tasks, or the pay disparities between the nurses and the ambulance officers entering the 
new emergency care roles. Second, there were supervisory and accountability difficulties, 
such  as  who  would  be  accountable  when  a doctor  delegates  the work of  taking  a  patient’s 
consent to a nurse. This illustration was solved when the health service agreed to be 
accountable for any adverse events that occurred in cases where a nurse obtained the 
patient’s  consent.  Third,  some  health  professionals  resisted  the  transfer  of  work  to 
unregistered health practitioners. For instance, when radiographers demanded that 
assistants complete two years training at a tertiary institution before being permitted to 
perform some plain X-rays. In contrast, pharmacists designed roles for pharmacy 
technicians as part of extending their medication audit service for mental health patients 
(Hyde et al., 2005). 
Training ranged from on-the-job training through supervision by a health professional to 
training packages provided by tertiary educators. Some organisations were able to 
establish in-house training and some participants suggested that this was related to having 
personnel with experience in hospital-based training of health professionals. Training 
progressed better where health professionals were prepared to hand over work to other 
personnel. Managers were concerned that educators were too inclined to make courses 
into diplomas, or to include skills that contributed little to particular roles, and therefore 
they preferred to conduct the training for new roles in-house. The authors noted that 
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qualifications based training was more portable for the health practitioners, and 
concluded that CWP had developed local capacity for role redesign that was previously 
unthinkable (Hyde et al., 2005). 
New roles in the UK’s Changing Workforce Programme 
Table  4: New health practitione r roles deve loped through the  C WP 
S ERVIC E AREA  NUMB ER O F 
NEW RO LES 
ILLUS T RA T I O NS 
Advanced health practitioners  8 Consultant podiatrist, education health worker 
Anaesthesia, critical care, pain 
management  
8 Recovery support worker, extended role for image 
intensifier operator  
Care for older persons 9 Nurse consultant, extension for home help role 
Diabetes care 15 Diabetes care technician, extended role for senior diabetes 
nurse 
Access and diagnostic services  7 New role for booking clerk, extended role for district care 
manager 
Emergency care 10 New role for emergency care worker, extended role for 
emergency physiotherapists  
Generalist and specialist care 9 New role for care coordinator, extended role for nurse 
practitioner in A&E 
Mental health 20 New roles for support, time and recovery workers, 
occupational facilitator, extended role for pharmacy 
technicians 
Primary care 13 New role for expert patient, extended role for healthcare 
worker 
Scientists 14 Extended roles for laboratory assistants and pharmacy 
assistants 
Senior house officers (medical 
practitioners) 
22 New role for consultant pharmacist, extended roles for 
nurses and technicians 
Stroke care 13 New role for consultant pharmacist, extended roles for 
nurses and technicians* 
Wider healthcare team 5 New roles for housekeeper and support team worker. 
* These roles are designed to free up the time of doctors, to meet European working time 
regulations. 
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